We provide evidence that US workers face a wage-effort offer curve with the high-wage high-effort jobs occurring in the capital intensive sectors. We find that real wage offers rose at every level of effort during the 1960's, a shift which is consistent with a decline in the rental cost of capital. During the 1970's, when relative prices of labor-intensive goods declined, the wage-effort offer curve twisted, offering lower pay for the low-paid jobs in the labor-intensive sectors but higher pay for the high-paid jobs in the capital-intensive sectors. In the 1980's, workers at every wage level began to work more hours for the same weekly wage. This we loosely attribute either to the increasing cost of non-wage benefits, especially health care, or to the introduction of new equipment. In studying the wage-effort offer curve rate of unionization, education, and rent sharing.

Although the issue of migration has received substantial attention in public debate in most countries of the West, only moderately satisfactory attention has been given in the economic literature. This book analyses the case of Germany from an economic point of view. It examines questions such as: Are there substantial negative side-effects of migration, faced by native workers, as sometimes publicly claimed? Do highly skilled and unskilled natives experience different effects? Do certain foreigner national groups affect natives differently? How important is the level of education of these incoming foreigners in determining wage impacts on natives? Do native workers in some industries profit from migration, while others suffer? How is the industrial wage structure affected by migration, if at all?

We decompose the real annual full time compensation costs of 1.1 million French workers followed over 12 years into a part that reflects their external opportunity wage and a part that reflects their internal wage rate. Using these components of compensation we investigate the extent to which firm-size wage differentials and inter-industry wage differentials are due to variability in the external wage (person effects) versus variability in the internal wage (firm effects). For France, we find that most of the firm-size wage effect and most of the inter-industry wage effect is due to person effects differences in the external wage rates.

This study investigates the effects of inward foreign direct investment on local workers' wages by focusing on U.S. manufacturing industries for the period from 1987 to 1992. I use two different approaches to control individual characteristics and to implement estimation in this study: (1) One-step estimation with industry - state level of inward foreign direct investments, and (2) Two-step industry characteristic regression approach. I find that the higher presence of foreign firms is associated with higher local wages after workers' observable characteristics are controlled for in cross-section analysis. However, I did not find a positive association between inward FDI activities and industry wage premiums within industry in a panel data analysis. In this analysis, inward FDI activities appeared to be negatively associated with worker's industry wage premium for workers with more than high a school education.

Excerpt from A Theory of Inter-Industry Wage Differentials The purpose of this paper is to present a mode which broadly fits some of the salient features of inter-industry wage differentials. Several recent empirical papers have found wage differences across industries to be large and persistent. They also show high concordance across occupations and countries. High wages appear to be paid in industries that have high capital/labor ratios and are highly profitable. Our model explains these facts on the basis of firm-specific human capital accumulation by individual workers. We focus on the bargaining between experienced workers and the firm over the division of the surplus output an experienced worker produces over that produced by inexperienced workers. We show that this surplus, and therefore equilibrium wages of trained workers, depends on the capital/labor ratio when the technology has putty-clay features. We also show that when there is multilateral bargaining between all firms and experienced workers, wages also depend on the profitability of the firm. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.