A charged revealing examination of the historical events surrounding the London Sunday Times headline of October 5, 1986: "Revealed: the secrets of Israel's nuclear arsenal". Mordechai Vanunu, was a former technician at Israel's secret nuclear research centre at Dimona, and had made public highly classified information about Israel's nuclear research program; for this he was kidnapped by the Mossad, subjected to a closed doors trial, convicted of espionage and treason, and subjected to an eighteen-year sentence. A careful and meticulous study of the Vanunu affair, this startling expose involves Israel's intelligence community, and draws from thousands of pages of court transcripts and testimony connected to the case. THE WHISTLEBLOWER OF DIMONA is compelling and strongly recommended reading -- especially in light of contemporary international events in the Middle East.

Israel has made a unique contribution to the nuclear age& mdash;it has created (with the tacit support of the United States) a special "bargain" with its bomb. Israel is the only nuclear-armed state that keeps its bomb invisible, unacknowledged, opaque. It will only say that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. The bomb is Israel's collective ineffable& mdash;the nation's last taboo. This bargain has a name: in Hebrew, it is called amimut, or opacity. By adhering to the bargain, which was born in a secret deal between Richard Nixon and Golda Meir, Israel creates a code of nuclear conduct that encompasses both governmental policy and societal behavior. The bargain lowers the salience of Israel's nuclear weapons, yet it also remains incompatible with the norms and values of liberal democracy. It relies on secrecy and opacity. It infringes on the public right to know and negates the notion of public accountability and oversight, among other offenses. Author of the critically acclaimed Israel and the Bomb, Avner Cohen offers a bold and original study of this politically explosive subject. Along with a fair appraisal of the bargain's strategic merits, Cohen provides a critique of its antidemocratic faults. Arguing that the bargain has become increasingly anachronistic, he calls for a reform in line with domestic democratic values as well as current international nuclear norms. Most important, he believes the old methods will prove inadequate in dealing with a nuclear Iran. Cohen concludes with fresh perspectives on Iran, Israel, and the effort toward global disarmament.

Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez’s groundbreaking history of the Six-Day War in 1967 radically changes our understanding of that conflict, casting it as a crucial arena of Cold War intrigue that has shaped the Middle East to this day. The authors, award-winning Israeli journalists and historians, have investigated newly available documents and testimonies from the former Soviet Union, cross-checked them against Israeli and Western sources, and arrived at fresh and startling conclusions. Contrary to previous interpretations, Ginor and Remez’s book shows that the Six-Day War was the result of a joint Soviet-Arab gambit to provoke Israel into a preemptive attack. The authors reveal how the Soviets received a secret Israeli message indicating that Israel, despite its official ambiguity, was about to acquire nuclear weapons. Determined to destroy Israel’s nuclear program before it could produce an atomic bomb, the Soviets then began preparing for war--well before Moscow accused Israel of offensive intent, the overt trigger of the crisis. Ginor and Remez’s startling account details how the Soviet-Arab onslaught was to be unleashed once Israel had been drawn into action and was branded as the aggressor. The Soviets had submarine-based nuclear missiles poised for use against Israel in case it already possessed and tried to use an atomic device, and the USSR prepared and actually began a marine landing on Israel’s shores backed by strategic bombers and fighter squadrons. They sent their most advanced, still-secret aircraft, the MiG-25 Foxbat, on provocative sorties over Israel’s Dimona nuclear complex to prepare the planned attack on it, and to scare Israel into making the first strike. It was only the unpredicted devastation of Israel’s response that narrowly thwarted the Soviet design.

This book describes the clandestine missions that were defining moments in the evolution of the Mossad, including its pursuit of the Black September terrorists who murdered Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic Games, its acquisition on the high seas of yellowcake uranium for Israel's undeclared nuclear weapons program, and its role in bringing to justice Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann. The agency's more questionable deeds are also covered, among them the assassination of civilian scientists associated with Iraq's nuclear energy program and the abduction of Israeli citizen Mordechai Vanunu, who, like Edward Snowden, has been variously depicted as a principled whistleblower and an unscrupulous traitor. Taken together, the missions discussed in this volume illustrate the Mossad's character, creativity and courage, while acknowledging the problematical moral dimensions of its operations.

Focused on the triangular relationship between rabbis, journalists and the public, this book analyses each group’s role in influencing the agenda around religion in Israel. The book draws upon the author's original research, comprising an analysis of the coverage of religion on four Israeli news websites, a series of surveys of rabbis, journalists, and the public, as well as a large number of interviews conducted with a range of stakeholders: community rabbis, teacher rabbis, and religious court judges; reporters, editors, and spokespersons; and the Israeli Jewish public. Key questions include: What are rabbis’ philosophical views of the media? How does the media define news about Judaism? What aspect of news about religion and spirituality interest the public? How do spokespersons and rabbis influence the news agenda? How is the triangular relationship between rabbis, journalists and the public being altered by the digital age? Despite a lack of understanding about mass media behaviour among many rabbis, and, concurrently, a lack of knowledge about religion among many journalists, it is argued that there is shared interest between the two groups, both in support of mass-media values like the right to know and freedom of expression. It is further argued that the public's attitude to news about religion is significant in determining what journalists should publish. The book will be of interest to those studying mass communications, the media, Judaism and Israeli society, as well as researchers of media and religion.

Global Secret and Intelligence Services II Hidden Systems that deliver Unforgettable Customer Service Global Secret and Intelligence Services II Hidden Systems that deliver Unforgettable Customer Service First Edition 2006 Second Edition 2009 Third Edition 2014 Updated: UUTYG/TT5443 Note: Because of some special contents of this publication, some pages are in French, German and Italien The DEA in popular culture * The DEA.org (The Drug Enjoying Americans), a drug information site. * Gary Oldman played a corrupt DEA Agent in The Professional. * Luis Guzman and Don Cheadle play two DEA agents in the movie Traffic. * Vin Diesel plays a DEA agent in the movie A Man Apart. * Max Payne is a DEA agent in the video game series Max Payne. In the game, Max battles addicts of a fictional designer drug called Valkyr. * David Duchovny played a transvestite DEA agent, Denise/Dennis Bryson on the series, Twin Peaks. * Mary-Louise Parker finds out that her boyfriend is a DEA agent on the Showtime series "Weeds"

For Israel_more so than for any other state_an effective Intelligence Community has been a matter of life and death. Over the past half-century or so, Israel has created and refined what is broadly regarded as one of the best intelligence networks in the world. It has repeatedly undone efforts by hostile Arab neighbors to defeat it in war, foiled countless terrorist attacks, contributed to military preparedness and armament production, and helped millions of Jews to reach the Promised Land. Unfortunately, it has also committed some terrible mistakes and made blunders it can ill afford. With all of this activity, it is no wonder so much has been written about Israeli Intelligence. However, a handy reference work bringing the various strands together has been sorely needed yet unavailable, until now. The Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence provides detailed information on the various agencies, operations, important leaders and operatives, and special aspects of tradecraft through a chronology, an introduction, a dictionary full of cross-referenced entries, and a bibliography suggesting further reading.

By positioning the late Edward Said's political interventions as a public intellectual on behalf of Palestinian populations living under Israeli occupation as a form of intellectual resistance, Abraham moves to consider forms of physical resistance, seeking to better understand the motivations of those who choose to turn their bodies into weapons.

In this book, the authors explore the controversial Iranian nuclear programme through the conceptual lens of nuclear hedging. In 2002, revelations regarding undeclared nuclear facilities thrust Iran’s nuclear activities under the spotlight and prompted concerns that Tehran was pursuing nuclear weapons. Iran has always denied nuclear weapons aspirations, yet it cannot be disputed that the Islamic Republic has gone well beyond what is required for a civil nuclear programme based on energy production and scientific research. What, then, is the nature and significance of Iran's nuclear behaviour? Does it form part of a coherent strategy? What can Iran's actions in the nuclear field tell us about Tehran's intentions? And what does the Iranian case teach us about proliferation behaviour more generally? This book addresses these questions by exploring the nature of nuclear hedging and how this approach might be identified, before applying this logic to the Iranian case. It provides fresh insights into the inherently opaque area of nuclear proliferation and a more nuanced interpretation of the Iranian nuclear challenge.

"Significant change took place when President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger adopted a new strategy.