This book makes two important contributions toward a general and systematic theory of rights-a powerful philosophical analysis of the language of rights and an explanation of the nature of rights. In working out these ideas, Wellman has provided a new and cohesive way of thinking and talking about rights of every sort. Wellman succeeds in bringing all kinds of rights-moral, legal, institutional, etc.-under one unified theory in a way that illuminates their similarities and differences. This enables him to deal in a consistent way with a very broad range of philosophical questions, questions that are too often dealt with in isolation from each other.

This is a systematic, full-length study of Locke's theory of rights and of its potential for making genuine contributions to contemporary debates about rights and their place in political philosophy. Simmons refers extensively to Locke's published and unpublished works.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

In any country where there is a Bill of Rights, constitutional rights reasoning is an important part of the legal process. As more and more countries adopt Human Rights legislation and accede to international human rights agreements, and as the European Union introduces its own Bill of Rights, judges struggle to implement these rights consistently and sometimes the reasoning behind them is lost. Examining the practice in other jurisdictions can be a valuable guide. Robert Alexy's classic work reconstructs the reasoning behind the jurisprudence of the German Basic Law and in doing so provides a theory of general application to all jurisdictions where judges wrestle with rights adjudication. In considering the features of constitutional rights reasoning, the author moves from the doctrine of proportionality, procedural rights and the structure and scope of constitutional rights, to general rights of liberty and equality and the problem of horizontal effect. A postscript written for the English edition considers critiques of the Theory since it first appeared in 1985, focusing in particular on the discretion left to legislatures and in an extended introduction the translator argues that the theory may be used to clarify the nature of legal reasoning in the context of rights under the British Constitution.

(unseen), $12.95. Donnelly explicates and defends an account of human rights as universal rights. Considering the competing claims of the universality, particularity, and relativity of human rights, he argues that the historical contingency and particularity of human rights is completely compatible with a conception of human rights as universal moral rights, and thus does not require the acceptance of claims of cultural relativism. The book moves between theoretical argument and historical practice. Rigorous and tightly-reasoned, material and perspectives from many disciplines are incorporated. Paper edition Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Contemporary philosophical pluralism recognizes the inevitability and legitimacy of multiple ethical perspectives and values, making it difficult to isolate the higher-order principles on which to base a theory of justice. Rising up to meet this challenge, Rainer Forst, a leading member of the Frankfurt School's newest generation of philosophers, conceives of an "autonomous" construction of justice founded on what he calls the basic moral right to justification. Forst begins by identifying this right from the perspective of moral philosophy. Then, through an innovative, detailed critical analysis, he ties together the central components of social and political justice--freedom, democracy, equality, and toleration--and joins them to the right to justification. The resulting theory treats "justificatory power" as the central question of justice, and by adopting this approach, Forst argues, we can discursively work out, or "construct," principles of justice, especially with respect to transnational justice and human rights issues. As he builds his theory, Forst engages with the work of Anglo-American philosophers such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya Sen, and critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth. Straddling multiple subjects, from politics and law to social protest and philosophical conceptions of practical reason, Forst brilliantly gathers contesting claims around a single, elastic theory of justice.

Combining the sustained, coherent perspective of an authored text with diverse, authoritative primary readings, Philosophy of Human Rights provides the context and commentary students need to comprehend challenging rights concepts. Clear, accessible writing, thoughtful consideration of primary source documents, and practical, everyday examples pertinent to students' lives enhance this core textbook for courses on human rights and political philosophy. The first part of the book explores theoretical aspects, including the nature, justification, content, and scope of rights. With an emphasis on contemporary issues and debates, the second part applies these theories to practical issues such as political discourse, free expression, the right to privacy, children's rights, and victims' rights. The third part of the book features the crucial documents that are referred to throughout the book, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, and many more.

Who, or what, is a 'person' according to the law? How did this understanding of personhood come about? In the twenty-first century, environmentalism, animal rights, artificial intelligence, and corporate personhood have compelled us to consider these questions once again. Legal personhood is a foundational concept of Western legal thought and A Theory of Legal Personhood seeks to go beyond contemporary debates, challenging our very understanding of legal personhood itself. Drawing on extensive research, scholarship, legislation, and court cases from around the globe, this book offers readers — with or without previous knowledge — new insights into legal personhood. It scrutinizes how personhood came to be understood synonymously with the holding of legal rights. It then posits that a better understanding of legal personhood is as a cluster property. Finally, it applies this new theory to explain and structure the numerous debates surrounding legal personhood.

What does it mean to have a right? Previous answers to this question fall into two groups: interest/benefit theories of rights and choice/will theories. This book proposes an alternative to these traditional views: the justified-constraint theory of rights, which avoids the pitfalls of earlier theories, and solves the puzzle of the relational nature of rights. The analysis shows that this theory applies without modification to past, present and future beings.

The Handbook is a comprehensive reference work in ethical theory consisting of commissioned articles by leading scholars. The first part treats meta-ethics and the second part normative ethical theory. As with all the Oxford Handbooks, the collection is designed to achieve three goals: exposition of central ideas, criticism of other approaches, and defenses of distinct points of view.