When Timothy Sprigge's The Vindication of Absolute Idealism appeared in 1983 it ran very much against the grain of the dominant linguistic and analytic traditions of philosophy in Britain. The very title of this work was a challenge to those who believed that Absolute Idealism fell with the critiques of Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore at the beginning of the 20th century. Sprigge, however, saw himself as providing an underrepresented position in the philosophical spectrum rather than as advocating an abandoned view. For him, idealism did not fall at any determinate point in the history of philosophy. The truth of any philosophical thesis cannot depend on what happens to be currently fashionable, but rather must stand on the soundness of philosophical argument. To this end, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism is a bold statement of his conclusions, a synthesis of panpsychism and absolute idealism, which he contends is the most satisfactory solution to the question of the nature of consciousness and the mind-body problem. Sprigge's view of consciousness remains a challenge to mainstream physicalism and a viable option that addresses pressing contemporary concerns not only in metaphysics and philosophy of mind but also in environmental ethics and animal rights.

Timothy Sprigge was one of the leading exponents of philosophical idealism in the last fifty years. The idealist worldview, long unfashionable, has been coming back into favour, and Sprigge's work has found a new readership. These selected essays focus on the view of consciousness on which his unique system of metaphysics and ethics is based.

This collection of essays -- the first of its kind -- analyses the impact of the thought of F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) on philosophy throughout the English-speaking world. The pre-eminent British philosopher of his generation, Bradley's rich and complex version of Absolute Idealism plays a key role not only in Idealist philosophy, politics and ethics, but also in the development of modern logic, of analytical philosophy, and of pragmatism, as well as in the thinking of figures such as R. G. Collingwood and A. N. Whitehead. The work of a group of Canadian philosophers writing from widely different standpoints, the essays in this volume define both the nature and scale of Bradley's influence and continuing significance in large areas of debate in twentieth-century philosophy. Topics covered include: the history of Idealism in the twentieth century; Bradley's relation to figures such as Bernard Bosanquet, C. A. Campbell, Brand Blanshard, John Watson, John Dewey, R. G. Collingwood and A. N. Whitehead; Bradley's influence on twentieth-century empiricism, modern logic, and analytical philosophy; and his significance for contemporary debates in epistemology and ethics.

Transcendental Ontology in German Idealism: Schelling and Hegel sheds remarkable light on a question central to post-Kantian philosophy: after the Copernican Revolution in philosophy, what can philosophy say about the world or reality as such? What remains of ontology's task after Kant? This is a question often overlooked in contemporary scholarship on German Idealism. Markus Gabriel offers a refreshing reinvigoration of a range of questions concerning scepticism, corporeality, freedom, the question of being, the absolute and the modal status of our determinations and judgments, all crucial to our understanding of the truly radical nature of post-Kantian philosophy. Gabriel's assessment of the experiments undertaken in post-Kantian ontology reaffirms Schelling's and Hegel's place at the heart of contemporary metaphysics. The book shows how far we still have to go in mining the thought of Hegel and Schelling and how exciting, as a result, we can expect twenty-first century philosophy to be.

Publisher Description

Volume four of a ten volume set which provides full and detailed coverage of all aspects of philosophy, including information on how philosophy is practiced in different countries, who the most influential philosophers were, and what the basic concepts are.

'The Trinity and the Vindication of Christian Paradox' grapples with the question of how one may hold together the ideals of systematic theology, apologetic proof, and theological paradox by building on the insights of Cornelius Van Til. Van Til developed an apologetic where one presupposes that the Triune God exists, and then proves this Christian presupposition by demonstrating that philosophies that deny it are self-defeating in the specific sense that they rely on principles that only the Trinity, asthe ultimate harmony of unity and diversity, can furnish. A question raised by Van Til's trademark procedure is how he can evade the charge that the apparent contradictions of the christian faith render it equally self-defeating as non-Christian alternatives. This text argues that for Van Til, Christian paradoxes can be differentiated from genuine contradictions by the way that their apparently opposing elements discernibly require one another, even as they present our minds with an irresolvable conflict. And yet, Van Til failed to sufficiently vindicate the central Christian paradox-the doctrine of the Trinity-along the lines required by his system. Hence, the present text offers a unique proof that God can only exist as the pinnacle of unity-in-diversity, and as the ground of a coherent Christian system, if He exists as three, and only three, divine persons.

First Published in 2004. In Arguing for Atheism, Robin Le Poidevin addresses the question of whether theism-the view that there is a personal, transcendent creator of the universe - solves the deepest mysteries of existence. Philosophical defences of theism have often been based on the idea that it explains things which atheistic approaches cannot: for example, why the universe exists, and how there can be objective moral values. The main contention of Arguing for Atheism is that the reverse is true: that in fact theism fails to explain many things it claims to, while atheism can explain some of the things it supposedly leaves mysterious. It is also argued that religion need not depend on belief in God. Designed as a text for university courses in the philosophy of religion and metaphysics, this book’s accessible style and numerous explanations of important philosophical concepts and positions will also make it attractive to the general reader.

This book introduces American readers to a philosophical and spiritual exemplar of dialogue. The author presents a way of thinking about ourselves, the world, and our relationship to God that is neither dualistic nor monistic. The thinkers presented in this book focus on a radical departure from objectivism and subjectivism. Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Herman Cohen, Ferdinand Ebner, Eugen Rosenstock, Franz Rosenzweig, and Martin Buber were all trying to find a way to allow a transaction between self, the world, and God without foregoing either individuality or the experience of merging. Some of the issues covered in the book include the origins of philosophy; objective versus existential truth; irony, truth, and faith; ethics versus aesthetics; ethics versus religion; thought and language; love of God and neighbor; I-Thou and I-It in Nature, with people, and with God; and redemption in the world.

Interest in German Idealism--not just Kant, but Fichte and Hegel as well--has recently developed within analytic philosophy, which traditionally defined itself in opposition to the Idealist tradition. Yet one obstacle remains especially intractable: the Idealists' longstanding claim that philosophy must be systematic. In this work, the first overview of the German Idealism that is both conceptual and methodological, Paul W. Franks offers a philosophical reconstruction that is true to the movement's own times and resources and, at the same time, deeply relevant to contemporary thought. At the center of the book are some neglected but critical questions about German Idealism: Why do Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel think that philosophy's main task is the construction of a system? Why do they think that every part of this system must derive from a single, immanent and absolute principle? Why, in short, must it be all or nothing? Through close examination of the major Idealists as well as the overlooked figures who influenced their reading of Kant, Franks explores the common ground and divergences between the philosophical problems that motivated Kant and those that, in turn, motivated the Idealists. The result is a characterization of German Idealism that reveals its sources as well as its pertinence--and its challenge--to contemporary philosophical naturalism.