This book examines the academic life of Alvin Hansen and his contribution to modern economics. Through tracing the development of his early work and pre-Keynesian ideas, the influence of Keynes and the 1937-8 recession on the direction of his work is explored, particularly in relation to his theoretical backing of the New Deal and subsequent American policy. The subsequent chapters focus on his later work on secular stagnation, savings and investment, American Keynesianism, managing the post-war mixed economy and the often overlooked contributions to global questions and wider aspects of political economy and public policy. This book aims to highlight the intellectual influence and academic value of Alvin Hansen’s work. It will be relevant to students and researchers interested in economic policy, political economy, and the history of economic thought.

Edited and with an introduction by Benjamin M. Friedman The connection between price inflation and real economic activity has been a focus of macroeconomic research--and debate--for much of the past century. Although this connection is crucial to our understanding of what monetary policy can and cannot accomplish, opinions about its basic properties have swung widely over the years. Today, virtually everyone studying monetary policy acknowledges that, contrary to what many modern macroeconomic models suggest, central bank actions often affect both inflation and measures of real economic activity, such as output, unemployment, and incomes. But the nature and magnitude of these effects are not yet understood. In this volume, Robert M. Solow and John B. Taylor present their views on the dilemmas facing U.S. monetary policymakers. The discussants are Benjamin M. Friedman, James K. Galbraith, N. Gregory Mankiw, and William Poole. The aim of this lively exchange of views is to make both an intellectual contribution to macroeconmics and a practical contribution to the solution of a public policy question of central importance.

IN TRADITIONAL economics the theory of money and the theory of output have been treated separately with little or no tendency toward integration. First Wicksell and then Keynes gave impetus to the movement to combine the theory of money with that of output as a whole. Drawing on classical economics and the modern aggregate analysis of Keynes, Professor Hansen in this volume succeeds in writing a book which, unlike the classical studies, shows the importance of money in the theory of output as a whole; and which, unlike numerous modern writings (e.g., of Hawtrey, Douglas, Hayek), avoids overemphasizing the importance of money. Here is a book that shows what monetary policy can and cannot achieve and why it has often failed in the past; the necessary supplementary role of monetary policy as an aid to fiscal policy; and the manner of integrating monetary and fiscal policy, in periods of both depression and inflation, as prerequisites for assuring a stable economy. Professor Hansen has drawn on his rich experience over thirty-five years in the study of cycles, fiscal policy, and international economics, and on his many years as an economic practitioner to write a book that makes use of the riches of classical economics, as well as neoclassical and Keynesian economics. The book should, for many years to come, be the standard work on monetary theory and fiscal policy as determinants of output. The reader will find here not only the modern theory of money and fiscal policy, but also rich surveys covering the last 150 years, reinterpreted with the tools of modern economics. He will find also suggestions, based on theory and history, for a policy in the years to come that will yield the high levels of income and stability without which the survival of democratic institutions is most unlikely.

In this new edition Professor Hansen augments his authoritative study of the business cycle with an analysis of the performance--and the problems--of the postwar American economy.

Written during the Second World War against the background of the economic and political futility of the 1930s, this book deals with the changing role of government, and particularly fiscal policy as an instrument for regulating the national income and its distribution. Arguing that the war had an economic basis - the inability of the great industrial nations to provide full employment at rising standards of real income - the book discusses how the failure to achieve a world order in the political sphere must be sought in the facts of economic frustration.

John Maynard Keynes is the great British economist of the twentieth century whose hugely influential work The General Theory of Employment, Interest and * is undoubtedly the century's most important book on economics--strongly influencing economic theory and practice, particularly with regard to the role of government in stimulating and regulating a nation's economic life. Keynes's work has undergone significant revaluation in recent years, and "Keynesian" views which have been widely defended for so long are now perceived as at odds with Keynes's own thinking. Recent scholarship and research has demonstrated considerable rivalry and controversy concerning the proper interpretation of Keynes's works, such that recourse to the original text is all the more important. Although considered by a few critics that the sentence structures of the book are quite incomprehensible and almost unbearable to read, the book is an essential reading for all those who desire a basic education in economics. The key to understanding Keynes is the notion that at particular times in the business cycle, an economy can become over-productive (or under-consumptive) and thus, a vicious spiral is begun that results in massive layoffs and cuts in production as businesses attempt to equilibrate aggregate supply and demand. Thus, full employment is only one of many or multiple macro equilibria. If an economy reaches an underemployment equilibrium, something is necessary to boost or stimulate demand to produce full employment. This something could be business investment but because of the logic and individualist nature of investment decisions, it is unlikely to rapidly restore full employment. Keynes logically seizes upon the public budget and government expenditures as the quickest way to restore full employment. Borrowing the * to finance the deficit from private households and businesses is a quick, direct way to restore full employment while at the same time, redirecting or siphoning