As the world's most dynamic region, Asia embodies explosive economic growth, diverse political systems, vibrant societies, modernizing militaries, cutting-edge technologies, rich cultural traditions amid globalization, and strategic competition among major powers. As a result, international relations in Asia are evolving rapidly. In this fully updated and expanded volume, leading scholars from Asia, Europe, and North America offer the most current and definitive analysis available of Asia's regional relationships. They set developments in Asia in theoretical context, assess the role of leading external and regional powers, and consider the importance of subregional actors and linkages. Combining interpretive richness and factual depth, their essays provide an authoritative and stimulating overview. Students of contemporary Asian affairs—new to the field and old hands alike—will find this book an invaluable read. Contributions by: Amitav Acharya, Sebastian Bersick, Nayan Chanda, Ralph A. Cossa, Michael Green, Samuel S. Kim, Edward J. Lincoln, Martha Brill Olcott, T.V. Paul, Phillip C. Saunders, David Shambaugh, Sheldon W. Simon, Scott Snyder, Robert Sutter, Hugh White, and Michael Yahuda

It is a unique and comprehensive study of all elements of Chinese military modernisation, focusing on the ground forces to a degree not found in other contemporary work.

Indonesia, the world's fourth most populous country, is undergoing a profound transformation that could lead to a variety of outcomes, from the consolidation of democracy to return to authoritarianism or military rule, to radical Islamic rule, or to violent disintegration. The stakes are high, for Indonesia is the key to Southeast Asian security. The authors examine the trends and dynamics that are driving Indonesia's transformation, outline possible strategic futures and their implications for regional stability, and identify options the United States might pursue in the critical challenge of influencing Indonesia's future course. Steps the United States might take now include support for Indonesia's stability and territorial integrity, reestablishment of Indonesian-U.S. military cooperation and interaction, aid in rebuilding a constructive Indonesian role in regional security, and support for development of a regional crisis reaction force. A continued strong U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region will reinforce the U.S. role as regional balancer.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."