Why does nature prefer some shapes and not others? The variety of sizes, shapes, and irregularities in nature is endless. Skillfully integrating striking full-color illustrations, the authors describe the efforts by scientists and mathematicians since the Renaissance to identify and describe the principles underlying the shape of natural forms. But can one set of laws account for both the symmetry and irregularity as well as the infinite variety of nature's designs? A complete answer to this question is likely never to be discovered. Yet, it is fascinating to see how the search for some simple universal laws down through the ages has increased our understanding of nature. The Parsimonious Universe looks at examples from the world around us at a non-mathematical, non-technical level to show that nature achieves efficiency by being stingy with the energy it expends.

This book presents first-year calculus roughly in the order in which it was first discovered. The first two chapters show how the ancient calculations of practical problems led to infinite series, differential and integral calculus and to differential equations. The establishment of mathematical rigour for these subjects in the 19th century for one and several variables is treated in chapters III and IV. Many quotations are included to give the flavor of the history. The text is complemented by a large number of examples, calculations and mathematical pictures and will provide stimulating and enjoyable reading for students, teachers, as well as researchers.

* Embraces a broad range of topics in analysis requiring only a sound knowledge of calculus and the functions of one variable. * Filled with beautiful illustrations, examples, exercises at the end of each chapter, and a comprehensive index.

An analysis of Newton's mathematical work, from early discoveries to mature reflections, and a discussion of Newton's views on the role and nature of mathematics. Historians of mathematics have devoted considerable attention to Isaac Newton's work on algebra, series, fluxions, quadratures, and geometry. In Isaac Newton on Mathematical Certainty and Method, Niccolò Guicciardini examines a critical aspect of Newton's work that has not been tightly connected to Newton's actual practice: his philosophy of mathematics. Newton aimed to inject certainty into natural philosophy by deploying mathematical reasoning (titling his main work The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy most probably to highlight a stark contrast to Descartes's Principles of Philosophy). To that end he paid concerted attention to method, particularly in relation to the issue of certainty, participating in contemporary debates on the subject and elaborating his own answers. Guicciardini shows how Newton carefully positioned himself against two giants in the “common” and “new” analysis, Descartes and Leibniz. Although his work was in many ways disconnected from the traditions of Greek geometry, Newton portrayed himself as antiquity's legitimate heir, thereby distancing himself from the moderns. Guicciardini reconstructs Newton's own method by extracting it from his concrete practice and not solely by examining his broader statements about such matters. He examines the full range of Newton's works, from his early treatises on series and fluxions to the late writings, which were produced in direct opposition to Leibniz. The complex interactions between Newton's understanding of method and his mathematical work then reveal themselves through Guicciardini's careful analysis of selected examples. Isaac Newton on Mathematical Certainty and Method uncovers what mathematics was for Newton, and what being a mathematician meant to him.

It could certainly be argued that the way in which Hegel criticizes Newton in the Dissertation, the Philosophy of Nature and the lectures on the History of Philosophy, has done more than anything else to prejudice his own reputation. At first sight, what we seem to have here is little more than the contrast between the tested accomplishments of the founding father of modern science, and the random remarks of a confused and somewhat disgruntled philosopher; and if we are persuaded to concede that it may perhaps be something more than this - between the work of a clearsighted mathematician and experimentalist, and the blind assertions of some sort of Kantian logician, blundering about among the facts of the real world. By and large, it was this clear-cut simplistic view of the matter which prevailed among Hegel's contemporaries, and which persisted until fairly recently. The modification and eventual transformation of it have come about gradually, over the past twenty or twenty-five years. The first full-scale commentary on the Philosophy of Nature was published in 1970, and gave rise to the realization that to some extent at least, the Hegelian criticism was directed against Newtonianism rather than the work of Newton himself, and that it tended to draw its inspiration from developments within the natural sciences, rather than from the exigencies imposed upon Hegel's thinking by a priori categorial relationships.