In response to a surprise incursion by Hezbollah combatants into northern Israel and their abduction of two Israeli soldiers, Israel launched a campaign that included the most complex air offensive to have taken place in the history of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). Many believe that the inconclusive results of this war represent a "failure of air power." The author demonstrates that this conclusion is an oversimplification of a more complex reality. He assesses the main details associated with the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) campaign against Hezbollah to correct the record regarding what Israeli air power did and did not accomplish (and promise to accomplish) in the course of contributing to that campaign. He considers IAF operations in the larger context of the numerous premises, constraints, and ultimate errors in both military and civilian leadership strategy choice that drove the Israeli government's decisionmaking throughout the counteroffensive. He also examines the IDF's more successful operation against the terrorist organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, to provide points of comparison and contrast in the IDF's conduct of the latter campaign based on lessons learned and assimilated from its earlier combat experience in Lebanon.--Publisher description.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The fact that the outcome of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige tarnished. This historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. The IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force. ¿An insightful, comprehensive examination of the war.¿ Illustrations.

This is the first comprehensive account of the progression of the Second Lebanese War, from the border abduction of an Israeli soldier on the morning of July 12, 2006, through the hasty decision for an aggressive response; the fateful discussions in the Cabinet and the senior Israeli command; to the heavy fighting in south Lebanon and the raging diplomatic battles in Paris, Washington and New York. The book answers the following questions: has Israel learned the right lessons from this failed military confrontation? What can Western countries learn from the IDF's failure against a fundamentalist Islamic terror organization? And what role did Iran and Syria play in this affair? 34 Days delivers the first blow-by-blow account of the Lebanon war and new insights for the future of the region and its effects on the West.

Examines the inconclusive results of the Israeli Defense Forces’ operation in Lebanon after Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers in 2006, which many believe represents a “failure of air power." The author demonstrates that this is an oversimplification of a more complex reality and contrasts the operation with Israel’s counteroffensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009.

This book assesses the causes and consequences of the impact on the recent Middle East war. The authors describe the popular basis of Hezbollah in Lebanon among the Shiites, but also its relation to the country's other religious communities and political forces. They analyze the regional roles of Syria, Iran, and Hamas as well as the politics of the United States and Europe. The authors dissect the strategic and political background behind recent actions taken by Israel; the impact of Israel's incursion into Lebanon and effects on Lebanon's population -- and the consequences of the war on Israel polity and society.

This report describes how the Israel Defense Force fought an adaptive hybrid adversary in a dense urban setting under intense public scrutiny during its wars in Gaza and draws lessons from the Israeli experience for the U.S. Army and the joint force.

From Simon & Schuster, Israel's Lebanon War is the first and only complete inside account of a disastrous military adventure and its ongoing consequences. A detailed narrative by two Israeli journalists on the origins, conduct, and political repercussions of the Lebanon war, based on previously unreleased documents and interviews with high officials.

Like Israel in 2006, the United States today is likely ill prepared for hybrid warfare. To identify lessons that the U.S. military might learn from the Israeli experience in Lebanon, the author examines the state of the Israeli military before the Second Lebanon War, the lessons it learned during that conflict, the reforms it undertook to address its deficiencies, and how it fared during Operation Cast Lead three years later.

Contents: Introduction; Chapter 1. Hard Lessons Learned: ¿Training, Training and Training as Well as Innovative Thinking¿: The IDF Response to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War; Hezbollah; The Gaza Conflict; Conclusion; Chapter 2. Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics: Introduction; Application of the PMESII+PT Variables; Hamas and Hezbollah; Political; Military; Economic; Social; Infrastructure; Information; Physical Environment; Time; The 2006 Second Lebanon War; Hezbollah TTPs; 2008-2009 Hamas/Israeli Conflict; Hamas TTPs; Conclusion. Charts and tables.

Israel has fought many wars since its founding in 1948, from conventional military conflicts with Arab forces to irregular clashes with guerrilla and terror groups. A study of these confrontations reveals strategic and military patterns. Written by a former member of the Israel Defense Forces, this book compares the wars fought in Lebanon against the Palestine Liberation Organization (1982) and against Hezbollah (2006), and in the Gaza Strip (1956, 1967, 2008-2009 and 2014). The author draws similarities between Israel and Western nations--mainly the United States and Britain--in their waging of conventional and irregular warfare, and offers a comparison of the Vietnam War to Israel's struggle with Hezbollah in the 1990s.