R. William Johnstone served on the transportation security staff of the 9/11 Commission, and wrote this book to build upon and supplement the Commission's work. In its pages, he explains the aviation security system failure on 9/11, uses that as a means for evaluating post-9/11 transportation security efforts, and proposes remedies to continued shortcomings. 9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security is based on information originally provided to the 9/11 Commission, augmented by unpublished reports and a wealth of other material that has come to light since the issuance of the Commission's own report in July 2004. Part One analyzes the aviation security system's history and institutions to explain why the system failed on 9/11. Part Two looks at what has been done in aviation and transportation security since 9/11, including the Commission's recommendations and the congressional response to them. Finally and most significantly, Part Three outlines a suggested approach for improving current U.S. transportation security. It begins with fundamental policy questions that must be answered if we are to optimize transportation security efforts, and concludes with both underlying principles for action and specific recommendations.

Intermodal transportation terminals -- locations where multiple modes or types of passengers or cargo transportation connect and merge -- are potentially high value targets for terrorists. For ex., NYCs Penn Station functions as an intermodal hub (IH) for Amtrak, 2 main commuter rail lines, and 6 subway routes. The Transport. Security Admin. (TSA) has responsibility for securing the aviation and surface transport. sectors (ASTS). This report addresses the following questions: (1) To what extent has TSA taken actions to ensure that efforts to strengthen the security of the ASTS are based on a risk mgmt. framework, esp. those that include IH? (2) To what extent has TSA taken actions to ensure the security of the ASTS, esp. those actions that involve IH?

Terrorist attacks on surface transportation facilities in Moscow, Mumbai, London, and Madrid caused casualties and highlighted the vulnerability of such systems. The Transportation Security Admin. (TSA) is the primary fed. agency responsible for security of transportation systems. This testimony focuses on the extent to which: (1) DHS has used risk management in strengthening surface transportation security; (2) TSA has coordinated its strategy and efforts for securing surface transportation with stakeholders; (3) TSA has measured the effectiveness of its surface transportation security-improvement actions; and (4) TSA has made progress in deploying surface transportation security inspectors and related challenges it faces in doing so.