Takes a new analytical look at the concept of fallacy and presents an up-to-date analysis of its usefulness for argumentation studies Although fallacies have been common since Aristotle, until recently little attention has been devoted to identifying and defining them. Furthermore, the concept of fallacy itself has lacked a sufficiently clear meaning to make it a useful tool for evaluating arguments. Douglas Walton takes a new analytical look at the concept of fallacy and presents an up-to-date analysis of its usefulness for argumentation studies. Walton uses case studies illustrating familiar arguments and tricky deceptions in everyday conversation where the charge of fallaciousness is at issue. The numerous case studies show in concrete terms many practical aspects of how to use textual evidence to identify and analyze fallacies and to evaluate arguments as fallacious. Walton looks at how an argument is used in the context of conversation. He defines a fallacy as a conversational move, or sequence of moves, that is supposed to be an argument that contributes to the purpose of the conversation but in reality interferes with it. The view is a pragmatic one, based on the assumption that when people argue, they do so in a context of dialogue, a conventionalized normative framework that is goal-directed. Such a contextual framework is shown to be crucial in determining whether an argument has been used correctly. Walton also shows how examples of fallacies given in the logic textbooks characteristically turn out to be variants of reasonable, even if defeasible or questionable arguments, based on presumptive reasoning. This is the essence of the evaluation problem. A key thesis of the book, which must not be taken for granted as previous textbooks have so often done, is that you can spot a fallacy from how it was used in a context of dialogue. This is an innovative and even, as Walton notes, "a radical and controversial" theory of fallacy.

Such a contextual framework is shown to be crucial in determining whether an argument has been used correctly.

Second edition of the introductory guidebook to the basic principles of constructing sound arguments and criticising bad ones. Non-technical in approach, it is based on 186 examples, which Douglas Walton, a leading authority in the field of informal logic, discusses and evaluates in clear, illustrative detail. Walton explains how errors, fallacies, and other key failures of argument occur. He shows how correct uses of argument are based on sound strategies for reasoned persuasion and critical responses. This edition takes into account many developments in the field of argumentation study that have occurred since 1989, many created by the author. Drawing on these developments, Walton includes and analyzes 36 new topical examples and also brings in work on argumentation schemes. Ideally suited for use in courses in informal logic and introduction to philosophy, this book will also be valuable to students of pragmatics, rhetoric, and speech communication.

The basic question of this monograph is: how should we go about judging arguments to be reasonable or unreasonable? Our concern will be with argument in a broad sense, with realistic arguments in natural language. The basic object will be to engage in a normative study of determining what factors, standards, or procedures should be adopted or appealed to in evaluating an argument as “good,” “not-so-good,” “open to criticism,” “fallacious,” and so forth. Hence our primary concern will be with the problems of how to criticize an argument, and when a criticism is reasonably justified.

This book, written by a leading expert, and based on the latest research, shows how to apply methods of argumentation to a range of examples.

This book offers a new theory of begging the question as an informal fallacy, within a pragmatic framework of reasoned dialogue as a normative theory of critical argumentation. The fallacy of begging the question is analyzed as a systematic tactic to evade fulfillment of a legitimate burden of proof by the proponent of an argument. The technique uses a circular structure of argument to block the further progress of dialogue and, in particular, the capability of the respondent to ask legitimate critical questions in reply to the argument. Walton analyzes the concept of burden of proof in argument, and provides chapters on the use of argument diagramming as a technique of argument reconstruction. This powerful method of argument analysis developed therein is then applied to more than 100 case studies of circular argumentation where the charge of begging the question is or has been thought to be an appropriate criticism. Throughout this work, Walton throws light on the relationship between the problem of circular reasoning and broader issues in the critical analysis of argumentation. Ground-breaking use is made of the pragmatic theory of argument as interactive dialogue. Rules for several kinds of dialogue framework provide standards of good reasoning to validate or to refute the criticism that a particular argument begs the question. This book is directed to students and professionals in the fields of speech communication, philosophy, linguistics, logic, dispute mediation, and education.

Presented as a Vorlesung in the German philosophical tradition, this book presents the most detailed account of Nelson’s method of argument analysis, celebrated by many luminaries such as Karl Popper. It was written in 1921 in opposition to the relativistic, subjectivistic and nihilistic tendencies of Nelson’s time. The book contains an exposition of a method that is a further development of Kant’s transcendental dialectics, followed by an application to the critical analysis of arguments by many famous thinkers, including Bentham, Mill, Poincaré, Leibniz, Hegel, Einstein, Bergson, Rickert, Simmel, Brentano, Stammler, Jellinek, Dingler, and Meinong. The book presents a general theory of philosophical argumentation as seen from the viewpoint of the typical fallacies committed by anybody arguing philosophically, whether professional philosophers or philosophical laypeople. Although the nature of philosophy and philosophical argumentation is one of the most recurrent objects of reflection for philosophers, this book represents the first attempt at a general theory of philosophical fallacy. According to Nelson, it is in the shape of false dilemmas that errors in reasoning always emerge, and false dilemmas are always the result of the same mechanism--the unwitting replacement of one concept for another.

Walter H. Beale offers the most coherent treatment of the aims and modes of discourse to be presented in more than a decade. His development of a semiotic “grammar of motives” that re­lates the problems of meaning in discourse both to linguistic structure and ways of construct­ing reality stands as a pro­vocative new theory of rhetoric sharply focused on writing. He includes a comprehensive treatment of rhetoric, its classes and varieties, modes, and stra­tegies. In addition, he demon­strates the importance of the purpose, substance, and social context of discourse, at a time when scholarly attention has be­come preoccupied with process. He fortifies and extends the Aristotelian approach to rhetoric and discourse at a time when much theory and pedagogy have yielded to modernist assump­tions and methods. And finally, he develops a theoretical framework that illuminates the relationship between rhetoric, the language arts, and the hu­man sciences in general.

In the past forty years there has been a revolution in logic. There is a widening consensus that mathematical logic has not been a satisfactory theory of argumentation, where argumentation is taken as a means of rational belief-revision and conflict resolution. It is also widely held that the traditional informal fallacies are inadequately analyzed in standard accounts found in the logical writings of the period 1950-1970. Here in nineteen chapters are the classical papers of Woods and Walton published in the decade 1972-1982, and constituting the so-called Woods-Walton Approach to fallacy theory. Originally published as a collection in 1989, the book is now re-issued with a new Forward by Dale Jacquette. Woods and Walton are recognized for their seminal role in reviving the fallacies project in logic and giving to the fallacies research programme much of its evolving character and emphasis. It is one of their principal contentions that the fallacies respond best to theoretical pluralism and that different analytical tools are needed for different fallacies. Again conveniently available in a single volume, these papers are indispensable reading for a new generation of researchers in informal logic, argumentation theory, critical thinking, computer science, linguistics and cognitive psychology. John Woods is also author of The Death of Argument: Fallacies in Agent-Based Reasoning 2005. Douglas Walton is author of A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy 1995.