This is an introduction for students of politics and society to the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and some topics in "ordinary-language" philosophy. It argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a revolutionary new conception of language, and hence a new and deeper understanding of ourselves and the world of human institutions and action. Language is seen as activity, and words as signals, rather than labels for classes of objects. The implications for the social sciences and for political action are wide-ranging and surprising. Questions of justice, for example, are seen to be neither just patterns of human behavior the social scientists can observe, nor the subjective expression of personal preference or passion, but the locus of rational judgement in accord with standards, different from the standards of science or mathematics but just as objective and resting on the same human foundations. The book ranges beyond topics usually treated in discussions of Wittgenstein to more difficult and important concerns such as "grammar" and "forms of life". After an initial explication relating Wittgenstein's ideas to those of several interpreters and critics, the author proceeds to applications of his thought to certain selected problems central to social science and political theory. These include the nature of explanation, the relationship between action and causation, validity in judgement, and the relationship between concepts and reality in the human world. The author also applies Wittgenstein's ideas to such specialized questions as what is "political" and the nature of power. The theme of human justice in relation to social problems, political action, and judgement pervades the book, appearing and reappearing at many points in the discussion.

This is an introduction for students of politics and society to the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and some topics in "ordinary-language" philosophy. It argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a revolutionary new conception of language, and hence a new and deeper understanding of ourselves and the world of human institutions and action. Language is seen as activity, and words as signals, rather than labels for classes of objects. The implications for the social sciences and for political action are wide-ranging and surprising. Questions of justice, for example, are seen to be neither just patterns of human behavior the social scientists can observe, nor the subjective expression of personal preference or passion, but the locus of rational judgement in accord with standards, different from the standards of science or mathematics but just as objective and resting on the same human foundations. The book ranges beyond topics usually treated in discussions of Wittgenstein to more difficult and important concerns such as "grammar" and "forms of life". After an initial explication relating Wittgenstein's ideas to those of several interpreters and critics, the author proceeds to applications of his thought to certain selected problems central to social science and political theory. These include the nature of explanation, the relationship between action and causation, validity in judgement, and the relationship between concepts and reality in the human world. The author also applies Wittgenstein's ideas to such specialized questions as what is "political" and the nature of power. The theme of human justice in relation to social problems, political action, and judgement pervades the book, appearing and reappearing at many points in the discussion.

Hanna Pitkin argues that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a revolutionary new conception of language, and hence a new and deeper understanding of ourselves and the world of human institutions and action.

In this book, Livingston develops the political implications of formal results obtained over the course of the twentieth century in set theory, metalogic, and computational theory. He argues that the results achieved by thinkers such as Cantor, Russell, Godel, Turing, and Cohen, even when they suggest inherent paradoxes and limitations to the structuring capacities of language or symbolic thought, have far-reaching implications for understanding the nature of political communities and their development and transformation. Alain Badiou's analysis of logical-mathematical structures forms the backbone of his comprehensive and provocative theory of ontology, politics, and the possibilities of radical change. Through interpretive readings of Badiou's work as well as the texts of Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Livingston develops a formally based taxonomy of critical positions on the nature and structure of political communities. These readings, along with readings of Parmenides and Plato, show how the formal results can transfigure two interrelated and ancient problems of the One and the Many: the problem of the relationship of a Form or Idea to the many of its participants, and the problem of the relationship of a social whole to its many constituents.

"In the Shadow of Justice tells the story of how liberal political philosophy was transformed in the second half of the twentieth century under the influence of John Rawls. In this first-ever history of contemporary liberal theory, Katrina Forrester shows how liberal egalitarianism--a set of ideas about justice, equality, obligation, and the state--became dominant, and traces its emergence from the political and ideological context of the postwar United States and Britain. In the aftermath of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, Rawls's A Theory of Justice made a particular kind of liberalism essential to political philosophy. Using archival sources, Forrester explores the ascent and legacy of this form of liberalism by examining its origins in midcentury debates among American antistatists and British egalitarians. She traces the roots of contemporary theories of justice and inequality, civil disobedience, just war, global and intergenerational justice, and population ethics in the 1960s and '70s and beyond. In these years, political philosophers extended, developed, and reshaped this liberalism as they responded to challenges and alternatives on the left and right--from the New International Economic Order to the rise of the New Right. These thinkers remade political philosophy in ways that influenced not only their own trajectory but also that of their critics. Recasting the history of late twentieth-century political thought and providing novel interpretations and fresh perspectives on major political philosophers, In the Shadow of Justice offers a rigorous look at liberalism's ambitions and limits."--

Searching for rigor and a clear grasp of the essential features of their objects of investigation, philosophers are often driven to exaggerations and harmful simplifications. According to Ludwig Wittgenstein's provocative suggestion, this has to do with confusions relating to the status of philosophical statements. The Struggle against Dogmatism elucidates his view that there are no theses, doctrines, or theories in philosophy. Even when this claim is taken seriously, explanations of what it means are problematic--typically involving a relapse to theses. This book makes Wittgenstein's philosophical approach comprehensible by presenting it as a response to specific problems relating to the practice of philosophy, in particular the problem of dogmatism. Although the focus of this book is on Wittgenstein's later work, Oskari Kuusela also discusses Wittgenstein's early philosophy as expressed in the Tractatus, as well as the relation between his early and later work. In the light of this account of Wittgenstein's critique of his early thought, Kuusela is able to render concrete what Wittgenstein means by philosophizing without theses or theories. In his later philosophy, Kuusela argues, Wittgenstein establishes a non-metaphysical (though not anti-metaphysical) approach to philosophy without philosophical hierarchies. This method leads to an increase in the flexibility of philosophical thought without a loss in rigor.

An engaging account of the titan of political philosophy and the development of his most important work, A Theory of Justice, coming at a moment when its ideas are sorely needed. It is hard to overestimate the influence of John Rawls on political philosophy and theory over the last half-century. His books have sold millions of copies worldwide, and he is one of the few philosophers whose work is known in the corridors of power as well as in the halls of academe. Rawls is most famous for the development of his view of “justice as fairness,” articulated most forcefully in his best-known work, A Theory of Justice. In it he develops a liberalism focused on improving the fate of the least advantaged, and attempts to demonstrate that, despite our differences, agreement on basic political institutions is both possible and achievable. Critics have maintained that Rawls’s view is unrealistic and ultimately undemocratic. In this incisive new intellectual biography, Andrius Gališanka argues that in misunderstanding the origins and development of Rawls’s central argument, previous narratives fail to explain the novelty of his philosophical approach and so misunderstand the political vision he made prevalent. Gališanka draws on newly available archives of Rawls’s unpublished essays and personal papers to clarify the justifications Rawls offered for his assumption of basic moral agreement. Gališanka’s intellectual-historical approach reveals a philosopher struggling toward humbler claims than critics allege. To engage with Rawls’s search for agreement is particularly valuable at this political juncture. By providing insight into the origins, aims, and arguments of A Theory of Justice, Gališanka’s John Rawls will allow us to consider the philosopher’s most important and influential work with fresh eyes.

This book advances a reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that moves beyond the main interpretative options of the New Wittgenstein debate. It covers Wittgenstein’s approach to language and logic, as well as other areas unduly neglected in the literature, such as his treatment of metaphysics, the natural sciences and value. Tejedor re-contextualises Wittgenstein’s thinking in these areas, plotting its evolution in his diaries, correspondence and pre-Tractatus texts, and developing a fuller picture of its intellectual background. This broadening of the angle of view is central to the interpretative strategy of her book: only by looking at the Tractatus in this richer light can we address the fundamental questions posed by the New Wittgenstein debate – questions concerning the method of the Tractatus, its approach to nonsense and the continuity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s early work remains insightful, thought-inspiring and relevant to contemporary philosophy of language and science, metaphysics and ethics. Tejedor’s ground-breaking work ultimately conveys a surprisingly positive message concerning the power for ethical transformation that philosophy can have, when it is understood as an activity aimed at increasing conceptual clarification and awareness.

In Wittgenstein and the Social Sciences, Robert Vinten takes a fresh look at the relationship between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the social sciences. He argues that although social sciences are quite different to the natural sciences, they are nonetheless properly called ‘sciences’. The book looks in detail at whether Wittgenstein can be claimed by conservatives, liberals, or socialists as their own. Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks and remarks about politics and culture are taken into account in deciding where to locate Wittgenstein in relation to various ideologies. In the final part of the book, Vinten considers how Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be of use in resolving or dissolving problems in the social sciences. Along the way, he critically assesses work from Perry Anderson, Terry Eagleton, Richard Rorty, and Chantal Mouffe in the light of Wittgenstein’s philosophical oeuvre. The book makes a compelling examination of how Wittgenstein’s work remains as relevant as ever to thinking about our cultural and political situation.

The Game of Justice argues that justice is politics, that politics is something close to ordinary people and not located in an abstract and distant institution known as the State, and that the concept of the game provides a new way to appreciate the possibilities of creating justice. Justice, as a game, is played in a challenging environment that makes serious demands on the participants, in terms of self-knowledge and individual self-government, and also in terms of understanding social behavior. What the term game provides is a radical opening of all established institutions: the status quo is neither absolute nor inevitable, but is the result of past political controversy, a result created by the winners to express their victory. At the same time, the game of justice, like all games, is played over and over again, with winners and losers changing places over time. This serves as encouragement to past losers and provides a cautionary reminder to past winners.