The Treasury Sub-Committee calls for much greater transparency from the Treasury in accounting for the liabilities taken on by the nationalisation and part-nationalisation of financial institutions. The report recommends that these disclosures appear in the annual Treasury resource accounts. Furthermore they should be at least as comprehensive as those made by major corporations and go further than meeting the minimum acceptable accounting standards. In particular, the Report notes that the Treasury's 2007-08 Annual Report and Accounts cover the Government's financial relationship with Northern Rock but do not comment on its performance under temporary public ownership. Given the level of interest in the fully nationalised institutions of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley, and the Treasury's role in their governance, the report recommends that key performance information for these institutions be published in the resource accounts as well. The wholesale nationalisation of Northern Rock, and Bradford & Bingley has created governance responsibilities for the Treasury while these entities remain under public ownership. The Government's announcements of October 2008 created further responsibilities regarding the oversight of part-nationalised banks, and created a new body, UK Financial Investments (UKFI). The report calls for UKFI to report annually to Parliament and to be accountable to the Treasury Committee. The Committee wants the Government to identify and publish performance indicators for UKFI, and to report against these measures on a six-monthly basis. All these developments are additional challenges for the Treasury and require it to act in areas its current staff base may not be fully equipped for or familiar with. The Government must ensure the Treasury is sufficiently resourced to manage the extended responsibilities arising from the economic downturn, especially those regarding financial stability.

This is the first annual scrutiny by the Treasury Committee of the Chancellor of Exchequer's Departments. The Committee sets out a number of conclusions and recommendations, including: that the Treasury should include within its' annual reports a summary of the results of the annual surveys of stakeholder opinion and the Treasury's response to stakeholders; the Committee recommends that the Treasury set itself a target to ensure that the Public Service Agreements finalised as part of the next Spending Review in 2009 or 2010 include a clear statement about the resources to be allocated across Government to the delivery of each Agreement; the Committee criticises the Treasury's failure to meet its objective for the appointment of professionally-qualified Finance Directors in all Departments by December 2006 and that a relevant accountancy qualification be described as an essental criterion in all future post advertisements; the Committee views the Value for Money Delivery Agreements across Government as disappointing, and wants the Government to develop programmes that measure quality of service and efficiency effectively; the Committee commends the Royal Mint's return to profitability but is concerned about the ambitious target set for next year; that the Office of Government Commerce has failed to publish a regular annual report; the Committee expresses surprise that HM Revenue and Customs had approved a 60% increase in senior civil service bonus payments over a period of poor performance and headcount reductions, also the Committee highlights the problems experienced in VAT registrations and the failure of HMRC to meet its processing target of VAT receipts as well as poor administration of tax credits.

The Chancellor's departments faced extraordinary challenges during 2008-09, mainly arising from the need to respond to the emerging financial crisis and associated economic downturn. The report concludes that it is very difficult to draw final conclusions regarding their level of success - too much remains unfinished business. It draws attention, in particular, to the new relationship between the Treasury and UKFI, and recommends that the Government considers whether the formal terms of the relationship need some re-definition in the light of experience. The report is particularly concerned by the dire results for HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) of a cross-Government staff survey pilot study. The Report calls for HMRC management to publish a clear and detailed plan to provide focus and direction to their efforts to re-engage with their workforce. Noting a rise in customer complaints and that, on average, only 57 per cent of calls to HMRC contact centres were answered during 2008-09. HMRC should publish more data to enable effective scrutiny of its performance against its targets, data which is essential for tax gaps to be closed and for the take up of the working tax credit to be assessed and improved. The Report is critical of the failure of most departments to provide accurate and timely monthly in-year figures to the Treasury. Other sections of the report cover National Savings & Investment, the revaluation of UK statutory ports and the performance of the Royal Mint.

This report gives an account of the work of the Treasury Committee and Sub-Committee in 2007. The report identifies four main themes of work: (i) a flexible reponse to topical issues; (ii) a strengthened and continuing priority for the scrutiny of the key elements of economic policy; (iii) a continuing commitment to scrutiny of the expenditure and administration of the Chancellor's of the Exchequer's departments; (iv) a commitment to innovations in practice. The report analyses the extent to which the Committee has fulfilled the core tasks of departmental select committees. Reports produced by the Committee, for this 2007 period, include: Are you Covered? Travel Insurance and its Regulation, (HCP 50-I, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780215032638); Unclaimed Assets within the Financial System, (HCP 533, session 206-07, ISBN 9780215035806); Financial Inclusion Follow-up: Saving for all and Shorter Term Saving Products, (HCP 504, session 2006-07, ISBN 9780215038128).

The Treasury Committee's report on the Pre-Budget Report 2008 (Cm. 7484, ISBN 9780101748421) considers that the balance of risks to the Treasury's forecast, for a swift recovery in economic growth for 2010 after a significant decline in output in 2009, is on the downside. The report highlights the lack of bank lending as the single most critical problem for the economy in the near term. The overall effect of the fiscal stimulus remains uncertain, the cost of the reduction in VAT is considerable and, in the view of the majority of commentators, the Treasury's analysis of its impact is an optimistic one. The report notes that the risk of a self-reinforcing deflationary cycle exists in the UK economy at present and recommends that the Treasury prepare and publish the actions it may consider taking should a period of "quantitative easing" be needed. While the need for lower interest rates to maintain economic growth is crucial at the present time, the needs of savers must not be forgotten and the Treasury should consider measures that will also support savers at this difficult time. The report notes with concern that the Pre-Budget Report contains no policy measures which will significantly advance meeting the 2010 child poverty target.

This report identified serious concerns in a number of areas, including: unacceptable difficulties contacting HMRC by phone during peak periods; endemic delays in responding to post; and an increasing focus on online communication that may exclude those without reliable internet access. The Committee recognises that the Department performs a crucial role and operates under significant external pressures including continuing resource reductions, deficiencies in tax legislation and the legacy of the merger. It also acknowledges the commitment of management to tackling these problems and the dedication and professionalism of HMRC staff. However, it concluded that the Department has a difficult few years ahead of it, as it attempts to improve its service. The Committee makes recommendations in the following areas: Improving the service provided by contact centres; providing robust alternative to online contact; ensuring greater awareness of the impact of process changes on individuals and businesses; ensuring reductions in resources are managed in a way that is commensurate with the enabling IT and process improvements and minimises the loss of Departmental tax expertise; reviewing the division of responsibilities between HMRC and HM Treasury in relation to making tax policy, to ensure practical considerations are taken into account at the earliest possible stage; better targeting of letters that threaten serious consequences against individuals; having the National Audit Office externally audit preparations for Real-time Information, to ensure Ministers can be held accountable for progress against the Government's ambitious timetable; and examining how the Department can achieve better accountability around the settlement of large tax cases

This report examines the forecasts and measures contained in the 2009 Budget (HC 107, session 2008-09, ISBN 9780102959161). The Committee noted that there is considerable uncertainty around the Government's GDP growth forecasts for 2009-2011, reflecting the fact that the UK economy is in uncharted territory. Whilst it is possible that the Government will meet its growth forecasts on the available evidence the Committee considers this an optimistic assumption. They question the decision to assume that the economy will begin registering positive growth as early as the fourth quarter of 2009 and that the economy will register such strong growth in 2011. The Committee's concern is in that the sharp recovery in consumption forecast for 2011 might be too optimistic given that the UK economy will only just have emerged from a sharp downturn. The strong rebound forecast in consumption growth from 2011 onwards has important implications for whether the rebalancing of the UK economy with a shift away from consumption and a rise in the savings ratio, is merely a short-term phenomenon. The Committee notes it is too early to judge whether the November 2008 fiscal stimulus has been successful.The Committee looked at unemployment and considers it too early to judge whether the Government's proposed guarantee of a job, work placement or training scheme for all young people who have been on Jobseekers Allowance for 12 months together with the monetary and fiscal stimuli will be sufficiently timely and substantial response to the unemployment challenge.For public finances the Committee recommends that future budgets and pre-budget reports provide a sectoral analysis of tax revenues so that as the UK economy becomes less dependent on financial services and other sectors become more prominent, the basis of the Treasury's revenue forecasts can be scrutinised. The Committee was concerned over the lack of any substantial measures to combat child poverty. For the housing market the Committee calls for a more stable framework for the payment of Local Housing Allowance and welcome the help announced for homeowners but regret the delays in implementation and lack of clarity in respect of some of the schemes, recommending that clear information is provided. The vehicle scrappage is noted to be of importance to the car industry and that it has been welcomed in some quarters and await the pre-budget 2009 report to assess how effective the scheme has been. The Committee believes there are uncertainties over the yield to be raised by the 50 percent top rate of income tax and recommend that the Treasury should report in the 2011 PBR on the revenue raised both nominally and as a percentage of the theoretical maximum revenue by this new top rate.Regarding tax relief on pensions the Committee notes the departure from the long standing principle that tax relief for pension contributions should be given at an individuals marginal rate tax and urges the Treasury to monitor the effect of this change, keeping under review the possibility that a cap on annual contributions might be a more equitable way of reducing the percentage of tax relief that benefits the highest earners.

This report follows on from the Committee's report on the crisis at Northern Rock (5th report, HC 56-I, ISBN 9780215038388) and the lessons to be learned by the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Bank of England (the Tripartite authorities). It examines legislative and practical changes that are needed. The overall case for legislative action in the field of banking regulation is compelling but the Government's preparations for new legislation may not be in place by late February 2009. The Committee recommends that the legislation provides: greater clarity about the nature and objective of "heightened supervision"; an explicit statutory power for the Bank of England to recommend to the FSA that a firm be made subject to the new Special Resolution Regime; a clear institutional separation between the executive functions of the Bank and the non-executive role of the Court of the Bank of England. Practical measures should include: the strengthening FSA's capacity to regulate; the Tripartite authorities must develop a communications strategy to secure public and market confidence in their new powers; and depositor protection arrangements must be developed which will function smoothly and effectively in the event of a bank failure. The Committee makes recommendations on "heightened supervision" and the Special Resolution Regime, identifies priorities for reform of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to protect depositors, and sets out proposals for strengthening the Bank of England. The new Tripartite Standing Committee must assume a central and continuing role in the financial stability work of the authorities at all time.

This report examines the failure of the UK banks. The Committee begins by examining how the present position came about. After looking at the economic situation the report addresses the fate of those banks now partly or wholly owned by the Government, comparing their experiences with those of the building societies. This analysis identifies several key factors as triggering this crisis. First, the growth of risk and complexity, with a concomitant growth in profit, meant that too few people (including many of those in charge) had a clear idea of what was on the banks' books. Second, the banking sector became over-reliant on wholesale funding and discounted any possibility that the wholesale market would dry up; third, rapid growth in the sector was facilitated by increased leverage. The Committee praises the response of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme which had to cope with a dramatic surge in its workload to help compensate those savers in failing institutions. The package of measures the Government has taken to address the problems in the banking sector is then examined and the Committee offers its initial view on these measures. The Government's multi-billion pound stake in the banking sector is being managed by UK Financial Investments Limited (UKFI) and the next section looks at its early work. Finally the report looks at the future of the banking sector, to see if structurally steps can be taken to limit the possibility of another banking crisis.

This report examines the forecasts and measures contained in the 2008 Budget (HC 455, session 2007-08, ISBN 9780102953336). The Treasury's lower forecasts for economic growth in 2008 and 2009 are above the average of independent forecasters, suggesting that the Treasury may have given insufficient weight to the risks of continued financial market turbulence and that some of the UK economy's characteristics that have proven beneficial in past crises (rapidly rising residential property prices, close links with the US and an increasing reliance on the financial services industry, for example) might prove to be conduits through which the current problems in global financial markets are transmitted to the UK real economy. The further weakening of the forecasts for the public finances is noted, and it appears premature for the Treasury to state that it is "on course" to meet the golden rule in the next economic cycle, given the lack of an end date for the previous economic cycle. Measures on child poverty are welcomed, but there is a need for a clear explanation on deployment of resources to ensure that the target to halve child poverty by 2010-11 will be achieved. The abolition of the 10 pence rate of income tax will most affect those under 65 years of age, in childless households, earning under £18,500: the Committee feels this group is an unreasonable target for raising additional tax revenues. The Treasury should commission research into whether the withdrawal of the 10 pence income tax band and high marginal deduction rates are creating disincentives that could frustrate the Government's welfare to work objectives. The Committee also calls for a national Saving Gateway targeted at low-income households and more consideration of tax changes on the middle and lower income groups of non-domiciled taxpayers.