This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.

This paper investigates why controls on capital inflows have a bad name, and evoke such visceral opposition, by tracing how capital controls have been used and perceived, since the late nineteenth century. While advanced countries often employed capital controls to tame speculative inflows during the last century, we conjecture that several factors undermined their subsequent use as prudential tools. First, it appears that inflow controls became inextricably linked with outflow controls. The latter have typically been more pervasive, more stringent, and more linked to autocratic regimes, failed macroeconomic policies, and financial crisis—inflow controls are thus damned by this “guilt by association.” Second, capital account restrictions often tend to be associated with current account restrictions. As countries aspired to achieve greater trade integration, capital controls came to be viewed as incompatible with free trade. Third, as policy activism of the 1970s gave way to the free market ideology of the 1980s and 1990s, the use of capital controls, even on inflows and for prudential purposes, fell into disrepute.

This paper provides an analysis of the use and effects of capital controls in 27 AEs and EMDEs which experienced at least one financial crisis between 1995 and 2017. Countries often turn to using capital controls in crisis: some ease inflow controls while others tighten controls on outflows. A key finding is that countries with pervasive controls before the start of the crisis are shielded compared to countries with more open capital accounts, which see a significant decline in capital flows during crises. In contrast, the effectiveness of capital controls introduced during crises appears to be weak and difficult to identify. There is also some evidence that the introduction of outflow controls during crises is negatively associated with sovereign debt ratings, but that investors may actually forgive with time.

We study capital controls on outflows (CCOs) in situations of macroeconomic and financial distress. We present novel empirical evidence indicating that CCO implementation is associated with crises and declines in GDP growth. We then develop a theoretical framework that is consistent with such empirical findings and also yields policy and welfare lessons. The theory features costly coordination failures by foreign investors which can sometimes be avoided by suitably tailored CCOs. The benefits of CCOs as coordination devices can make them optimal even if CCOs entail deadweight losses; if the latter are large, however, CCOs are detrimental for welfare. We show that optimal CCOs can suffer from time inconsistency, and also how political opportunism may limit CCO policy. Hence government credibility and reputation building emerge as critical for the successful implementation of CCOs.

This book is the thirteenth volume in the International Papers in Political Economy (IPPE) series which explores the latest developments in political economy. A collection of eight papers, the book concentrates on the deregulation of domestic financial markets and discusses financial liberalisation in terms of its past performance, current progress and future developments. The chapters have been written by expert contributors in the field and focus on topics such as past records of financial liberalisation, future policies of regulation, and current account imbalances. Other papers examine capital account regulations in developing and emerging countries, and capital controls in the Eurozone after the 2007 financial crisis. This collection of papers invites readers to consider the impact of financial liberalisation both during and after the global economic crisis. Scholars and students with an interest in political economy, financialisation, and economic performance will find this collection stimulating and informative.

The increasing capital flows in the emerging markets and developed countries have raised various concerns worldwide. One main concern is the impact of the sharp decline of capital flows – so-called sudden stops – on financial markets and the stability of banking systems and the economy. The sudden stops and banking crises have been identified as the two main features of most financial crises, including the recent Asian Financial Crisis and Global Financial Crisis. However, how capital flows and banking crises are connected still remains unanswered. Most current studies on capital flows are empirical work, which faces various challenges. The challenges include how data has been collected and measured in each country and how sensitive the results are to the data and the adopted methodologies. Moreover, the links between capital flows and banking systems have been neglected. This book helps provide some insight into the challenges faced by empirical studies and the lessons of the recent crises. The book develops theoretical analysis to deepen our understanding on how capital flows, banking systems and financial markets are linked with each other and provides constructive policy implications by overcoming the empirical challenges.

A comprehensive examination of policy measures intended to help emerging markets contend with large and volatile capital flows. While always episodic in nature, capital flows to emerging market economies have been especially volatile since the global financial crisis. After peaking at $680 billion in 2007, flows to emerging markets turned negative at the onset of crisis in 2008, then rebounded only to recede again during the U.S. sovereign debt downgrade in 2011. Since then, flows have continued to swing wildly, leaving emerging market policy makers wondering whether they can put in place policies during the inflow phase that will soften the blow when flows subsequently recede. This book offers the first comprehensive treatment of policy measures intended to help emerging markets contend with large and volatile capital flows. The authors, all IMF experts, explain that, in the spirit of liberalization and deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, many emerging market governments eliminated capital inflow controls along with outflow controls. By 2012, however, capital inflow controls were again acknowledged as legitimate policy tools. Focusing on the macroeconomic and financial-stability risks associated with capital flows, the authors combine theoretical and empirical analysis to consider the interaction between monetary, exchange rate, macroprudential, and capital control policies to mitigate these risks. They examine the effectiveness of various policy tools, discuss the practical considerations and multilateral implications of their use, and provide concrete policy advice for dealing with capital inflows.

Finance and Development, June 2016

An account of the significant though gradual, uneven, disconnected, ad hoc, and pragmatic innovations in global financial governance and developmental finance induced by the global financial crisis. In When Things Don't Fall Apart, Ilene Grabel challenges the dominant view that the global financial crisis had little effect on global financial governance and developmental finance. Most observers discount all but grand, systemic ruptures in institutions and policy. Grabel argues instead that the global crisis induced inconsistent and ad hoc discontinuities in global financial governance and developmental finance that are now having profound effects on emerging market and developing economies. Grabel's chief normative claim is that the resulting incoherence in global financial governance is productive rather than debilitating. In the age of productive incoherence, a more complex, dense, fragmented, and pluripolar form of global financial governance is expanding possibilities for policy and institutional experimentation, policy space for economic and human development, financial stability and resilience, and financial inclusion. Grabel draws on key theoretical commitments of Albert Hirschman to cement the case for the productivity of incoherence. Inspired by Hirschman, Grabel demonstrates that meaningful change often emerges from disconnected, erratic, experimental, and inconsistent adjustments in institutions and policies as actors pragmatically manage in an evolving world. Grabel substantiates her claims with empirically rich case studies that explore the effects of recent crises on networks of financial governance (such as the G-20); transformations within the IMF; institutional innovations in liquidity support and project finance from the national to the transregional levels; and the “rebranding” of capital controls. Grabel concludes with a careful examination of the opportunities and risks associated with the evolutionary transformations underway.

This paper examines whether—and how—emerging market economies (EMEs) respond to capital flows to mitigate their untoward consequences. Based on a sample of about 50 EMEs over 2005Q1–2013Q4, we find that EME policy makers respond proactively to capital inflows by using a combination of policy tools: central banks raise the policy interest rate to address economic overheating concerns; intervene in the foreign exchange market to resist currency appreciation pressures; tighten macroprudential measures to dampen credit growth; and deploy capital inflow controls in the face of competitiveness and financial-stability concerns. Contrary to conventional policy advice to EMEs, we find no evidence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the face of capital inflows. Overall, policies are more likely to respond, and used in combination, during inflow surges than in more normal times.