How do alliances, in the aggregate, "behave"? What explains the actions and performance of alliances? Within alliances, how do members' actions and performance vary, and what explains that variance? This book addresses these questions with respect to one of the world's principal alliances of the late twentieth century, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), also known as the Warsaw Pact. The author argues that though we understand a great deal about the military hardware of the Warsaw Pact, little is known about its reliability, cohesiveness, and the distribution of military burden within it--all key variables, he argues, in influencing change in alliance behavior. In each chapter he offers a new way to measure one of these variables and suggests possible explanations for variance. In addition, he examines the effect East-West relations have on cohesion and how Warsaw Pact allies have distributed the defense effort in the past. A concluding chapter is devoted to an empirical assessment of Warsaw Pact alliance behavior, combining indicators of cohesion, reliability, and burden-sharing in a general portrait of the WTO as a collective actor in international politics.

Drawing on recently declassified information, this is a study of the various intrabloc tensions that plagued both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War and how those tensions affected the working of the alliances.

The Warsaw Pact is generally regarded as a mere instrument of Soviet power. In the 1960s the alliance nevertheless evolved into a multilateral alliance, in which the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members gained considerable scope for manoeuvre. This book examines to what extent the Warsaw Pact inadvertently provided its members with an opportunity to assert their own interests, emancipate themselves from the Soviet grip, and influence Soviet bloc policy. Laurien Crump traces this development through six thematic case studies, which deal with such well known events as the building of the Berlin Wall, the Sino-Soviet Split, the Vietnam War, the nuclear question, and the Prague Spring. By interpreting hitherto neglected archival evidence from archives in Berlin, Bucharest, and Rome, and approaching the Soviet alliance from a radically novel perspective, the book offers unexpected insights into international relations in Eastern Europe, while shedding new light on a pivotal period in the Cold War.

This is the first book to document, analyze, and interpret the history of the Warsaw Pact based on the archives of the alliance itself. As suggested by the title, the Soviet bloc military machine that held the West in awe for most of the Cold War does not appear from the inside as formidable as outsiders often believed, nor were its strengths and weaknesses the same at different times in its surprisingly long history, extending for almost half a century. The introductory study by Mastny assesses the controversial origins of the "superfluous" alliance, its subsequent search for a purpose, its crisis and consolidation despite congenital weaknesses, as well as its unexpected demise. Most of the 193 documents included in the book were top secret and have only recently been obtained from Eastern European archives by the PHP project. The majority of the documents were translated specifically for this volume and have never appeared in English before. The introductory remarks to individual documents by co-editor Byrne explain the particular significance of each item. A chronology of the main events in the history of the Warsaw Pact, a list of its leading officials, a selective multilingual bibliography, and an analytical index add to the importance of a publication that sets the new standard as a reference work on the subject and facilitate its use by both students and general readers.

Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict in two important ways. First, it applies economic analysis to diverse conflict activities such as war, arms races, and terrorism, showing how they can be understood as purposeful choices responsive to underlying incentives. Second, it treats appropriation as a fundamental economic activity, joining production and exchange as a means of wealth acquisition. Drawing on a half-century of scholarship, this book presents a primer on the key themes and principles of conflict economics. Although much work in the field is abstract, the book is made accessible to a broad audience of scholars, students and policymakers by relying on historical data, relatively simple graphs and intuitive narratives. In exploring the interdependence of economics and conflict, the book presents current perspectives of conflict economics in novel ways and offers new insights into economic aspects of violence.

A broad-ranging study of the relationship between alliances and the conduct of grand strategy, examined through historical case studies.

At a crucial point in the twentieth century, as Nazi Germany prepared for war, negotiations between Britain, France, and the Soviet Union became the last chance to halt Hitler’s aggression. Incredibly, the French and British governments dallied, talks failed, and in August 1939 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Germany. Michael Carley’s gripping account of these negotiations is not a pretty story. It is about the failures of appeasement and collective security in Europe. It is about moral depravity and blindness, about villains and cowards, and about heroes who stood against the intellectual and popular tides of their time. Some died for their beliefs, others labored in obscurity and have been nearly forgotten. In 1939 they sought to make the Grand Alliance that never was between France, Britain, and the Soviet Union. This story of their efforts is background to the wartime alliance created in 1941 without France but with the United States in order to defeat a demonic enemy. 1939 is based upon Mr. Carley’s longtime research on the period, including work in French, British, and newly opened Soviet archives. He challenges prevailing interpretations of the origins of World War II by situating 1939 at the end of the early cold war between the Soviet Union, France, and Britain, and by showing how anti-communism was the major cause of the failure to form an alliance against Hitler. 1939 was published on September 1, the sixtieth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland and the start of the war.

This book, first published in 1990, examines the nature and causes of the changes to Soviet national security policy under Gorbachev. Changes in leadership and institutional arrangements, economic policy, ideology and military involvement all fostered new patterns of cooperation and competition. Authors look at the historical, economic and cultural contexts of change and proceed to a discussion of change agents, such as modernization, technology and domestic politics. Specific components of foreign and military policy, such as arms control and relations with Western Europe, the Warsaw Pact and the Third World, are also examined.

A comprehensive look at the role of history, economics, security, threat perception, and domestic politics in the South Korea-United States alliance.