“What does it take to make a great general or a great leader in any field? . . . An excellent contribution to the study of leadership among those who make life-and-death decisions in the most challenging situations—one that could well serve as required reading in both military and business schools.”—Kirkus Reviews Throughout his life, Edgar F. “Beau” Puryear has studied America’s top military leaders. In his research for this book, he has sought to discover what allowed them to rise above their contemporaries; what prepared them for the terrible responsibilities they bore as the commanders of our armed forces during World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf, and on to today; how they are different from you and me. Ultimately, first and foremost, Dr. Puryear discovered that character is the single most important and the most distinctive element shared by these individuals: that character is everything! “Beau Puryear again reaches into his gold mine of research and comes forward with the essence of great generalship. . . . Well-done and a worthy read.”—General Colin L. Powell “We can always learn more about the importance of character to successful leadership. With this book, we do just that.”—General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

A New York Times bestseller! An epic history of the decline of American military leadership—from the bestselling author of Fiasco and Churchill and Orwell. While history has been kind to the American generals of World War II—Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley—it has been less kind to the generals of the wars that followed, such as Koster, Franks, Sanchez, and Petraeus. In The Generals, Thomas E. Ricks sets out to explain why that is. In chronicling the widening gulf between performance and accountability among the top brass of the U.S. military, Ricks tells the stories of great leaders and suspect ones, generals who rose to the occasion and generals who failed themselves and their soldiers. In Ricks’s hands, this story resounds with larger meaning: about the transmission of values, about strategic thinking, and about the difference between an organization that learns and one that fails.

In the first full biography of Lieutenant General John McAllister Schofield (1831-1906), Donald B. Connelly examines the career of one of the leading commanders in the western theater during the Civil War. In doing so, Connelly illuminates the role of politics in the formulation of military policy, during both war and peace, in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Connelly relates how Schofield, as a department commander during the war, had to cope with contending political factions that sought to shape military and civil policies. Following the war, Schofield occupied every senior position in the army--including secretary of war and commanding general of the army--and became a leading champion of army reform and professionalism. He was the first senior officer to recognize that professionalism would come not from the separation of politics and the military but from the army's accommodation of politics and the often contentious American constitutional system. Seen through the lens of Schofield's extensive military career, the history of American civil-military relations has seldom involved conflict between the military and civil authority, Connelly argues. The central question has never been whether to have civilian control but rather which civilians have a say in the formulation and execution of policy.

After World War I, J F C Fuller stated that the three pillars of generalship (meaning good generalship of course) are "courage, creative intelligence, and physical fitness: and the attributes of youth rather than middle age." The study of character traits and leadership principles dominated our thought and leadership teaching methodology during and after World War II, with role playing and case studies used extensively. Current leadership doctrine for the entire Army is prescribed in Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership, a publication that relies heavily on historical examples for its message. Since "the foundations of Army leadership are firmly grounded in history," senior leaders must have a core of historical knowledge to give them the perspective necessary to solve the leadership and command challenges of today.

His campaigns, military thought, and insurgent strategy There are many biographies of the Prophet, and they tend to fall into three categories: pious works that emphasize the virtues of the early Islamic community, general works for non-Muslim or non-specialist readers, and source-critical works that grapple with historiographical problems inherent in early Islamic history. In The Generalship of Muhammad, Russ Rodgers charts a new path by merging original sources with the latest in military theory to examine Muhammad's military strengths and weaknesses. Incorporating military, political, and economic analyses, Rodgers focuses on Muhammad’s use of insurgency warfare in seventh-century Arabia to gain control of key cities such as Medina. Seeking to understand the operational aspects of these world-changing battles, he provides battlefield maps and explores the supply and logistic problems that would have plagued any military leader at the time. Rodgers explains how Muhammad organized his forces and gradually built his movement against sporadic resistance from his foes. He draws from the hadith literature to shed new light on the nature of the campaigns. He examines the Prophet's intelligence network and the employment of what would today be called special operations forces. And he considers the possibility that Muhammad received outside support to build and maintain his movement as a means to interdict trade routes between the Byzantine Empire and the Sasanid Persians.

General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, faced the daunting task not only of overseeing two theaters of a global conflict but also of selecting the best generals to carry out American grand strategy. Marshall and His Generals is the first and only book to focus entirely on that selection process and the performances, both stellar and disappointing, that followed from it. Stephen Taaffe chronicles and critiques the background, character, achievements, and failures of the more than three dozen general officers chosen for top combat group commands—from commanders like Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur to some nearly forgotten. Taaffe explores how and why Marshall selected the Army’s commanders. Among his chief criteria were character (including “unselfish and devoted purpose”), education, (whether at West Point, Fort Leavenworth, or the Army War College), and striking a balance between experience and relative youth in a war that required both wisdom and great physical stamina. As the war unfolded, Marshall also factored into his calculations the combat leadership his generals demonstrated and the opinions of his theater commanders. Taaffe brings into sharp focus the likes of Eisenhower, MacArthur, George Patton, Omar Bradley, Walter Krueger, Robert Eichelberger, Courtney Hodges, Lucian Truscott, J. Lawton Collins, Alexander “Sandy” Patch, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgeway, Mark Clark, and twenty-five other generals who served in the conflict. He describes their leadership and decision-making processes and provides miniature biographies and personality sketches of these men drawn from their personal papers, official records, and reflections of fellow officers. Delving deeper than other studies, this path-breaking work produces a seamless analysis of Marshall’s selection process of operational-level commanders. Taaffe also critiques the performance of these generals during the war and reveals the extent to which their actions served as stepping stones to advancement. Ambitious in scope and filled with sharp insights, Marshall and His Generals is essential reading for anyone interested in World War II and military leadership more generally.

History has thrilling accounts of brilliant Generals leading small armies to defeat huge forces of their opponents. Better the Generalship, greater the victories. The Indian Army too has produced many great Generals, who have defeated evil designs of adversaries. Yet they have produced none like Rommel, Manstein, Model, or even like some old Indian warriors like Maharana Pratap, Hari Singh Nalwa, or Zorawar Singh. India can and must produce Generals of that calibre; Generals who don’t just defend territory or restore status quo, but those who annihilate aggressors, to teach memorable lessons to adversaries who transgress, who initiate punitive actions for conventional and nuclear deterrence to be effective. To produce Generals of such calibre, the first step is to understand what is good a Generalship. Then study Generalship in previous conflicts to appreciate achievements and also learn lessons from opportunities missed. Only then the Armed Forces can institute measures to improve the quality of Generalship for the future. This book is written to facilitate such study, in that order.