America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

In 1974 the Greek colonels ousted the Greek-Cypriot leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and Turkey retaliated by invading and seizing a third of the island. Cyprus remains split in two, like Berlin before the wall came down, bristling with troops and spying bases, and permanently policed by the United Nations. Henry Kissinger claimed he could do nothing to stop the coup because of the Watergate crisis, but this book presents evidence to support the view that it was no failure of American foreign policy, but the realization of a long-term plot. The authors describe the strategic reasons for Washington's need to divide the island. Their account encompasses an international cast of characters that includes Eden, Eisenhower, Nixon, Kissinger, Wilson, Callaghan, Grivas, and the leaders of the two halves of the divided island, Clerides and Denktas.

"The book describes how the Greek fixation with Enosis--union with Greece--led to a one-sided war against the Turks and the brutal massacres of their men, women and children."--Provided by publisher.

Can Henry Kissinger be described as a serious statesman who altered the course of relations between states? Or was he a shallow impersonator of those whom he admired, and a geopolitical engineer who treated people as collateral fodder, reducing morality to the status of a strategic and tactical tool? Using the story of Kissinger’s behaviour over Cyprus, backed up by recently revealed government documents, many critical, William Mallinson, former diplomat and leading authority on Cyprus’ history, provides an incisive analysis and evaluation of Kissinger’s approach, revealing a man who appears to have considered political strategy more important than law and ethics.

"This monograph will prove to be one of the more valuable works ever written on the efficacy of modern era amphibious warfare. While many students of military affairs have assumed that large-scale forcible entry amphibious operations are a thing of the past, the authors have done an outstanding job, in just eight concise and well-written chapters, to demonstrate how amphibious warfare, in combination with other joint operations, can prove decisive on modern-day battlefields. Covering a little-known combat operation that incredibly involved two neighboring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies--Greece and Turkey--the 1974 battle known in Turkey as Operation Star Drop-4 and erroneously in the West as Operation Attila, took place on the perpetually restive island nation of Cyprus. Moreover, the authors have finally brought to light what is "arguably only one of two such [amphibious] operations" fought since 1945 that involved a substantially opposed landing. The operation also included the heavy use of airborne, airmobile, naval surface, and other follow-on armored forces that proved decisive toward relative Turkish success on Cyprus in 1974"--

The British faced two serious problems the first, the Greek Cypriots desire for Enosis and second, the intense rivalry and antipathy between the Greek and Turkish communities.In 1955 the former resulted in a bitter EOKA terrorist campaign led by Colonel George Grivas. This resulted in the deaths of over 100 British servicemen. Nicosias Murder Mile was the scene of many shootings. The Governor Field Marshal Harding narrowly escaped assassination in his residence. The next phase was the Turkish Governments military intervention in 1974 to prevent what they saw as the Greek takeover. In a bloody invasion which saw widespread ethnic cleansing and displacement of communities, the Island was divided into two sectors policed by the United Nations. This exists today, as do the British Sovereign Base areas at Dhekalia and Atrokiri/Episkopi.This book describes the most troubled years of this beautiful island which is so well known to British servicemen, their families and vacationers.

America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

This book provides the first bilateral study of Greek–US relations during Greece’s transition to democracy in the second half of the 1970s. Following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, which led to the collapse of the Greek dictatorship and Athens’ partial withdrawal from NATO, many scholars have claimed that Greece moved away from the United States. This book explicitly rejects this view. It argues that Greek political leaders continued to view close relations with the United States as an integral part of Greek national security despite the disappointment felt during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. At the same time, the Greek leadership could not overlook the anti-American movement, and had to respond to and manage it. In the United States, relations with Greece became part of the clash between the executive and legislative branches of government. Both President Gerard R. Ford and President Jimmy Carter proclaimed their commitment to restoring relations with Athens. This book highlights the continuity between the Republican and Democratic administrations of the 1970s in foreign policy objectives. Drawing on Greek, US and British archival records, it charts the evolving connections between Greece and the United States through the Greek–Turkish disputes, the impact of anti-Americanism and the Greek–NATO relationship offering original insight into this Cold War special relationship.

Borowiec portrays Cyprus as a permanent source of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and a potential trigger for future conflict between Greece and Turkey. He describes the depth of animosity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and analyzes the obstacles in the path of a search for a solution. Most casual observers see the conflict between Greeks and Turks on a strategic Mediterranean island as a struggle within a sovereign state. Borowiec concludes that there has never been a Cypriot nation, only Greeks and Turks living in Cyprus, separated by the hostility reflecting the traditional animosity between their motherlands. If these two groups could forget their past conflicts—as did, for example, Germany and Poland—there might be a way to end the partition of Cyprus. At the present time, however, the crisis is likely to continue with varying degrees of tension, threatening the entire Eastern Mediterranean and undermining NATO's cohesion. Borowiec traces the history of Cyprus from antiquity through Ottoman and British colonial rule and the post-independence period. He describes the break between the island's communities in 1963, the UN intervention of 1964, and the path toward the Athens junta's coup in 1974 which caused the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. He compares the conflicting views of the protagonists—the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority. Considerable attention is paid to the two separate economic and political entities on the island. Borowiec analyzes the futility of myriad international mediation efforts and suggests possible ways of creating a climate propitious to dialogue. This important new look at the Cypriot conflict will be valuable to researchers, policy makers, and scholars involved with the Eastern Mediterranean and conflict/peace studies.

For nearly 60 years, the tiny Mediterranean nation of Cyprus has taken a disproportionate share of the international spotlight. In The Cyprus Problem, James Ker-Lindsay--recently appointed as expert advisor to the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Cyprus--offers an incisive, even-handed account of the conflict. Ker-Lindsay covers all aspects of the Cyprus problem, placing it in historical context, addressing the situation as it now stands, and looking toward its possible resolution.