Analyzes the roots of Europe's economic decline, examining institutions of the European Union and exploring possibilities for reform.

Presenting a sweeping analysis of the legal foundations, institutions, and substantive legal issues in EU monetary integration, The EU Law of Economic and Monetary Union serves as an authoritative reference on the legal framework of European economic and monetary union. The book opens by setting out the broader contexts for the European project - historical, economic, political, and regarding the international framework. It goes on to examine the constitutional architecture of EMU; the main institutions and their legal powers; the core legal provisions of monetary and economic union; and the relationship of EMU with EU financial market and banking regulation. The concluding section analyses the current EMU crisis and the main avenues of future reform.

If the plans concerning EMU will be realised, by 2002 national currencies will be replaced by the Euro and national central banks will be partially replaced by the European Central Bank. The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union starts with the argument that EMU is more a political than an economic project. It develops this theme by addressing five different questions. First, precisely what is the general role of EMU in the globalising political economy? Second, how EMU will change the power relations and the relationship between `political' and `economic'? Third, what effects will EMU have on generally accepted values - including for example efficiency, self-determination, and democracy? Fourth, how does the EMU-related politics of symbols - including money - take part in constructing political identities? And last, but certainly not least, what effects EMU will have on the social and political dimension of the Union and thus also on its legitimacy? The politics of EMU includes many dimensions. The book tries to explain the hegemony of the neoliberal and German vision of Europe in the context of recent development in the global political economy. It assesses the consequences of this hegemony and the possibility for alternatives from a variety of perspectives. In many chapters, it is also argued that the legitimation problems of the Union may turn into an acute crisis also because of EMU. We should expect an actualised crisis to lead to a transformation of the Union.

Why have the states of Europe agreed to create an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and a single European currency? What will decide the fate of this bold project? This book explains why monetary integration has deepened in Europe from the Bretton Woods era to the present day. McNamara argues that the development of a neoliberal economic policy consensus among European leaders in the years after the first oil crisis was crucial to stability in the European Monetary System and progress towards EMU. She identifies two factors, rising capital mobility and changing ideas about the government's proper role in monetary policymaking, as critical to the neoliberal consensus but warns that unresolved social tensions in this consensus may provoke a political backlash against EMU and its neoliberal reforms.McNamara's findings are relevant not only to European monetary integration, but to more general questions about the effects of international capital flows on states. Although this book delineates a range of constraints created by economic interdependence, McNamara rejects the notion that international market forces simply dictate government policy choice. She demonstrates that the process of neoliberal policy change is a historically dependent one, shaped by policymakers' shared beliefs and interpretations of their experiences in the global economy.

Economic and monetary union in the European Union represents a massive change for Europe and for the world. The Road to Maastricht identifies why the agreement was possible and how the agreement was made. The book examines the motives that inspired European political leaders, the strategies that they pursued, and the institutions that were used to achieve monetary union. Drawing on a wide range of sources and unprecedented research and interviews, the book combines careful political analysis with new information about the way in which European Monetary Union was negotiated. It delves into the complex forces at work in Europe, including the cross-national political interactions, to produce an authoritative account of the boldest and riskiest venture in the history of European integration.

In this book, a historical analysis of the precedents of the euro is examined within the context of the current issues affecting the Eurozone and the long-term effects of the institutional changes implemented since 2010. The book begins by placing the Eurozone challenges in the historical context of previous monetary unions, drawing on the experience of the gold standard. It then specifically focuses on the problems arising from the running of permanent trade imbalances within the Eurozone. The authors explore the advantages and disadvantages of being a member of the Eurozone and attempt to measure the optimality of a currency area by the calculation of an index on internal macroeconomic asymmetries. They address the proposals recently made in favour of a fiscal union in the Euro zone; including the economic and political feasibility of fiscal transfers in the Eurozone. The final two papers discuss whether the monetary union is in fact more than just that, and whether it will lead inevitably to some form of political union if it is to survive. With chapters by leading experts from both Europe and the UK, this book will appeal to students in Economics, Finance, Politics, EU integration and European studies; as well as academics and professional economists doing research in EU integration, the Euro zone, monetary history and monetary and banking unions in Europe, the UK and elsewhere.

Sir Alan Walters ex-chief economic advisor to PM Margaret Thatcher Whether it succeeds or fails, Europe is everyone's concern. The idea of a united Europe has been entertained, even partially at least, achieved, inter alia, CharlemagI!e, Napoleon, Hitler, and in our da)' by Spaak, Monet and Chancellor Kohl: the first three by military conquest, the last three by "negotiation" and the creation of integrating institutional arrangements. The motives varied from the twisted paranoia of the Nazis to the idealism of SpaaklMonet/Kohl in avoiding conflicts and wars. Under the protection of NATO the European Coal and Steel Community soon was transformed into the EEC by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The massive reduction of trade barriers, particularly between France and Germany, was rewarded by vigorous growth over the next 15 years. Even as late as 1972, when Britain acceeded to the Treaty of Rome, the EEC was thought to be lar~ely a customs union: in de Gaulle eyes the EEC was simply a collection of sovereISJ:l states who cooperated primarily on trade. Each state however enjoyed a veto; deCIsions had to be unanimous.

Europe’s financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro’s invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar’s privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany’s persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community’s Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

The first edition of this book was published in 1994, as the future of monetary unification in Europe was very much in doubt. With Economic and Monetary Union now in place, it is appropriate to bring the scholarship on the topic up to date for the students of international political economics. To this effect, essayists Jeffry Frieden, Geoffrey Garrett, Lisa L. Martin, Benjamin J. Cohen revised four of the original chapters to reflect new conditions. Editors, Barry Eichengreen and Frieden completely rewrote the introductory essay. Three new chapters by Matthew Gabel, Charles Engel, and Paul De Grauwe et al cover public support for EMU, local currency pricing, and whether Europe is now better off? The updated volume's purpose remains that of bringing the latest in scholarship in Economics and Political Science to bear on the European monetary integration