A comprehensive analysis of the European defence project: its origins, purpose, and goals.

This paper briefly explores the possibility and limitations of a common European foreign and security policy (CFSP). It concludes that, contrary to the recieved wisdom, a the material basis for a viable CFSP does in fact already exist due to national security policies such as the French Force d'Action Rapide (FAR), and similar rapid reaction forces. However while the material base needed for a CFSP does exist, the political unity and will to employ such forces does not yet exist. However as time passes the possibility of a viable unified CFSP will increase as the functionalist processes of the EU gradually transform the potential of an EU CFSP into reality.

This dissertation traces military integration in Europe from the 1940s to the early 2000s in order to reveal the growth of a common European defence identity. Four factors characterize its approach. First, European defence identity is analyzed in relation to the broader path of European integration and its historical context, showing connections with key turning points in European integration, with the evolution of Franco-German relations and European-American relations, with the Cold War and subsequent Collapse of Communism, etc. Second, the dissertation applies theories of identity formation to guide the historical analysis. This approach draws attention, for example, to the important roles that borders and symbols played in European defence identity formation. Third, the thesis adopts a hybrid ztop-downy and zbottom-upy approach; one side considers formal programs, policies, and institutions that promoted a European defence identity, while the other takes stock of public perceptions, actions by zrank and filey soldiers, etc. This dual approach helps to reveal more fully the complex, negotiated character of European defence identity formation. Finally, this thesis traces the growth of a European defence identity as a path of ideological and emotional change, growing commitment, and trust-building that spanned decades.

"The EU made a strong commitment to developing an effective EU led crisis management capacity. By 2003 the EU must be in a position to deploy within 60 days up to 50,000-60,000 troops capable of a full range of so-called Petersberg tasks including: humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, combat force tasks in crisis management and peacemaking missions." "According to the EU however the initiative should not be seen as a duplication of NATO. Neither should the establishment of a European Force be confused with the concept of a European army. Whether a European army, or a common defence for Europe is more capable of handling the future needs and challenges of the EU is not the subject of this book. Essentially it is about whether a military crisis management system is practical and realistic and how the planned initiatives within the agreed limits are to be transformed into operative policy."--BOOK JACKET.

At the European Union's Helsinki summit of December 1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the development of a new Common European Security and Defense Policy aimed at giving the EU a stronger role in international affairs backed by a credible military force. This Marshall Center Paper analyzes the processes leading to Helsinki by examining why and how this new European consensus on defense issues came about. It takes the pulse of the EU's emerging defense policy and touches upon the main controversies and challenges that still lie ahead.

This illustrated book that includes tables, charts, and maps primarily discusses the role of USAREUR (US Army Europe) in rearming and training the new German Army which was perhaps the Army's single greatest contribution toward maintaining security in Western Europe. Likewise, the relationship between American soldiers and their French and West German hosts evolved over time and is a critical element in telling the story of the US Army in Europe.

The NATO Alliance deterred Soviet aggression towards Western Europe by maintaining a large ground force of several corps supported by numerous air armadas. Success lay partly on vigilance and partly on the large heavy mechanized and armored divisions, which were suited for intensive combat in Central Europe. That era has passed, unlikely to be replicated again. To its credit, the Alliance recognized this change and began adapting almost immediately. In this monograph, Dr. Andrew Dorman briefly examines the European response to the changing security environment and the opportunities presented by the European Security and Defense Policy Expeditionary Force. As he correctly observes, the establishment of a European expeditionary force will be no easy matter, will require substantial investment, and will take years to complete. However, it is the right course for Europe to take. The European Union (EU) cannot manage emerging security issues using Cold War legacy forces because they are too ponderous to deploy. A lighter, more nimble expeditionary force is critical to EU policy.

Using the European Defence Community (EDC) as a case-study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting view of the British and American governments towards European integration in the early 1950s. The British, fearing an 'agonizing reappraisal' of the American defence commitment to Europe if the supranational EDC failed, went to great lengths to ensure the success of the scheme. When, despite these efforts, the EDC finally collapsed in August 1954, NATO was plunged into arguably the most severe crisis in its history. The crisis also possessed an Anglo-American dimension, with London and Washington badly divided on how it should be resolved. In the end, the British were instrumental in the creation of the Western European Union as a successor to the EDC. Their crisis management, however, had been rooted in fear of the 'agonizing reappraisal', a danger dismissed by many historians as exaggerated but which the British, in 1954, were perhaps right to take seriously.