This book examines potential technologies for replacing antipersonnel landmines by 2006, the U.S. target date for signing an international treaty banning these weapons. Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines emphasizes the role that technology can play to allow certain weapons to be used more selectively, reducing the danger to uninvolved civilians while improving the effectiveness of the U.S. military. Landmines are an important weapon in the U.S. military's arsenal but the persistent variety can cause unintended casualties, to both civilians and friendly forces. New technologies could replace some, but not all, of the U.S. military's antipersonnel landmines by 2006. In the period following 2006, emerging technologies might eliminate the landmine totally, while retaining the necessary functionalities that today's mines provide to the military.

At the rate that government and nongovernmental organizations are clearing existing landmines, it will take 450-500 years to rid the world of them. Concerned about the slow pace of demining, the Office of Science and Technology asked RAND to assess potential innovative technologies being explored and to project what funding would be required to foster the development of the more promising ones. The authors of this report suggest that the federal government undertake a research and development effort to develop a multisensor mine detection system over the next five to eight years.

This study was undertaken in response to a request by the U.S. Air Force that the National Research Council (NRC) examine whether the technologies that underlie the concept of a hypersonic, air-launched, air-breathing, hydrocarbon-fueled missile with speeds up to Mach 81 can be demonstrated in time to be initially operational by 2015. To conduct the study, the NRC appointed the Committee on Review and Evaluation of the Air Force Hypersonic Technology Program, under the auspices of the Air Force Science and Technology Board.

The U.S. military has a stockpile of approximately 400,000 tons of excess, obsolete, or unserviceable munitions. About 60,000 tons are added to the stockpile each year. Munitions include projectiles, bombs, rockets, landmines, and missiles. Open burning/open detonation (OB/OD) of these munitions has been a common disposal practice for decades, although it has decreased significantly since 2011. OB/OD is relatively quick, procedurally straightforward, and inexpensive. However, the downside of OB and OD is that they release contaminants from the operation directly into the environment. Over time, a number of technology alternatives to OB/OD have become available and more are in research and development. Alternative technologies generally involve some type of contained destruction of the energetic materials, including contained burning or contained detonation as well as contained methods that forego combustion or detonation. Alternatives for the Demilitarization of Conventional Munitions reviews the current conventional munitions demilitarization stockpile and analyzes existing and emerging disposal, treatment, and reuse technologies. This report identifies and evaluates any barriers to full-scale deployment of alternatives to OB/OD or non-closed loop incineration/combustion, and provides recommendations to overcome such barriers.

Against all odds, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines helped to enact a global treaty banning antipersonnel mines in 1997. For that achievement it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In this volume, Leon Sigal shows how a handful of NGOs with almost no mass base got more than 100 countries to outlaw a weapon that their armies had long used. It is a story of intrigue and misperception, of clashing norms and interests, of contentious bureaucratic and domestic politics. It is also a story of effective leadership, of sustained commitment to a cause, of alliances between campaigners and government officials, of a US senator who championed the ban, and of the skilful use of the news media. Despite this monumental effort, the campaign failed to get the United States to sign the treaty. Drawing on extensive internal documents and interviews with US officials and ban campaigners, Sigal tells the story of the in-fighting inside the Clinton administration, in the Pentagon, and within the ban campaign itself that led to this major setback for an otherwise unprecedented, successful global effort. Negotiating Minefields will be of interest to students and scholars of military and strategic studies and politics and international relations.

This book provides a detailed history of the global movement to ban anti-personnel landmines (APL), marking the first case of a successful worldwide civil society movement to end the use of an entire category of weapons. In March 1995, Belgium became the first state to pass a domestic anti-personnel landmine ban. In December 1997, 122 states joined Belgium in signing the comprehensive Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Treaty. The movement to ban landmines became a turning point in global politics that continues to influence policy and strategy decisions regarding weapon use today. Disarming States: The International Movement to Ban Landmines describes how non-government organizations (NGOs) brought the landmine issue to international attention by forming the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The author presents new information gleaned from interviews and intensive research conducted around the world. The critical role of mid-size states—such as Austria, Canada, and Switzerland—recruited to back the movement's goals is examined. The book concludes by examining how NGOs affect the international political agenda, especially in seeking legal prohibitions on weapons and changes in states' behaviors.

10. The future of Landmines

Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law: A View From the Vanishing Point considers in depth the various customary and conventional legal regimes applicable to the use of anti-personnel mines. All involved with the global effort to control and eliminate anti-personnel mines as well as the policy-makers who are concerned about the devastation resulting from the widespread deployment of these arbitrary weapons need to familiarize themselves with the information presented in this timely volume. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.

The confluence of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack and the U.S. Army's historic role to support civil authorities has resulted in substantial new challenges for the Army. To help meet these challenges, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology requested the National Research Council (NRC) carry out a series of studies on how science and technology could assist the Army prepare for its role in homeland security (HLS). The NRC's Board on Army Science and Technology formed the Committee on Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security to accomplish that assignment. The Committee was asked to review relevant literature and activities, determine areas of emphasis for Army S&T in support of counter terrorism and anti-terrorism, and recommend high-payoff technologies to help the Army fulfill its mission. The Department of Defense Counter-Terrorism Technology Task Force identified four operational areas in reviewing technical proposals for HLS operations: indications and warning; denial and survivability; recovery and consequence management; and attribution and retaliation. The study sponsor asked the Committee to use these four areas as the basis for its assessment of the science and technology (S&T) that will be important for the Army's HLS role. Overall, the Committee found that: There is potential for substantial synergy between S&T work carried out by the Army for its HLS responsibilities and the development of the next generation Army, the Objective Force. The Army National Guard (ARNG) is critical to the success of the Army's HLS efforts.

The Symposium on Avoiding Technology Surprise for Tomorrow's Warfighter is a forum for consumers and producers of scientific and technical intelligence to exchange perspectives on the potential sources of emerging or disruptive technologies and behaviors, with the goal of improving the Department of Defense's technological warning capability. This volume summarizes the key themes identified in the second and most recent symposium, a two-day event held in Suffolk, Virginia, on April 28 and 29, 2010. The symposium combined presentations highlighting cutting-edge technology topics with facilitated discourse among all participants. Three categories of surprise were identified: breakthroughs in product and process technology, new uses of existing technology, and the unexpectedly rapid progression of a technology to operational use. The incorporation of an adversary's own culture, history, beliefs, and value systems into analyses also emerged in discussions as an important factor in reducing surprise.