The Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") represents a massive and unprecedented investment of taxpayer money designed to stabilise the financial industry and promote economic recovery. The long-term success of the program is not assured. Success -- or failure -- will depend on whether the Department of the Treasury has spent, and will spend in the future, that massive investment wisely and efficiently to attain the program's goals. While it is too early to draw any conclusions on that ultimate issue, this assessment must necessarily begin with an understanding of what the Treasury has done thus far. The goal of this book is to present a ready reference on what TARP is and how it has been used, at least for the first $350 billion authorised as of January 23, 2009. This book consists of public domain documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access.

Includes a new foreword to the paperback edition.

Financial crises are recurring phenomena that result in the financial distress of systemically important banks, making it imperative to understand how to best respond to such crises and their consequences. Two policy responses became prominent for dealing with these distressed institutions since the last Global Financial Crisis: bailouts and bail-ins. The main questions surrounding these responses touch everyone: Are bailouts or bail-ins good for the financial system and the real economy? Is it essential to save distressed financial institutions by putting taxpayer money at risk in bailouts, or is it better to use private money in bail-ins instead? Are there better options, such as first lines of defense that help prevent such distress in the first place? Can countercyclical prudential and monetary policies lessen the likelihood and severity of the financial crises that often bring about this distress? Through careful analysis, authors Berger and Roman review and critically assess the extant theoretical and empirical research on many resolution approaches and tools. Placing special emphasis on lessons learned from one of the biggest bailouts of all time, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), while also reviewing other programs and tools, TARP and Other Bank Bailouts and Bail-Ins around the World sheds light on how best to protect the financial system on Wall Street and the real economy on Main Street. Presents a well-informed and rich account of bailouts, bail-ins, and other resolution approaches to resolve financially distressed banks. Uses TARP as a key case study of bailouts that has been thoroughly researched. Provides valuable research and policy guidance for dealing with future financial crises.

A special series outlining policy priorities and solutions in 2021 by the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Crisis and Response: An FDIC History, 2008¿2013 reviews the experience of the FDIC during a period in which the agency was confronted with two interconnected and overlapping crises¿first, the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, and second, a banking crisis that began in 2008 and continued until 2013. The history examines the FDIC¿s response, contributes to an understanding of what occurred, and shares lessons from the agency¿s experience.

Collects the transcripts of a series of lectures given by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke about the 2008 financial crisis as part of a course at George Washington University on the role of the Federal Reserve in the economy.

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.

Includes a new afterword to mark the 10th anniversary of the financial crisis The brilliantly reported New York Times bestseller that goes behind the scenes of the financial crisis on Wall Street and in Washington to give the definitive account of the crisis, the basis for the HBO film “Too Big To Fail is too good to put down. . . . It is the story of the actors in the most extraordinary financial spectacle in 80 years, and it is told brilliantly.” —The Economist In one of the most gripping financial narratives in decades, Andrew Ross Sorkin—a New York Times columnist and one of the country's most respected financial reporters—delivers the first definitive blow-by-blow account of the epochal economic crisis that brought the world to the brink. Through unprecedented access to the players involved, he re-creates all the drama and turmoil of these turbulent days, revealing never-before-disclosed details and recounting how, motivated as often by ego and greed as by fear and self-preservation, the most powerful men and women in finance and politics decided the fate of the world's economy.

The New York Times bestseller "Blinder's book deserves its likely place near the top of reading lists about the crisis. It is the best comprehensive history of the episode... A riveting tale." - Financial Times One of our wisest and most clear-eyed economic thinkers offers a masterful narrative of the crisis and its lessons. Many fine books on the financial crisis were first drafts of history—books written to fill the need for immediate understanding. Alan S. Blinder, esteemed Princeton professor, Wall Street Journal columnist, and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, held off, taking the time to understand the crisis and to think his way through to a truly comprehensive and coherent narrative of how the worst economic crisis in postwar American history happened, what the government did to fight it, and what we can do from here—mired as we still are in its wreckage. With bracing clarity, Blinder shows us how the U.S. financial system, which had grown far too complex for its own good—and too unregulated for the public good—experienced a perfect storm beginning in 2007. Things started unraveling when the much-chronicled housing bubble burst, but the ensuing implosion of what Blinder calls the “bond bubble” was larger and more devastating. Some people think of the financial industry as a sideshow with little relevance to the real economy—where the jobs, factories, and shops are. But finance is more like the circulatory system of the economic body: if the blood stops flowing, the body goes into cardiac arrest. When America’s financial structure crumbled, the damage proved to be not only deep, but wide. It took the crisis for the world to discover, to its horror, just how truly interconnected—and fragile—the global financial system is. Some observers argue that large global forces were the major culprits of the crisis. Blinder disagrees, arguing that the problem started in the U.S. and was pushed abroad, as complex, opaque, and overrated investment products were exported to a hungry world, which was nearly poisoned by them. The second part of the story explains how American and international government intervention kept us from a total meltdown. Many of the U.S. government’s actions, particularly the Fed’s, were previously unimaginable. And to an amazing—and certainly misunderstood—extent, they worked. The worst did not happen. Blinder offers clear-eyed answers to the questions still before us, even if some of the choices ahead are as divisive as they are unavoidable. After the Music Stopped is an essential history that we cannot afford to forget, because one thing history teaches is that it will happen again.

The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act1 (EESA) enacted on October 3, 2008. EESA was passed by Congress and signed by President George W. Bush to address an ongoing financial crisis that reached near-panic proportions in September 2008.