This book interrogates the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement from its inception in July 2005 to its conclusion in the latter part of 2008 through 12 articles, each of which focuses on different aspects of the deal. They discuss the factors that facilitated the deal, the roadblocks that were encountered, and the implications of the deal for the future of India’s foreign policy, its energy security and the international non-proliferation regime. Together, they address the internal political dynamics in India and the United States in order to present perspectives of both countries.

From 2005 to 2008, the United States and India negotiated a pathbreaking nuclear agreement that recognised India's nuclear status and lifted longstanding embargoes on civilian nuclear cooperation with India. This book offers the most comprehensive account of the diplomacy and domestic politics behind this nuclear agreement. Domestic politics considerably impeded - and may have entirely prevented - US nuclear accommodation with India; when domestic obstacles were overcome, US–India negotiations advanced; and even after negotiations advanced, domestic factors placed conditions on and affected the scope of US–India nuclear cooperation. Such a study provides new insights into this major event in international politics, and it offers a valuable framework for analysing additional US strategic and nuclear dialogues with India and with other countries.

The Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal July 2005 Is An Epochal Event Setting The Stage For India S Tacit Admission Into The Elite Nuclear Club Of Five . While Opening The Doors For India To The Global Nuclear Energy Market, The Deal Will Have Far-Reaching Impact On Regional As Well As International Relations. Some As China And Pakistan Could See It Detrimental To Their Security Interests. Others As France And Germany, Acknowledging India S Rising Power, Have Preferred To Engage It. Within The Two Nations, India And The U.S., The Opinions Have Been Sharply Divided. The U.S. Non-Proliferation Community Has Attacked President Bush For Opening A Pandora S Box By Cooperating With A State Which Possesses Nuclear Weapons But Is Non-Signatory Of The Npt. In India, Concerns Of Sovereignty Have Overshadowed The Sizeable Gains Accruing To The Country In Its Quest For Energy Sufficiency.The Articles In The Present Book Place The Entire Debate On Indo-U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal In Perspective By Examining The Background Which Led The Bush Administration To Propose A Change In The Nuclear Rules In Favor Of India, The Range Of Deliberations That Have Followed And The Final Stages Awaiting Formal Recognition. An Attempt Has Been Made To Cover Both The Objective And Subjective Factors Which Have Driven This Nuclear Debate. In Addition To Articles By Erudite Experts In The Field Of International Affairs, The Book Also Includes Important Documents Relating To The Nuclear Deal Speeches Of The U.S. President, Indian Prime Minister, Senators, Congressmen, Senior Officials, The Viewpoints Of Different Countries, The Nsg, And The Iaea Chief.The Book Is A Seminal Contribution To Indo-U.S. Relations And Will Prove Invaluable To Students And Scholars Of International Affairs, Strategic Analysts, Policy Planners, Diplomats, Parliamentarians As Well As Common Readers Interested In Contemporary World Affairs.

Publisher Fact Sheet The definitive history of India's long flirtation with nuclear capability, culminating in the nuclear tests that surprised the world in May 1998.

The controversial civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the United States fueled controversial civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the United States fueled controversy and opposition to in a way that no foreign policy issue has done in recent memory. This happened for the good reason that the country`s ``Janes-faced`` or dual-purpose nuclear energy programme is the jewel in the crown of the Indian state and spearheads the longstanding policy of government to make Indian an advanced scientific and technological power. The nuclear deal has come to be seen as undermining this national intent and ambition by substituting self-reliance with risky dependence on foreign Countries and Companies. The deal promised facilitation of trade and commerce in frontline nuclear technologies. But the only technology readily on offer is seen to be the light water reactor that are finding it difficult to be peddled elsewhere, including in their own countries, to their own people, because of the widespread concerns about nuclear accidents, radiation hazards, and environmental damage, a `la Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The fact that India was unlikely easily to access other technologies after the enabling US law the so-called ``Hyde Act``, was legislated in December 2006 by the US Congress. This Act expressly forbids sale or transfer of any technology related to uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and heavy water production. Worse, even for this limited nuclear deal, Washington extracted some very onerous terms requiring, among other things, that India separate its hitherto integrated nuclear energy programme into its military and civilian components and erect ``firewalls`` between them thereby, at a stroke, destroying its cohension and the scheme of the best and most economical use of scarce human, financial, and material resources; agree to put the bulk of hte civilian-use reactors under international safeguards; and, to accept the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty strictures even though India is not a signatory and not bound by it terms. Most worryingly, however, is the Indian government`s acceptance of the no-testing condition as the basis for the deal. It amounts to India signing, de facto, the Comprohensive Test Ban Treaty strategically the worst thing the country can do at a time when further testing, particularly of the thermonuclear warheads and weapons is an urgent imperative, considering that the test of the fusion device in 1998 had fizzled out. Without more tests, India`s deterrent will lack credibility and its thermonuclear armaments will neither be reliable nor safe. This is intolerable from the point of view of national security. The four authors three of them stalwarts of the nuclear programme and the fourth, a highly regarded strategic expert-wrote extensively about these and other negatives of the nuclear deal. This is a compilation of their writings in newspapers and journals critical of the deal ands why it will turn out to be aliability.P.K. Iyenger, a theoretical physicist of international repute, was successively head of the Physics Group that designed the 1974 implosion device, director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), Trombay, and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. A.N. Prasad is an expert in plutonium reprocessing and retired as Director, BARC, and Member of the Atomic Energy Commission. For many years, he was also Adviser to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. A. Gopalakrishnan, a Berkeley-trained engineer, was involved in various prestigious nuclear energy projects, retiring as Chairman, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board responsible for the safety of nuclear installations in the country. He has been a Fellow at Harvard University. Bharat Karnad is Professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and author of India`s Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security. He was member of the Nuclear Doctrine Drafting Group and Formely, Adviser, Defence Expenditure, Finance Commission.

This book explores the relationship between the developing India–US strategic Partnership and Pakistan’s security. It assesses India and the US's areas of cooperation to show that the partnership will bring drastic changes for India’s military capabilities and modernization of its forces. The book shows that, in addition to enhancing India’s domestic nuclear stockpiles through the nuclear cooperation agreement, collaboration in high-tech areas such as space and innovative technologies will enable India to acquire sophisticated delivery systems as well as surveillance capacity. The author argues that these advancements will enable India to destabilize the strategic balance in the region. The book also briefly explores the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan that provide an insight into the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining deterrence in the region. To understand the power dynamics caused by the strategic partnership and their impact on strategic stability in South Asia, the author utilizes the Balance of Power and Power Transition theories. A timely analysis of the India–US Strategic Partnership with a Pakistan angle, the book will be of interest to academics working in the fields of Asian security, Asian politics, especially South Asia, strategic studies, international relations, political science, nuclear non-proliferation, conflict studies, arms control, and security studies.

The U.S. government has made safeguarding of weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium an international policy priority, and convened The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., on April 12 and 13, 2010. Forty six governments sent delegations to the summit and twenty nine of them made national commitments to support nuclear security. During the Summit, India announced its commitment to establish a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership. The Centre is to be open to international participation through academic0 exchanges, training, and research and development efforts. India-United States Cooperation on Global Security is the summary of a workshop held by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) together with its partner of more than 15 years, the National Institute for Advanced Studies (NIAS) in Bangalore, India. The workshop identified and examined potential areas for substantive scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries on issues related to nuclear material security. Technical experts from India and the United States focused on topics of nuclear material security and promising opportunities for India and the United States to learn from each other and cooperate. This report discusses nuclear materials management issues such as nuclear materials accounting, cyber security, physical security, and nuclear forensics.

As Britain and the United States commemorate five decades of the special nuclear relationship embodied in the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA), two leading research institutes--one on either side of the Atlantic--have collaborated to examine that history. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C., and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, enlisted senior officials, scientists, academics, and members of industry who have been involved in the implementation of the MDA over the years. The contributors were asked to recount how the U.S.-UK nuclear relationship flourished despite such obstacles as the halt in the scientific cooperation that had spurred the Manhattan Project; the Suez crisis; and sharp disagreements over scientific, political, and technical issues. They were also asked to look to the future of this unparalleled transatlantic relationship. Abstracts from 36 oral histories (taken with, among others, Des Browne, UK secretary of state for defence; James Schlesinger, former U.S. secretary of energy; and Harold Brown, former U.S. secretary of defense) add to the historical dimension of this work. The resulting collection of histories, analyses, and anecdotes provides valuable reading for an understanding of how the two nations were drawn together by a common threat during a turbulent era, as well as how they will face future challenges in a radically changed security environment. -- Amazon.com.

The US-India nuclear deal, popularly known as the 123 Agreement, announced by George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh on 18 July 2005, was a defining moment in the relationship of the two countries, as also India's relationship with the non-proliferation regime. The Bush administration's implied recognition of India's nuclear weapons, and its abrupt reversal of three decades of sanctions to restore Indian access to nuclear fuel, reactors, and dual-use technologies despite being a non-proliferation treaty non-signatory, led to contentious debates in both India and the USA. This text emphasises the multifaceted debate in India over the nuclear deal using concepts from science and technology studies.