Seminar paper from the year 2012 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Topic: Globalization, Political Economics, grade: 1,0, University of Potsdam (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultat), language: English, abstract: This paper will deal with the behaviour of the International Monetary Fund during the financial crises in Asia of the 1990s and the current financial crisis in Europe. The main interest lies in whether the political environment in Europe with the third party European Union (EU) and the institutions of the euro area causes a different incentive and power structure leading to a different behaviour on the part of the IMF in the European crisis when compared to the Asian crisis. In Asia, the IMF was confronted with a more or less conventional regional financial crisis and it put together an individual programme for every country asking for help. In Europe on the other hand the EU represents a new, supranational, sovereign institution that has power over its member states and has become the linchpin when dealing with the European financial crisis. My thesis is that the EU-institutions (most notably the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank) took over the role the IMF had in the Asian crisis and now act as the authorities that link the financial aid to conditionalities while the IMF is marginalized into the simple task of providing financial assistance What the paper doesn t want to do: No assessment of the failure or success of the IMFs rescue packages for the Asian and European countries will be given. This goes beyond the initial interest and in case of the European crisis it is too early to assess as the crisis is still ongoing. Furthermore, the paper will abstract from the differences between the crises in Asia and Europe in terms of economic difficulties (exchange rate crisis, crisis of the financial sector, debt crisis). I think this is reasonable considering the focus does not

This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.

Seminar paper from the year 2012 in the subject Politics - Topic: Globalization, Political Economics, grade: 1,0, University of Potsdam (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät), language: English, abstract: This paper will deal with the behaviour of the International Monetary Fund during the financial crises in Asia of the 1990s and the current financial crisis in Europe. The main interest lies in whether the political environment in Europe with the third party European Union (EU) and the institutions of the euro area causes a different incentive and power structure leading to a different behaviour on the part of the IMF in the European crisis when compared to the Asian crisis. In Asia, the IMF was confronted with a more or less conventional regional financial crisis and it put together an individual programme for every country asking for help. In Europe on the other hand the EU represents a new, supranational, sovereign institution that has power over its member states and has become the linchpin when dealing with the European financial crisis. My thesis is that the EU-institutions (most notably the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank) took over the role the IMF had in the Asian crisis and now act as the authorities that link the financial aid to conditionalities while the IMF is marginalized into the simple task of providing financial assistance What the paper doesn ́t want to do: No assessment of the failure or success of the IMFs rescue packages for the Asian and European countries will be given. This goes beyond the initial interest and in case of the European crisis it is too early to assess as the crisis is still ongoing. Furthermore, the paper will abstract from the differences between the crises in Asia and Europe in terms of economic difficulties (exchange rate crisis, crisis of the financial sector, debt crisis). I think this is reasonable considering the focus does not lie on which kind of rescue programmes have been established, but on how the IMF behaved in the process of crisis management. The main part is divided in one segment for the Asian crisis and one for the European crisis. In both I will answer the same three questions: a) which actions were taken by the IMF? b) what did the institutional environment in which the IMF acted look like? and c) how did the IMF behave and how can this behaviour be explained? By focussing on these three points I will be able to draw a line between the Asian and the European financial crisis and explain why the IMF behaves differently today in Europe than it did in the 1990s in Asia. In a concluding chapter I will summarize my results.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) features prominently in today's media. Its visible and contentious involvement in the Asian crisis have attracted inordinate media attention both good and bad. On one end of the scale, it has been portrayed as an institutionalized financial messiah, whose mere presence is able to resurrect emaciated economies and restore the public's confidence. However, at the same time it is also regarded as a Western-dominated financial bludgeon whose measures are aimed to break open developing economies for foreign pickings.Such disparate and extreme opinions are often underscored by a common want of understanding of the primary aims and functions of the IMF. Despite the IMF's prominence and its crucial participation in resuscitating these ailing Asian economies, its exact functions and operations remain an enigma to many. This book provides an easily digestible overview of the institution and its half-century of development, with an emphasis on its more current role in Asia. With the relentless trend towards a more integrated and developed global economy, the IMF's relevance will no doubt be accentuated. This institution's increasing visibility in world economic and social affairs will make knowledge about the organization and its activities an indispensable asset.

This paper reviews macroeconomic developments during the first year of the crisis in east Asia and draws some preliminary policy lessons. The crisis is rooted in the interaction of large capital inflows and weak private and public sector governance. At the same time, macroeconomic adjustment in these countries has resulted in some surprising outcomes, including severe economic contractions, low inflation, and rapid external adjustment. The lessons for crisis resolution include the importance of tight monetary policy early on for exchange rate stabilization, flexible fiscal policy, and comprehensive structural reform. Crises are avoided by prudent macroeconomic policies, diligent bank supervision, transparent data dissemination, strong governance, and forward-looking policymaking, even in good times.

The turmoil that has rocked Asian markets since the middle of 1997, and that is now having such deep effects on the economies in the region, is the third major currency crisis of the 1990s. This study explains how the Asian crisis arose and spread. It then outlines the corrective policy measures that could help end the crisis, and the shortcomings that have been revealed in the international financial system that require reform to reduce the chances of a recurrence.

Two Crises, Different Outcomes examines East Asian policy reactions to the two major crises of the last fifteen years: the global financial crisis of 2008–9 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. The calamity of the late 1990s saw a massive meltdown concentrated in East Asia. In stark contrast, East Asia avoided the worst effects of the Lehman Brothers collapse, incurring relatively little damage when compared to the financial devastation unleashed on North America and Europe. Much had changed across the intervening decade, not least that China rather than Japan had become the locomotive of regional growth, and that the East Asian economies had taken numerous steps to buffer their financial structures and regulatory regimes. This time Asia avoided disaster; it bounced back quickly after the initial hit and has been growing in a resilient fashion ever since. The authors of this book explain how the earlier financial crisis affected Asian economies, why government reactions differed so widely during that crisis, and how Asian economies weathered the Great Recession. Drawing on a mixture of single-country expertise and comparative analysis, they conclude by assessing the long-term prospects that Asian countries will continue their recent success.

The lingering effects of the economic crisis are still visible—this shows a clear need to improve our understanding of financial crises. This book surveys a wide range of crises, including banking, balance of payments, and sovereign debt crises. It begins with an overview of the various types of crises and introduces a comprehensive database of crises. Broad lessons on crisis prevention and management, as well as the short-term economic effects of crises, recessions, and recoveries, are discussed.