This text functions as a collection of primary source materials for researches and students of moral weakness. It is tailor-made for upper-division courses on Moral Weakness, Praise and Blame, Action Explanation, and other such topics. It can function as the text for Ethics, Moral Issues, Moral Decision, and other such topics. It can also function as a text for an Introduction to Philosophy, when augmented with other texts. In some contexts the text can stand-alone, but it functions especially well when augmented by secondary sources. By strategically pairing secondary texts with the primary texts, a professor can focus on different epochs, or selections, as personal taste directs. (From internet site "Linus Publications")

This book considers the common human predicament that we often choose an action other than the one we perceive to be best. Philosophers know this problem as akrasia. The author develops a nuanced understanding of the nature and causes of akrasia by integrating the best insights of Socrates, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, and several contemporary philosophers.

First Published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In thirteen original essays, eminent scholars of the history of philosophy and of contemporary philosophy examine weakness of will, or incontinence--the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's better judgment.

The way in which society views addiction underlies how it treats, understands, blames, or even punishes those with addictive behaviours. This fascinating new book addresses a number of paradoxes faced by current thinking about addiction and weakness of will, in particular the significance of control and intention for responsible action

Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets and extends Kant's moral theory in a series of essays that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. He introduces the major themes of Kantian ethics and explores its practical application to questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes.

This lively anthology provides classic and contemporary defenses and critiques of the central ethical theories, along with readings on a selection of moral issues such as freedom of expression, immigration, and the treatment of non-human animals. Generous excerpts of canonical texts are included alongside contemporary works, all carefully selected and thoughtfully edited for student use. Readings on the ethical theories are organized intuitively, by implicit source of value: god, human nature, culture, reason, consent, character, emotion, care, particulars, and intuitions. The interconnections among readings amplify teaching possibilities and create a vigorous conversation about morality.

Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. One of the central problems in recent moral philosophy is the apparent tension between the "practical" or "action-guiding" side of moral judgments and their objectivity. That tension would not exist if practical reason existed (if reason played a substantial role in producing motivation) and if recognition of obligation were one of the areas in which practical reason operated. In Practical Reason, Aristotle, and the Weakness of the Will,Norman Dahl argies that, despite widespread opinion to the contrary, Aristotle held a position on practical reason that both provides an objective basis for ethics and satisfies an important criterion of adequacy—that it acknowledges genuine cases of weakness of the will. In arguing for this, Dahl distinguishes Aristotle's position from that of David Hume, who denied the existence of practical reason. An important part of his argument is an account of the role that Aristotle allowed the faculty nous to play in the acquisition of general ends. Relying both on this argument and on an examination of passages from Aristotle's ethics and psychology, Dahl argues that Aristotle recognized that a genuine conflict of motives can occur in weakness of the will. This provides him with the basis for an interpretation that finds Aristotle acknowledging genuine cases of weakness of the will. Dahl's arguments have both a philosophical and a historical point. He argues that Aristotle's position on practical reason deserves to be taken seriously, a conclusion he reinforces by comparing that position with more recent attempts, by Kant, Nagel, and Rawls, to base ethics on practical reason.

Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by an excellent international team of philosophers, some well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of the current debate over weakness of will and practical irrationality more generally.Issues covered include classical questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion, the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia, strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across philosophy of mind andethics, the collection will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates in both these fields.