Reports findings of a December 1973 Jerusalem Symposium assessing the trauma among the world's Jews (and non-Jews) during and following the October war.

An updated edition that sheds new light on one of the most dramatic reversals of military fortune in modern history. The easing of Israeli military censorship after four decades has enabled Abraham Rabinovich to offer fresh insights into this fiercest of Israel-Arab conflicts. A surprise Arab attack on two fronts on the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, with Israel’s reserves un-mobilized, triggered apocalyptic visions in Israel, euphoria in the Arab world, and fraught debates on both sides. Rabinovich, who covered the war for The Jerusalem Post, draws on extensive interviews and primary source material to shape his enthralling narrative. We learn of two Egyptian nationals, working separately for the Mossad, who supplied Israel with key information that helped change the course of the war; of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s proposal for a nuclear “demonstration” to warn off the Arabs; and of Chief of Staff David Elazar’s conclusion on the fifth day of battle that Israel could not win. Newly available transcripts enable us to follow the decision-making process in real time from the prime minister’s office to commanders studying maps in the field. After almost overrunning the Golan Heights, the Syrian attack is broken in desperate battles. And as Israel regains its psychological balance, General Ariel Sharon leads a nighttime counterattack across the Suez Canal through a narrow hole in the Egyptian line -- the turning point of the war.

This is the authoritative account of the Israeli army’s performance in the bitter Yom Kippur War of 1973. The origins of the war amid the turbulent history of competing powers in the Middle East are fully explored, as is the build-up of Arab forces that almost inexplicably caught Israel by surprise. The author then provides a gripping narrative of the conflict itself, punctuated by firsthand accounts and interviews with combatants. The War of Atonement is full of drama and tales of inspirational bravery, as Israel defied the odds to defeat the two-pronged invasion. An analysis of the political implications of the conflict bring this epic tale to a close. For this edition Chaim Herzog’s son, Brigadier General Michael Herzog, has written an introduction which places the book in the context of his father’s achievements and gives a revealing insight into the man himself. This is the most comprehensive work on a conflict that has had major implications for our own troubled times.

A balanced depiction, minutely detailÝing ̈ the causes, preparation, strategies and actual battles of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. --Booklist

On October 6, 1973, Israel's Northern Command was surprised by the thunder of cannon fire and the sight of dense, black smoke. A Syrian force of 1,400 tanks supported by artillery and air power had attacked from the north while the Egyptian military invaded the Sinai Peninsula in the south. Syria sought to avenge its devastating loss of the Golan Heights in the 1967 Six-Day War -- a conflict that not only resulted in territorial gain for Israel but also cemented the nation's reputation as the region's preeminent military power. Although Israel ultimately prevailed, the Yom Kippur War (or Ramadan War, as it is known in Arab countries) shattered the illusion of Israel's invincibility. In Syrians at the Border , Israel's foremost scholar of the war, Dani Asher, and an eminent group of experts provide the definitive history of this key conflict. The contributors -- Major General Yitzhak Hofi, the Northern commander in chief; Major General Uri Simchoni, head of Command Operations; Brigadier General Avraham Bar David, head of Artillery; and Colonel Hagai Mann, the command's intelligence officer -- all held key positions during the fighting. Together, they offer fresh insight into the prewar debate that raged between the Israeli Northern Command and intelligence officers who believed that Syria would not instigate conflict. This seminal study also examines the pivotal battles that changed the course of the war, as well as the disastrous effects of a flawed postwar evaluation that adversely affected the careers of several high-ranking intelligence officials and the course of defense strategic planning thereafter. The contributors' incisive analyses contribute significantly to our understanding of this troubled region.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War marked a turning point in the "special relationship" between the United States and Israel. While previous U.S. administrations had taken a relatively even hand in the Middle East, the action saw American support of Israel become virtually unconditional. A massive airlift of military hardware to Israel brought the U.S. and the Soviet Union closer to conflict. As the war--just two weeks in duration--played out along the Suez Canal, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew was forced to resign amidst bribery allegations. Watergate escalated, resulting in President Nixon's near-breakdown. Despite Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's efforts to supply arms to Israel, he was stymied by resistance in the Department of Defense, which some saw as overly provocative toward the Arabs. Ostensibly a U.S. foreign policy success, the war led directly to the 1974 oil crisis and a permanent rift in U.S.-Arab relations. Drawing on Kissinger's telephone conversations and recently declassified documents, this book tells the story of how the secretary became the chief architect of America's Middle East policy, and how his Cold War strategy played a critical role in the decision to pursue active military involvement.

Looking at the political, military and intelligence components of the Yom Kippur War, this work offers interpretations of Israel's conflict with the Arabs. The contributors, Israeli academics, some involved in the war, make a contribution to the understanding of this part of Israel's history.

A commander and an officer with the IDF recount their experiences in the Yom Kippur War, offering insight into Israel’s military leadership. At the Decisive Point in the Sinai is a firsthand account of Operation Stouthearted Men—arguably the 1973 Yom Kippur War’s most intense engagement. General Jacob Even and Colonel Simcha B. Moaz were key leaders in Major General Ariel Sharon’s division. Together, Even and Maoz recount the initial stages of the Suez crossing, examine the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) response to Egypt’s surprise attack, and explain Sharon’s role in the transition from defense to offense. They detail Sharon’s struggle to convince his superiors of his plan and argue that an effective division commander is not only revealed by his leadership of subordinates but also by his ability to influence his senior officers. Even and Maoz challenge students of military leadership by offering a case study on effective leadership. “At the Decisive Point is the single best volume I have ever read on the Yom Kippur War. It bridges the gap between the two standard forms of writing on the 1973 conflict?the memoir and the historical monograph?and does so in a very effective manner.” —Robert M. Citino, author of The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 “The authors’ work, in sum, presents an interesting and informative account of the Yom Kippur War on the Sinai front.” —Israel Affairs

The surprise of the Yom Kippur War (1973) rivals that of the other two major strategic surprises in the twentieth century—Operation Barbarossa, the German surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The major difference between these events is that Israeli intelligence had a lot more and better quality information leading up to the attack than did the Soviet Union or the United States prior to those attacks. Why, then, was the beginning of the Yom Kippur War such a surprise? While many scholars have tried to explain why Israel was caught unawares despite its sophisticated military intelligence services, Dalia Gavriely-Nuri looks beyond the military, intelligence, and political explanations to a cultural explanation. Israeli Culture on the Road to the Yom Kippur War reveals that the culture that evolved in Israel between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War played a large role in the surprise. Gavriely-Nuri’s analysis provides new and innovative insights into the relationship between culture and socio-political phenomena and security.