Institutions of Law offers an original account of the nature of law and legal systems in the contemporary world. It provides the definitive statement of Sir Neil MacCormick's well-known 'institutional theory of law', defining law as 'institutional normative order' and explaining each of these three terms in depth. It attempts to fulfil the need for a twenty-first century introduction to legal theory marking a fresh start such as was achieved in the last century by H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law. It is written with a view to elucidating law, legal concepts and legal institutions in a manner that takes account of current scholarly controversies but does not get bogged down in them. It shows how law relates to the state and civil society, establishing the conditions of social peace and a functioning economy. In so doing, it takes account of recent developments in the sociology of law, particularly 'system theory'. It also seeks to clarify the nature of claims to 'knowledge of law' and thus indicate the possibility of legal studies having a genuinely 'scientific' character. It shows that there is an essential value-orientation of all work of this kind, so that valid analytical jurisprudence not merely need not, but cannot, be 'positivist' as that term has come to be understood. Nevertheless it is explained why law and morality are genuinely distinct by virtue of the positive character of law contrasted with the autonomy that is foundational for morality.

In this book, Adrian Vermeule shows that any approach to legal interpretation rests on institutional and empirical premises about the capacities of judges and the systemic effects of their rulings. He argues that legal interpretation is above all an exercise in decisionmaking under severe empirical uncertainty.

The book investigates the role of law and legal experts in the organisational dynamics of a population, demonstrating that law is a stable practice among those who (in virtue of the special knowledge they master) are called upon to select the ‘normative facts’ of a population, i.e. the interactional standards that are proclaimed as binding for the entire population by the publicly recognised legal experts (whose peremptory judgments can be only revised by peers). It proposes an integration of the recent research outcomes achieved in three different areas of study: legal positivism, legal institutionalism and legal pluralism and examines the notions of rule, coercion, institution, practice elaborated by significant theorists in the mentioned areas and illumine both their merits and flaws. Furthermore it advances a notion of law and a description of the legal field which are able to account for the nature of the legal filed as the cradle of the social order. new back cover copy: In an era characterized by a streaking global pluralism, the collapse of many state agencies, the emergence of multiple sources of law, and the rise of informal justice, the idea of a unitary and homogenous legal system seems old-fashioned. But philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists still hold many debates on the nature of law and its function, which is that law represents an institution that characterizes any orderly social context of human beings, and this book plunges into the center of those debates. Self-sufficiency of Law: A Critical-institutional Theory of Social Order investigates the role of law and legal experts in the organizational dynamics of a population. It demonstrates that law is a stable practice among those who are called upon to select the “normative facts” of a population, that is, the interactional standards that are proclaimed as binding for the entire population by the publicly recognized legal experts. To do this, the author proposes an integration of the recent research outcomes achieved in three different areas of study—legal positivism, legal institutionalism and legal pluralism. He examines the notions of rule, coercion, institution and practice elaborated on by significant theorists in these fields, highlighting both the merits and flaws and ultimately advancing a notion of law and a description of the legal field which are able to account for the nature of the legal field as the cradle of social order. This text covers key guidelines for empirical research and political activities in Western and non-Western countries.

MacCormick's `Institutions of Law' is the culmination of a lifetime's work in legal theory by one of the world's most respected legal theorists. Featuring an impressive collection of contributions from well-known legal theorists from around the world, all of whom are familiar with MacCormick’s work, this collection provides a cutting edge account of the book’s significance.

The Institutional Theory of the Firm examines recent and previous organization theory literature to advocate what Evans (1995) refers to as the "embedded autonomy" of the firm, as well as its role in being simultaneously anchored in, for example, corporate legislation and regulatory practices on the national, regional (i.e., within the European Union) and transnational levels, while at the same time being granted the right to operate with significant degrees of freedom within this legal-regulatory model. Seen in this view, the embedded autonomy of the corporation represents a theoretical view of the corporation that complements the market-based image of the corporation in economic theory. When advocating the institutional theory model, three forms of embedded autonomy are examined. First, the corporation is enacted as a legal entity sui juris—as a freestanding "legal person" in corporate law and within the regulatory framework that serves to enforce legislation in everyday life settings. Second, the corporation is embedded within what social theorists refer to as moral economies, the norms and values that regulate what are the socially acceptable and legitimate means for conducting business. Third and finally, the corporation is embedded in governance, a relatively complex economic concept that denotes legal and regulatory control on the societal and economic system levels, and on the level of the individual corporation. By combining the three forms of embeddedness, sanctioned by law, norms, and governance, the embedded autonomy of the firm is secured on the basis of a variety of social practices and resources. This book brings together a diverse literature including management studies, economic sociology, legal theory, finance theory, and mainstream economic theory to advance the argument that the corporation is best understood as what is embedded in a social and economic context, yet best serving its defined and stipulated ends by assuming considerable degrees of freedom to operate in isolation from various stakeholders. It will be of relevance for a variety of readers, including graduate students, management scholars, policy-makers, and management consultants interested in organization theory and management studies.

The Legal Theory of Carl Schmitt provides a detailed analysis of Schmitt’s institutional theory of law, mainly developed in the books published between the end of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. By reading Schmitt’s overall work through the lens of his institutional turn, the authors offer a strikingly different interpretation of Schmitt’s theory of politics, law and the relation between these two domains. The book argues that Schmitt’s adhesion to legal institutionalism was a key theoretical achievement, based on serious reconsideration of the main flaws of his own decisionist paradigm, in the light of the French and Italian institutional theories of law. In so doing, the authors elucidate how Schmitt was able to unravel many of the impasses that affected his previous conceptual framework. The authors also make comparisons between Schmitt and other leading legal theorists (H. Kelsen, M. Hauriou, S. Romano and C. Mortati) and explain why the current legal debate should take into serious account his legacy.

This book – which is the result of several years of research, discussion, writing and re-writing – consists of three parts and eight chapters. The rst part is given by the two rst chapters introducing the issue of validity and facticity in law. The second part (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) is the core of this study and tries to present a theory based on a speci c view about language and social practice. The third part deal with the issue of value judgments and views about morality and consists of Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 8 should nally serve as epilogue. In the rst chapter a discussion is started about the relationship between law and power, seen as a presupposition for an assessment of the nature of law. As a matter of fact, as has been remarked, “general theories of law struggle to do justice to the 1 multiple dualities of the law”. Indeed, law has a “dual nature”: it is a fact, but it also a norm, a sort of ideal entity. Law is sanction, but it is also discourse. It is effectivity, or facticity, but it is also a vehicle of principles among which the central one is justice. But this duality is not only a phenomenological, or a matter of justi cation and implementation as two separate moments.