This paper uses the three-country duopoly model to examine the effects of lowered trade barriers when a new entrant joins a trading bloc. There are two firms—a small-country firm and a large-country firm within the bloc—and three markets—two within and one (new entrant’s) outside the bloc. The analysis generally shows greater gains for the small-country than for the large-country firm. The small-country firm will export more to the external country than the large-country firm. But if tariffs decline, the export share of the large-country firm will increase relative to the small-country firm’s, though profits will improve more for the latter.

This paper uses the three-country duopoly model to examine the effects of lowered trade barriers when a new entrant joins a trading bloc. There are two firms a small-country firm and a large-country firm within the bloc and three markets two within and one (new entrant`s) outside the bloc. The analysis generally shows greater gains for the small-country than for the large-country firm. The small-country firm will export more to the external country than the large-country firm. But if tariffs decline, the export share of the large-country firm will increase relative to the small-country firm`s, though profits will improve more for the latter.

The recent proliferation of free trade areas and customs unions in the world trading system has led to a revival of interest in the economic analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). The principal theoretical question of the 1950s and 1960s (Viner) was whether PTAs encourage or discourage the worldwide nondiscriminatory freeing of trade. The essays in this volume present the central contributions to the analytical approaches developed to examine these questions. -- Provided by publisher.

In this paper, we present a model where trade is motivated both by preference for variety and comparative advantages. We use this framework to analyze the welfare implications of trading blocs among countries with different endowments with and without transportation costs. In this framework, we address the following issues: a) the welfare implications of the consolidation of the world into a few trading blocs; b) the different incentives that rich and poor countries have in choosing their partners in trade arrangements; c) whether the welfare consequences of continental preferential trade arrangements depend on the relative endowments.

Covers trends from 1957 to 1995.

Regional economic arrangements such as free trade areas (FTAs), customs unions, and currency blocs, have become increasingly prevalent in the world economy. Both pervasive and controversial, regionalization has some economists optimistic about the opportunities it creates and others fearful that it may corrupt fragile efforts to encourage global free trade. Including both empirical and theoretical studies, this volume addresses several important questions: Why do countries adopt FTAs and other regional trading arrangements? To what extent have existing regional arrangements actually affected patterns of trade? What are the welfare effects of such arrangements? Several chapters explore the economic effects of regional arrangements on patterns of trade, either on price differentials or via the gravity model on bilateral trade flows. In addition, this book examines the theoretical foundation of the gravity model. Making extensive use of the gravity model of bilateral trade, several chapters explore the economic effects of regional arrangements. In addition, this book examines the theoretical foundation of the gravity model.