Characterized by some authors as a rehearsal for the First World War, the Russo-Japanese War was arguably the world’s first modern war. During this war, the lethality of weapons on the 20th Century battlefield was clearly demonstrated. Recording the events of the Russo-Japanese War were military and civilian observers from every major power of the time. These observers wrote voluminous accounts of the war that clearly illustrated this new battlefield destructiveness. The research question of this thesis is what tactical lessons were available to the observer nations of the Russo-Japanese War that were not used in their preparations for World War I. This paper will look at both observer accounts of the war and professional journal articles written soon after the war to consider this question. To answer this question, the stationary Siege of Port Arthur and the maneuver Battle of Mukden are used as representative battles of this war. Reports from these two battles clearly demonstrate the lethality of modern warfare and foreshadow the combined effects of hand grenades, mortars, machineguns, and field artillery in World War I.

The Russo-Japanese war saw the first defeat of a major European imperialist power by an Asian country. When Japanese and Russian expansionist interests collided over Manchuria and Korea, the Tsar assumed Japan would never dare to fight. However, after years of planning, Japan launched a surprise attack on the Russian Port Arthur, on the Liaoyang Peninsula in 1904 and the war that followed saw Japan win major battles against Russia. This book explains the background and outbreak of the war, then follows the course of the fighting at Yalu River, Sha-ho, and finally Mukden, the largest battle anywhere in the world before the First World War.

Like Volume one, Volume two of The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective examines the Russo-Japanese War in its military, diplomatic, social, political, and cultural context. In this volume East Asian contributors focus on the Asian side of the war to flesh out the assertion that the Russo-Japanese War was, in fact, World War Zero, the first global confl ict of the 20th century. The contributors demonstrate that the Russo-Japanese War, largely forgotten in the aftermath of World War I, actually was a precursor to the catastrophe that engulfed the world less than a decade after the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. This study also helps us better understand Japan as it emerged at the beginning of its fateful 20th century.

The Russo-Japanese War was the major conflict of the earliest decade of the twentieth century. The struggle for mastery in northeast Asia, specifically for control of Korea, was watched at the time very closely by observers from many other countries keen to draw lessons about the conduct of war in the modern industrial age. The defeat of a traditional European power by a non-white, non-western nation became a model for imitation and admiration among people under, or threatened with, colonial rule. Examining the wide impact of the war and exploring the effect on the political balance in northeast Asia, this book focuses on the reactions in Europe, the United States, East Asia and the wider colonial world, considering the impact on different sections of society, on political and cultural ideas and ideologies, and on various national independence movements.

The Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria was the first 20th century conflict fought between the regular armies of major powers, employing the most modern means – machine guns, trench warfare, minefields and telephone communications; and the battle of Mukden in March 1905 was the largest clash of armies in world history up to that date. Events were followed by many foreign observers; but the events of 1914 in Western Europe suggest that not all of them drew the correct conclusions. For the first time in the West the armies of this distant but important war are described and illustrated in detail, with rare photos and the superbly atmospheric paintings of Russia's leading military illustrator.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

The Russo-Japanese War was fought for 19 months (8 February 1904– 5 September 1905) between the empires of Japan and the Russia over the southern part of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. While essentially a colonial conflict, the war became a major engagement both in scale and innovation unseen until then. In recent years there has been a growing awareness that this event marks a historical juncture far more important than it was usually taken to be. This second edition of the Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War offers a major revision of the highly praised first edition, which, by all accounts, has been the standard work on this conflict in any language during the last decade. The book contains a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, and an extensive bibliography. Moreover, the dictionary section has some 800 new or fully revised cross-referenced entries on the battles, weaponry, and major personalities of the war, as well as various international events and conflicts, agreements, schemes, and projects that led to the war. This book is an excellent resource for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the Russo-Japanese War.

The Russo-Japanese War was in essence a colonial conflict between the expanding interests of Russia and Japan in East Asia. However, while appearing regional, the war itself in fact had a major global impact. The conflict and Japanese victory stimulated the Russian revolutionary movement in 1905 and hence the Russian Revolution of 1917. In addition, the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth created a tension between the United States and Japan that would establish the starting point for the road directly leading to Pearl Harbor in 1941. Eventually the war had a major impact on Germany, whose diplomats wanted to use the war to bind St Petersburg to Berlin, and whose military planners closely observed the events to prepare themselves for the next possible conflict. This book makes a strong argument for the consideration of initially minor events in the analysis of global history. By describing and analyzing the interrelationship between the events in East Asia and the major developments in Europe and the United States, it shows the significance of the Russo-Japanese War as a key factor in determining the most momentous historical events of the twentieth century: The First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War.

The purpose of the World Psychiatric Association is to coordinate the activities of its Member Societies on a world-wide scale and to advance enquiry into the etiology, pathology, and treatment of mental illness. To further this purpose, the Association organizes mono- or multi thematic Regional Symposia in different parts of the world twice a year, and World Congresses dealing with all individual fields of psychiatry once every five or six years. Between these meetings the continuation of the Association's scientific work is assured through the activities of its specialty sections, each covering an important field of psychiatry. The programs of the World Congresses reflect on the one hand the intention to present the coordinating functions of the Association and on the other to open a broad platform for a free exchange of views. Thus, the VII World Congress of Psychiatry, held in Vienna from July 11 to 16, 1983, was composed of two types of scientific events - those structured by the Association and those left to the initiative of the participants. The first type comprised Plenary Sessions, planned by the Scientific Program Committee, and Section Symposia, organized by the WPA sections; the second embraced Free Symposia, free papers, video sessions, and poster presentations prepared by the participants. Altogether, 10 Plenary Sessions, 52 Section Symposia, and 105 Free Symposia took place, and 78 free papers and poster sessions and 10 video sessions were held.

The history of psychiatry is complex, reflecting diverse origins in mythology, cult beliefs, astrology, early medicine, law religion, philosophy, and politics. This complexity has generated considerable debate and an increasing outflow of historical scholarship, ranging from the enthusiastic meliorism of pre-World War II histories, to the iconoclastic revisionism of the 1960s, to more focused studies, such as the history of asylums and the validity and efficacy of Freudian theory. This volume, intended as a successor to the centennial history of American psychiatry published by the American Psychiatric Association in 1944, summarizes the significant events and processes of the half-century following World War II. Most of this history is written by clinicians who were central figures in it. In broad terms, the history of psychiatry after the war can be viewed as the story of a cycling sequence, shifting from a predominantly biological to a psychodynamic perspective and back again -- all presumably en route to an ultimate view that is truly integrated -- and interacting all the while with public perceptions, expectations, exasperations, and disappointments. In six sections, Drs. Roy Menninger and John Nemiah and their colleagues cover both the continuities and the dramatic changes of this period. The first four sections of the book are roughly chronological. The first section focuses on the war and its impact on psychiatry; the second reviews postwar growth of the field (psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, psychiatric education, and psychosomatic medicine); the third recounts the rise of scientific empiricism (biological psychiatry and nosology); and the fourth discusses public attitudes and perceptions of public mental health policy, deinstitutionalization, antipsychiatry, the consumer movement, and managed care. The fifth section examines the development of specialization and differentiation, exemplified by child and adolescent psychiatry, geriatric psychiatry, addiction psychiatry, and forensic psychiatry. The concluding section examines ethics, and women and minorities in psychiatry. Anyone interested in psychiatry will find this book a fascinating read.