Lawrence of Arabia's forgotten treatise on the art and the science of guerrilla warfare This little booklet reproduces T.E. Lawrence's famed 1920s work The Science of Guerrilla Warfare which shaped the thinking of partisans and guerrilla-hunters alike for more than two generations. Unique in its focus, completely logical in its conclusions and epic in its scope, The Science of Guerrilla Warfare is concerned mainly with the Arab Revolt, led by Lawrence during the First World War. T.E. Lawrence was the preeminent irregular warfare thinker of his day and this small tome allows us the opportunity, a century later, to peer deeply into the unconventional military mind of a genius in the science of guerrilla warfare.

The Civil War tends to be remembered as a vast sequence of battles, with a turning point at Gettysburg and a culmination at Appomattox. But in the guerrilla theater, the conflict was a vast sequence of home invasions, local traumas, and social degeneration that did not necessarily end in 1865. This book chronicles the history of “guerrilla memory,” the collision of the Civil War memory “industry” with the somber realities of irregular warfare in the borderlands of Missouri and Kansas. In the first accounting of its kind, Matthew Christopher Hulbert’s book analyzes the cultural politics behind how Americans have remembered, misremembered, and re-remembered guerrilla warfare in political rhetoric, historical scholarship, literature, and film and at reunions and on the stage. By probing how memories of the guerrilla war were intentionally designed, created, silenced, updated, and even destroyed, Hulbert ultimately reveals a continent-wide story in which Confederate bushwhackers—pariahs of the eastern struggle over slavery—were transformed into the vanguards of American imperialism in the West.

Much as Che Guevara's book Guerilla Warfare helped define and delineate a new type of warfare in the wake of the Cuban revolution in 1961, Cyber Guerilla will help define the new types of threats and fighters now appearing in the digital landscape. Cyber Guerilla provides valuable insight for infosec professionals and consultants, as well as government, military, and corporate IT strategists who must defend against myriad threats from non-state actors. The authors take readers inside the operations and tactics of cyber guerillas, who are changing the dynamics of cyber warfare and information security through their unconventional strategies and threats. This book draws lessons from the authors' own experiences but also from illustrative hacker groups such as Anonymous, LulzSec and Rebellious Rose. - Discusses the conceptual and ideological foundation of hackers and hacker groups - Provides concrete footholds regarding hacker group strategy - Discusses how cyber guerillas are changing the face of cyber warfare and cyber security through asymmetrical, flexible and stealthy means and methods - Explains the tactics, techniques, and procedures these hacker groups use in their operations - Describes how cyber guerrillas and hackers use the media and influence the public - Serves as a must-have guide for anyone who wants to understand—or is responsible for defending against—cyber warfare attacks

This book deals with guerrilla warfare; it does not aim at presenting a universal theory, for such a theory would be either exceedingly vague or exceedingly wrong. The present volume is the first part of a wider study which, the author believes, has not been attempted before - a critical interpretation of guerrilla and terrorist theory and practice

As fitting for the 21st century as von Clausewitz's "On War" was in its own time, "Invisible Armies" is a complete global history of guerrilla uprisings through the ages.

Che Guevara, the larger-than-life hero of the 1959 revolutionary victory that overturned the Cuban dictatorship, believed that revolution would also topple the imperialist governments in Latin America. Che's call to action, his proclamation of "invincibility"-the ultimate victory of revolutionary forces-continues to influence the course of Latin American history and international relations. His amazing life story has lifted him to almost legendary status. This edition of Che's classic work Guerrilla Warfare contains the text of his book, as well as two later essays titled "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method" and "Message to the Tricontinental." A detailed introduction by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., examines Guevara's text, his life and political impact, the situation in Latin America, and the United States' response to Che and to events in Latin America. Loveman and Davies also provide in-depth case studies that apply Che's theories on revolution to political situations in seven Latin American countries from the 1960s to the present. Also included are political chronologies of each country discussed in the case studies and a postscript tying the analyses together. This book will help students gain a better understanding of Che's theoretical contribution to revolutionary literature and the inspiration that his life and Guerrilla Warfare have provided to revolutionaries since the 1960s. This volume is an invaluable addition to courses in Latin American studies and political science.

Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both industrialized and developing nations attract ever-increasing numbers of people, outstripping rural growth rates worldwide. As a consequence of this population shift from the countryside to the cities, guerrilla conflict in urban areas, similar to the violent response to U.S. occupation in Iraq, will become more frequent. Urban Guerrilla Warfare traces the diverse origins of urban conflicts and identifies similarities and differences in the methods of counterinsurgent forces. In this wide-ranging and richly detailed comparative analysis, Anthony James Joes examines eight key examples of urban guerrilla conflict spanning half a century and four continents: Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, Algiers in 1957, Montevideo and São Paulo in the 1960s, Saigon in 1968, Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1998, and Grozny from 1994 to 1996. Joes demonstrates that urban insurgents violate certain fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare as set forth by renowned military strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung. Urban guerrillas operate in finite areas, leaving themselves vulnerable to encirclement and ultimate defeat. They also tend to abandon the goal of establishing a secure base or a cross-border sanctuary, making precarious combat even riskier. Typically, urban guerrillas do not solely target soldiers and police; they often attack civilians in an effort to frighten and disorient the local population and discredit the regime. Thus urban guerrilla warfare becomes difficult to distinguish from simple terrorism. Joes argues persuasively against committing U.S. troops in urban counterinsurgencies, but also offers cogent recommendations for the successful conduct of such operations where they must be undertaken.