Through a range of case studies spanning the post-Cold War period in Iraq, Moldova and Serbia, this innovative book breaks new ground in its study of asymmetric conflicts where warring sides exhibit vast power differentials. It uses multiple theories to examine the different pathways that encourage minor powers to engage in both offensive and defensive wars that they are likely to lose, analysing domestic crisis as a key catalyst and considering ways to mitigate conditions that drive conflict. The author provides an important framework that can be applied to contemporary conflicts elsewhere.

Using case studies spanning the post-Cold War period in Iraq, Moldova and Serbia, this book breaks new ground in its study of asymmetric conflicts where warring sides exhibit vastly different power differentials.

Through a range of case studies spanning the post-Cold War period in Iraq, Moldova and Serbia, this innovative book breaks new ground in its study of asymmetric conflicts where warring sides exhibit vast power differentials. It uses multiple theories to examine the different pathways that encourage minor powers to engage in both offensive and defensive wars that they are likely to lose, analysing domestic crisis as a key catalyst and considering ways to mitigate conditions that drive conflict. The author provides an important framework that can be applied to contemporary conflicts elsewhere.

Formal and empirical explanations of peace and war

"A superb book.…Mearsheimer has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the behavior of great powers."—Barry R. Posen, The National Interest The updated edition of this classic treatise on the behavior of great powers takes a penetrating look at the question likely to dominate international relations in the twenty-first century: Can China rise peacefully? In clear, eloquent prose, John Mearsheimer explains why the answer is no: a rising China will seek to dominate Asia, while the United States, determined to remain the world's sole regional hegemon, will go to great lengths to prevent that from happening. The tragedy of great power politics is inescapable.

How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, in this 2005 book Ivan Arregúin-Toft shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favors the weak. This approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to makes sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979–89). Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policy makers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.

This book develops the idea that since decolonisation, regional patterns of security have become more prominent in international politics. The authors combine an operational theory of regional security with an empirical application across the whole of the international system. Individual chapters cover Africa, the Balkans, CIS Europe, East Asia, EU Europe, the Middle East, North America, South America, and South Asia. The main focus is on the post-Cold War period, but the history of each regional security complex is traced back to its beginnings. By relating the regional dynamics of security to current debates about the global power structure, the authors unfold a distinctive interpretation of post-Cold War international security, avoiding both the extreme oversimplifications of the unipolar view, and the extreme deterritorialisations of many globalist visions of a new world disorder. Their framework brings out the radical diversity of security dynamics in different parts of the world.