Considers S. Res. 151, to require the President to have the approval of Congress in order to make foreign commitments. Focuses on presidential use of power in U.S. foreign policy commitment to Vietnam.

It is now 20 years since the Cold War effectively ended with the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union and its client states in Eastern and Central Europe, and just over three decades since the final bloody climax of the Vietnam War played itself out on the streets of Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane. The historiography of the wider Cold War has burgeoned accordingly, greatly assisted by increasing access to all manner of archival material belonging to former foes on both sides of what was once the Iron Curtain. That of the Vietnam War, at least insofar as the West is concerned, had already established itself as a field of significant depth and breadth by the end of the 1980s. However, it too has benefited and continued to grow in the wake of the large-scale release by many Western governments of their remaining official material from that era into the public domain.

This book undertakes an in-depth examination of the dynamics of commitment in U.S.-Southeast Asia strategy. Drawing on cases including the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and Washington’s pivot to Asia amid China’s growing regional role, it constructs an original balance of commitment model to explain continuity and change in U.S.-Southeast Asia policy. Balance of commitment goes beyond balance of power approaches to explains how translating Southeast Asia’s importance in U.S. thinking into actual commitments has proven challenging for policymakers as it requires simultaneously calibrating adjustments to power shifts, threat perceptions and resource extraction. The book applies the balance of commitment approach to several practical case studies, based on hundreds of conversations with policymakers and experts in the United States and Southeast Asia, personal experiences across nearly two decades and primary and secondary source material across a half-century. The findings suggest that the challenges of U.S. commitment to the region are rooted not simply in differences between administrations or divergences in outlook between Washington and regional capitals, but tough balancing acts for U.S. policymakers in domestic politics and wider foreign policy. As such, shaping U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia and calibrating and sustaining commitment requires not just appreciating Southeast Asia’s significance, but committing to the region in ways that manage structural aspects of U.S. thinking, capabilities and resourcing.

A History of the Manila Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) from its establishment in 1954 until its dissolution in 1977. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) has received meagre scholarly attention in comparison to other key events and global developments during the duration of the Cold War, due to its perceived failure early in its existence. However, there has been a renewed interest in the academic study of the organization. Some scholars have argued that SEATO was not an outright failure. New literatures have also shed in detail the workings of SEATO, such as operational-level contingency plans and counter-insurgency plans. This book aims to reconstruct a comprehensive life cycle of SEATO using declassified archival documents which were unavailable to scholars studying the organization from the 1950s through the 1980s and provide a nuanced assessment of it. In addition, in recent years, there is also an emerging interest in the possibility of a multilateral military alliance in Asia, for instance the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue morphing into an "Asian NATO". As such, it is therefore crucial to study how previous multilateral alliances in the context of Asia were formed, how they functioned, and subsequently dissolved. A groundbreaking reference on a key element of the United States’ Cold War strategy in Asia, which will be a valuable resource to scholars of twentieth century diplomatic history.