This Note records work accomplished during Phase 1 of the project Analysis of Special Operations Forces Decision Aids. The objective of this project is to recommend ways in which the capabilities and contributions of special operations forces (SOF) can be better represented in decision aids that support the defense planning, programming, and budgeting process. Phase 1 includes two tasks. Task 1 required RAND to discern the issues central to SOF analysis. The results of Task 1 were briefed to U.S. Special Operations Command staff in October 1991. They are presented here in a condensed form.

This report examines U.S. decisions related to the development or use of special operations forces. It should assist in future planning and execution by the Army Special Operations Forces, the U.S. Army, and the joint special operations community.

The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was concerned that decision aids, especially computer-driven models, used to support resource allocation did not adequately represent the contributions of special operations forces (SOF). On the basis of a survey of existing models, RAND concluded that the SOF contribution is not adequately represented. Moreover, many important SOF tasks cannot be captured by models because they are either dominated by uncertainty or are poorly understood. In addition, the doctrinal missions for SOF are just broad areas of employment that do not offer a useful framework for analyzing special operations. These missions should, instead, be analyzed using a hierarchy of objectives descending from national goals to operational tasks and their associated employment concepts. This framework should be applied in four contexts: national-level tasking, large-force operations, guerrilla warfare, and other use, capturing the collateral employment of SOF. Each context differs with respect to typical objectives, command and control arrangements, and characteristic missions. For example, a national-level tasking is set by the national command authority, is controlled at a very high level, and often involves counterterrorism, although SOF might perform any other mission in this context. The study concludes with broad recommendations for a cautious approach to modeling and a briefly stated rationale for maintaining an elite SOF that generates little sustained combat power. This rationale includes leverage, unique capabilities, audacity, flexibility, low visibility, and guerrilla warfare, in which SOF excel.

A selective review of modern decision science and implications for decision-support systems. The study suggests ways to synthesize lessons from research on heuristics and biases with those from "naturalistic research." It also discusses modern tools, such as increasingly realistic simulations, multiresolution modeling, and exploratory analysis, which can assist decisionmakers in choosing strategies that are flexible, adaptive, and robust.

This publication outlines the planning process as it relates to a Special Forces (SF) operational detachment-alpha (ODA) conducting deliberate planning for special operations. Planning is an essential task common to all aspects of SF operations. More content available at: doguedebordeauxsurvival.com

On 24 January 2013, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DCAR) that excluded women from assignment to units and positions whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. In doing so, the SecDef directed the opening of all occupational specialties, positions and units to women; the validation of gender-neutral standards for those positions; and establishment of milestones for implementation. In a March 2013 memorandum, Commander USSOCOM directed several initiatives as a result of the SecDef's DCAR rescission. While other studies examined individual performance and standards, the JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research examined the effects on team dynamics. The challenge for this study was to determine if changing the gender component of Special Operations Forces elite teams from single-gender (masculine) to mixed-gender would affect team dynamics in a way that would compromise the ability of the team to meet a mission objective.

Includes publications previously listed in the supplements to the Index of selected publications of the Rand Corporation (Oct. 1962-Feb. 1963)

Volume 8 of the Army University Large Scale Combat Operations series. The Competitive Advantage: Special Operations Forces in Large Scale Combat Operations presents twelve historical case studies of special operations forces from World War I through Operation Iraqi Freedom. This volume sheds light upon the emerging roles, missions, and unique capabilities that have forged a path for Army Special Operations Forces today. These case studies set Large Scale Combat Operations in the center and place ARSOF's role in the forefront. If a reader were to take one piece from this volume, it would be the clear understanding of the close synergy that occurs between the Conventional Force and SOF in Large Scale Combat Operations for major wars in the 20th and early 21st century. That synergy should provide a broad azimuth for military planners and practitioners to follow as the Army, SOF, and the Joint Force combine to preserve the peace, defend the Nation, and defeat any adversary.

RAND's National Defense Research Institute was asked to assess minority representation and recruiting in special operations forces. Our study is a quantitative and qualitative research effort to evaluate the level of minority representation in special operations forces and the reasons for current representation and to suggest policy changes that might, if necessary, increase minority representation in these forces. The study may be of interest to other agencies or organizations concerned with issues of minority representation, both within and outside the Department of Defense.