This report summarizes the higher capital requirements for U.S. banks regulated for safety and soundness.

In this paper, we provide an overview of the concerns surrounding the variations in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) across banks and jurisdictions and how this might undermine the Basel III capital adequacy framework. We discuss the key drivers behind the differences in these calculations, drawing upon a sample of systemically important banks from Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. We then discuss a range of policy options that could be explored to fix the actual and perceived problems with RWAs, and improve the use of risk-sensitive capital ratios.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) sets the guidelines for world-wide regulation of banks. It is the forum for agreeing international regulation on the conduct of banking. Based on special access to the archives of the BCBS and interviews with many of its key players, this book tells the story of the early years of the Committee from its foundation in 1974/5 right through until 1997 - the year that marks the watershed between the Basel I Accord on Capital Adequacy and the start of work on Basel II. In addition, the book covers the Concordat, the Market Risk Amendment, the Core Principles of Banking and all other facets of the work of the BCBS. While the book is primarily a record of the history of the BCBS, it also provides an assessment of its actions and efficacy. It is a major contribution to the historical record on banking supervision.

This book analyzes the impact of Basel Accord in Bangladesh. More specifically, it focuses on the credit risk homogenization under standardized approach of Basel Accord where External Credit Rating Agencies (ECAIs) are allowed to rate the exposures, the potential risk of allowing sub-ordinated debt (Sub-debt) as Tier 2 capital, and multiple bank distress cases as a real-world scenarios. In doing so, the book explores why the ECAIs rating fail to capture the real credit risk of exposure and to what extent sub-debt is reliable as regulatory capital. With that, the book's scope is categorized into three tracts (i) analyzes the ECAIs incentive and sanction issues from institutional economics perspective (ii) discusses the ill-impact of Naïve adoption of sub-ordinated debt as regulatory capital and its associated risk on financial system, and (iii) providing readers an empirical illustrations of bank distress when an economy tapped into institutional failures in the above-mentioned tracts (i) and (ii).

The turmoil in financial markets that resulted from the 2007 subprime mortgage crisis in the United States indicates the need to dramatically transform regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Would these institutions have been sounder if the 2004 Revised Framework on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II accord)—negotiated between 1999 and 2004—had already been fully implemented? Basel II represents a dramatic change in capital regulation of large banks in the countries represented on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Its internal ratings–based approaches to capital regulation will allow large banks to use their own credit risk models to set minimum capital requirements. The Basel Committee itself implicitly acknowledged in spring 2008 that the revised framework would not have been adequate to contain the risks exposed by the subprime crisis and needed strengthening. This crisis has highlighted two more basic questions about Basel II: One, is the method of capital regulation incorporated in the revised framework fundamentally misguided? Two, even if the basic Basel II approach has promise as a paradigm for domestic regulation, is the effort at extensive international harmonization of capital rules and supervisory practice useful and appropriate? This book provides the answers. It evaluates Basel II as a bank regulatory paradigm and as an international arrangement, considers some possible alternatives, and recommends significant changes in the arrangement.

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.

An argument that contagion is the most significant risk facing the financial system and that Dodd¬Frank has reduced the government's ability to respond effectively. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 was intended to reform financial policies in order to prevent another massive crisis such as the financial meltdown of 2008. Dodd–Frank is largely premised on the diagnosis that connectedness was the major problem in that crisis—that is, that financial institutions were overexposed to one another, resulting in a possible chain reaction of failures. In this book, Hal Scott argues that it is not connectedness but contagion that is the most significant element of systemic risk facing the financial system. Contagion is an indiscriminate run by short-term creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent institutions insolvent. It poses a serious risk because, as Scott explains, our financial system still depends on approximately $7.4 to $8.2 trillion of runnable and uninsured short-term liabilities, 60 percent of which are held by nonbanks. Scott argues that efforts by the Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the Treasury to stop the contagion that exploded after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers lessened the economic damage. And yet Congress, spurred by the public's aversion to bailouts, has dramatically weakened the power of the government to respond to contagion, including limitations on the Fed's powers as a lender of last resort. Offering uniquely detailed forensic analyses of the Lehman Brothers and AIG failures, and suggesting alternative regulatory approaches, Scott makes the case that we need to restore and strengthen our weapons for fighting contagion.

The First Basel Capital Accord, implemented in 1988, was aimed at ensuring the soundness and stability of the international banking system. The new accord, Basel II, which is planned for implementation in December 2006, is intended to strengthen the framework for dealing with credit risk. This book provides an informative analysis of what Basel II means for the small and medium-sized enterprize (SME) sector in Europe and its impact on its credit financing conditions. It also presents a detailed analysis of how banks formulate an internal rating system and illustrates how this system works in practice. Finally, it concludes with the key measures that should be taken by banks, SMEs, and public policymakers to improve financing in the new rating culture.

Analytical background -- Nature of systemic risk -- Who should be regulated (by whom) -- Counter-cyclical regulation -- Regulation of liquidity and maturity mismatches -- Other regulatory issues -- The structure of regulation -- Conclusions -- Appendix : the boundary problem in financial regulation -- Discussion and roundtables.