Universals in Legal Reasoning by Judges explores and expounds the usage of rules to justify judicial decisions. Inspired by Savigny's canons of interpretation, and informed by the author's years of study and teaching in Germany, the book constructs a matrix for all legal argumentation in place of the so-called rules of interpretation, classifying justificatory arguments into four categories: textual, historical, purposive, and system-contextual. Along these categories, the book reveals certain universals while dispelling the confusion and mystery surrounding reasoning from judicial case decisions. This it does — simply and elegantly — by equating reasoning from case decisions with reasoning from statute. A myriad of examples, primarily from Germany, California, and the United Kingdom, show how these arguments find universal application. From start to finish, this book is itself an argument: an argument for judicial transparency and candour, which requires that judges reveal their thoughts and motivations-their ultimate reasons. This is necessary to enhance the persuasiveness and efficacy of judicial precedents, to foster democratic legitimacy, and to permit political accountability.

It is twenty-five years since the publication of Neil MacCormick's book Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, a book that has been in print continuously since its first publication. This book looks at how examining legal reasoning can bring up important theoretical and ethical issues, as MacCormick revisits the issues anew in his current work.

This edited volume examines the very essence of the function of judges, building upon developments in the quality of justice research throughout Europe. Distinguished authors address a gap in the literature by considering the standards that individual judgments should meet, presenting both academic and practical perspectives. Readers are invited to consider such questions as: What is expected from judicial reasoning? Is there a general concept of good quality with regard to judicial reasoning? Are there any attempts being made to measure the quality of judicial reasoning? The focus here is on judges meeting the highest standards possible in adjudication and how they may be held to account for the way they reason. The contributions examine theoretical questions surrounding the measurement of the quality of judicial reasoning, practices and legal systems across Europe, and judicial reasoning in various international courts. Six legal systems in Europe are featured: England and Wales, Finland, Italy, the Czech Republic, France and Hungary as well as three non-domestic levels of court jurisdictions, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The depth and breadth of subject matter presented in this volume ensure its relevance for many years to come. All those with an interest in benchmarking the quality of judicial reasoning, including judges themselves, academics, students and legal practitioners, can find something of value in this book.

This book tackles the basics of legal reasoning in twelve chapters, including the principles of classic logic, deductive and inductive reasoning, application of the Socratic method to legal reasoning, and formal and material fallacies.

Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise special forms of reasoning is false.

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.

What makes an argument in a law case good or bad? Can legal decisions be justified by purely rational argument or are they ultimately determined by more subjective influences? These questions are central to the study of jurisprudence, and are thoroughly and critically examined in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, now with a new and up-to-date foreword. Its clarity of explanation and argument make this classic legal text readily accessible to lawyers, philosophers, and any general reader interested in legal processes, human reasoning, or practical logic.

This book seeks to examine the relations that obtain between law and a theory of law and legal reasoning and a theory of legal reasoning.