Paul Daly develops a theory concerning the appropriate allocation of authority between courts and administrative bodies.

This book investigates judicial deference to the administration in judicial review, a concept and legal practice that can be found to a greater or lesser degree in every constitutional system. In each system, deference functions differently, because the positioning of the judiciary with regard to the separation of powers, the role of the courts as a mechanism of checks and balances, and the scope of judicial review differ. In addition, the way deference works within the constitutional system itself is complex, multi-faceted and often covert. Although judicial deference to the administration is a topical theme in comparative administrative law, a general examination of national systems is still lacking. As such, a theoretical and empirical review is called for. Accordingly, this book presents national reports from 15 jurisdictions, ranging from Argentina, Canada and the US, to the EU. Constituting the outcome of the 20th General Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, held in Fukuoka, Japan in July 2018, it offers a valuable and unique resource for the study of comparative administrative law.

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Ronald Dworkin once imagined law as an empire and judges as its princes. But over time, the arc of law has bent steadily toward deference to the administrative state. Adrian Vermeule argues that law has freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons. In area after area, judges and lawyers, working out the logical implications of legal principles, have come to believe that administrators should be granted broad leeway to set policy, determine facts, interpret ambiguous statutes, and even define the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. Agencies have greater democratic legitimacy and technical competence to confront many issues than lawyers and judges do. And as the questions confronting the state involving climate change, terrorism, and biotechnology (to name a few) have become ever more complex, legal logic increasingly indicates that abnegation is the wisest course of action. As Law’s Abnegation makes clear, the state did not shove law out of the way. The judiciary voluntarily relegated itself to the margins of power. The last and greatest triumph of legalism was to depose itself.

"Introduction Deference and the International Adjudication of Private Property Disputes While working as a government lawyer in 2011, a letter came into our office advising that the Philip Morris tobacco company had decided to sue Australia under a bilateral investment treaty. The company contended that Australia's tobacco plain packaging requirements breached its intellectual property rights, entitling it to billions of dollars in compensation under international law. This news was not particularly shocking to the small team of which I was part, which had been assembled within the government's Office of International Law to respond to these types of claims. The news was shocking, though, to the wider Australian community. Over the ensuing months, the community's disbelief became better-articulated in the press: How can an international tribunal sit in judgment over a measure which the Australian Parliament had decided was in the public interest after extensive scientific enquiry and public consultation? Could an international tribunal really reverse the finding of Australia's highest court that the legislation was lawful?"--

A new framework for understanding contemporary administrative law, through a comparative analysis of case law from Australia, Canada, England, Ireland, and New Zealand. The author argues that the field is structured by four values: individual self-realisation, good administration, electoral legitimacy and decisional autonomy.

From two legal luminaries, a highly original framework for restoring confidence in a government bureaucracy increasingly derided as “the deep state.” Is the modern administrative state illegitimate? Unconstitutional? Unaccountable? Dangerous? Intolerable? American public law has long been riven by a persistent, serious conflict, a kind of low-grade cold war, over these questions. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the administrative state can be redeemed, as long as public officials are constrained by what they call the morality of administrative law. Law and Leviathan elaborates a number of principles that underlie this moral regime. Officials who respect that morality never fail to make rules in the first place. They ensure transparency, so that people are made aware of the rules with which they must comply. They never abuse retroactivity, so that people can rely on current rules, which are not under constant threat of change. They make rules that are understandable and avoid issuing rules that contradict each other. These principles may seem simple, but they have a great deal of power. Already, without explicit enunciation, they limit the activities of administrative agencies every day. But we can aspire for better. In more robust form, these principles could address many of the concerns that have critics of the administrative state mourning what they see as the demise of the rule of law. The bureaucratic Leviathan may be an inescapable reality of complex modern democracies, but Sunstein and Vermeule show how we can at last make peace between those who accept its necessity and those who yearn for its downfall.

In recent years, the question whether judges should defer to administrative decisions has attracted considerable interest amongst public lawyers throughout the common law world. This book examines how the common law of judicial review has responded to the development of the administrative state in three different common law jurisdictions – the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada – over the past 100 years. This comparison demonstrates that the idea of judicial deference is a valuable feature of modern administrative law, because it gives lawyers and judges practical guidance on how to negotiate the constitutional tension between the democratic legitimacy of the administrative state and the judicial role in maintaining the rule of law.

"These are just some of the issues that are addressed in this new volume of essays, Judicial Deference to Administrative Tribunals in Canada: Its History and Future. Written by three of the country's leading experts on the subject, this collection of commentaries critiquing the Supreme Court of Canada's jurisprudence on the principle of judicial deference offers an authoritative overview of the evolution and development of the doctrine."--Résumé de l'éditeur.

For centuries, courts across the common law world have developed systems of law by building bodies of judicial decisions. In deciding individual cases, common law courts settle litigation and move the law in new directions. By virtue of their place at the top of the judicial hierarchy, courts at the apex of common law systems are unique in that their decisions and, in particular, the language used in those decisions, resonate through the legal system. Although both the common law and apex courts have been studied extensively, scholars have paid less attention to the relationship between the two. By analyzing apex courts and the common law from multiple angles, this book offers an entry point for scholars in disciplines related to law - such as political science, history, and sociology - who are seeking a deeper understanding and new insights as to how the common law applies to and is relevant within their own disciplines.