Much of what has been heard, read, or taught about the 2008 financial crisis is incorrect. It was not caused by free market capitalism run amok. The crisis was not created by deregulatory zeal. It wasn’t primarily due to greed on Wall Street. The crisis was not simply created by people’s “irrational exuberance” or “animal spirits.” Perhaps most importantly, it did not require bailouts and thousands of pages of new regulations to fix. Instead, it came about because of significant market distortions created by government subsidies, misregulation, and perverse incentives. The conventional wisdom blames unbridled markets for mortgage fraud, imprudent risks, and extreme leverage in financial institutions. Policy makers told us that the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the near failure of American International Group and many large banks, would have resulted in catastrophic decline and perhaps another Great Depression. After the crisis, thousands of pages of new regulations were written to limit the types of risk banks can take and the kinds of investments they can make so that a financial crisis of this magnitude can’t happen again. But what if this conventional wisdom was wrong? If the problem wasn’t unregulated, unrestrained markets leading to fraud and excessive risk-taking, if instead it was perverted incentives and distorted market signals due to numerous regulations and mandates in the first place, then the thousands of new pages of regulations haven’t solved the fundamental problem. In fact, they have made it worse. This book shows that it is time to reassess the conventional wisdom. Perhaps there is still time to reverse the faulty solutions based upon it before another financial crisis breaks out.

The 2008 global financial crisis affects everyone, but its root causes and potential cures – knowledge necessary in order to make strong financial decisions moving forward – are confusing to many. This compilation of expert views from the University of Toronto's Rotman School of Management navigates what went wrong, why, and the lessons that these events can teach business people, policy makers, and interested observers alike. The Finance Crisis and Rescue features essays from ten leading Rotman professors and renowned journalist Michael Hlinka as well as a foreword by Rotman Dean Roger Martin. These intellectual leaders from the front lines of business thinking tackle the subject from varied perspectives, analyzing the crisis through their diverse backgrounds in fields such as structured finance, behavioural finance, value investing, pension plans, risk management, corporate governance, public policy, and leadership. A timely and considered response to current events, The Finance Crisis and Rescue will be of interest to all those following recent global financial developments.

The #1 Wall Street Journal Bestseller “Required reading. . . . Shows how our economic crisis was a failure, not of the free market, but of government.” —Charles Koch, Chairman and CEO, Koch Industries, Inc. Did Wall Street cause the mess we are in? Should Washington place stronger regulations on the entire financial industry? Can we lower unemployment rates by controlling the free market? The answer is NO. Not only is free market capitalism good for the economy, says industry expert John Allison, it is our only hope for recovery. As the nation’s longest-serving CEO of a top-25 financial institution, Allison has had a unique inside view of the events leading up to the financial crisis. He has seen the direct effect of government incentives on the real estate market. He has seen how government regulations only make matters worse. And now, in this controversial wake-up call of a book, he has given us a solution. The national bestselling The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure reveals: Why regulation is bad for the market—and for the world What we can do to promote a healthy free market How we can help end unemployment in America The truth about TARP and the bailouts How Washington can help Wall Street build a better future for everyone With shrewd insight, alarming insider details, and practical advice for today’s leaders, this electrifying analysis is nothing less than a call to arms for a nation on the brink. You’ll learn how government incentives helped blow up the real estate bubble to unsustainable proportions, how financial tools such as derivatives have been wrongly blamed for the crash, and how Congress fails to understand it should not try to control the market—and then completely mismanages it when it tries. In the end, you’ll understand why it’s so important to put “free” back in free market. It’s time for America to accept the truth: the government can’t fix the economy because the government wrecked the economy. This book gives us the tools, the inspiration—and the cure.

An upbeat antidote to the gloom and doom forecasts of the financial future Just about everyone is worried about the economy and markets. And the fear is that they will stay down for a long time. But a few brave voices say that the gloom and doom forecasts are just too pessimistic. Reality is that entrepreneurs don't give up. History is pretty clear, every time the economy is thought to be done, worn out, finished, it bounces back and heads to new highs. In fact, the economy and the markets-counter to conventional wisdom-have started to improve in the first half of 2009. Even housing is showing some signs of life. With It's Not as Bad as You Think, Brian Wesbury, ranked as one of the top economic forecasters by the Wall Street Journal and USA Today, shows you that while the financial future may be hard to predict, it will ultimately be profitable over the long haul. In this easy-to-follow and engaging forecast of the future, Wesbury takes a look at the good, the bad, and the ugly-and debunks the pouting pundits of pessimism to show you how to prosper now and in the future. An optimistic look at the economy and the markets written by one of today's foremost financial forecasters Presents a roadmap to seek opportunities in all the panic Shows you how to analyze economic indicators and government policy to grow your wealth so you don't lose by hiding under the bed A breath of fresh air, Wesbury's objectivity and optimism provide welcome relief to the daily bad news stories, as he sets us all up to capitalize on tomorrow's great possibilities.

Was our country’s economic success before the Crash of ‘08 built on false pretenses? Did we simply borrow and spend too much, or was something else really going on? The conventional wisdom now accuses Wall Street and the mortgage industry of using predatory tactics to seduce homeowners. Meanwhile, average Americans are blamed for increasing consumption to unsustainable levels by borrowing recklessly. And the tax policies of the Reagan and Bush administrations are blamed for encouraging reckless risk-taking. Edward Conard disagrees. In an attempt to set the record straight he presents a fascinating new case for how the economy really works, why the U.S. has outperformed other countries, what caused the financial crisis, and what improvements might better protect our economy without damaging growth.

Over roughly the past decade, oil and gas production in the United States has surged dramatically—thanks largely to technological advances such as high-volume hydraulic fracturing, more commonly known as “fracking.” This rapid increase has generated widespread debate, with proponents touting economic and energy-security benefits and opponents highlighting the environmental and social risks of increased oil and gas production. Despite the heated debate, neither side has a monopoly on the facts. In this book, Daniel Raimi gives a balanced and accessible view of oil and gas development, clearly and thoroughly explaining the key issues surrounding the shale revolution. The Fracking Debate directly addresses the most common questions and concerns associated with fracking: What is fracking? Does fracking pollute the water supply? Will fracking make the United States energy independent? Does fracking cause earthquakes? How is fracking regulated? Is fracking good for the economy? Coupling a deep understanding of the scholarly research with lessons from his travels to every major U.S. oil- and gas-producing region, Raimi highlights stories of the people and communities affected by the shale revolution, for better and for worse. The Fracking Debate provides the evidence and context that have so frequently been missing from the national discussion of the future of oil and gas production, offering readers the tools to make sense of this critical issue.

Before 2007, economists thought that financial crises would never happen again in the United States, that such upheavals were a thing of the past. Gary B. Gorton, a prominent expert on financial crises, argues that economists fundamentally misunderstand what they are, why they occur, and why there were none in the U.S. from 1934 to 2007. Misunderstanding Financial Crises offers a back-to-basics overview of financial crises, and shows that they are not rare, idiosyncratic events caused by a perfect storm of unconnected factors. Instead, Gorton shows how financial crises are, indeed, inherent to our financial system. Economists, Gorton writes, looked from a certain point of view and missed everything that was important: the evolution of capital markets and the banking system, the existence of new financial instruments, and the size of certain money markets like the sale and repurchase market. Comparing the so-called "Quiet Period" of 1934 to 2007, when there were no systemic crises, to the "Panic of 2007-2008," Gorton ties together key issues like bank debt and liquidity, credit booms and manias, moral hazard, and too-big-too-fail--all to illustrate the true causes of financial collapse. He argues that the successful regulation that prevented crises since 1934 did not adequately keep pace with innovation in the financial sector, due in part to the misunderstandings of economists, who assured regulators that all was well. Gorton also looks forward to offer both a better way for economists to think about markets and a description of the regulation necessary to address the future threat of financial disaster.

An empirical investigation of financial crises during the last 800 years.

Hailed as "the best business book of 2010" (Huffington Post), this New York Times bestseller about the 2008 financial crisis brings the devastation of the Great Recession to life. As soon as the financial crisis erupted, the finger-pointing began. Should the blame fall on Wall Street, Main Street, or Pennsylvania Avenue? On greedy traders, misguided regulators, sleazy subprime companies, cowardly legislators, or clueless home buyers? According to Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, two of America's most acclaimed business journalists, many devils helped bring hell to the economy. All the Devils Are Here goes back several decades to weave the hidden history of the financial crisis in a way no previous book has done. It explores the motivations of everyone from famous CEOs, cabinet secretaries, and politicians to anonymous lenders, borrowers, analysts, and Wall Street traders. It delves into the powerful American mythology of homeownership. And it proves that the crisis ultimately wasn't about finance at all; it was about human nature. Just as McLean's The Smartest Guys in the Room was hailed as the best Enron book on a crowded shelf, so will All the Devils Are Here be remembered for finally making sense of the financial meltdown and its consequences.

The 2008 financial crisis—like the Great Depression—was a world-historical event. What caused it will be debated for years, if not generations. The conventional narrative is that the financial crisis was caused by Wall Street greed and insufficient regulation of the financial system. That narrative produced the Dodd-Frank Act, the most comprehensive financial-system regulation since the New Deal. There is evidence, however, that the Dodd-Frank Act has slowed the recovery from the recession. If insufficient regulation caused the financial crisis, then the Dodd-Frank Act will never be modified or repealed; proponents will argue that doing so will cause another crisis. A competing narrative about what caused the financial crisis has received little attention. This view, which is accepted by almost all Republicans in Congress and most conservatives, contends that the crisis was caused by government housing policies. This book extensively documents this view. For example, it shows that in June 2008, before the crisis, 58 percent of all US mortgages were subprime or other low-quality mortgages. Of these, 76 percent were on the books of government agencies such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. When these mortgages defaulted in 2007 and 2008, they drove down housing prices and weakened banks and other mortgage holders, causing the crisis. After this book is published, no one will be able to claim that the financial crisis was caused by insufficient regulation, or defend Dodd-Frank, without coming to terms with the data this book contains.