In the past two decades, peace negotiators around the world have increasingly accepted that granting amnesties for human rights violations is no longer an acceptable bargaining tool or incentive, even when the signing of a peace agreement is at stake. While many states that previously saw sweeping amnesties as integral to their peace processes now avoid amnesties for human rights violations, this anti-amnesty turn has been conspicuously absent in Asia. In Negotiating Peace: Amnesties, Justice and Human Rights Renée Jeffery examines why peace negotiators in Asia have resisted global anti-impunity measures more fervently and successfully than their counterparts around the world. Drawing on a new global dataset of 146 peace agreements (1980–2015) and with in-depth analysis of four key cases - Timor-Leste, Aceh Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines - Jeffery uncovers the legal, political, economic and cultural reasons for the persistent popularity of amnesties in Asian peace processes.

This book is the first and only practical guide to negotiating peace. In this ground-breaking book Sven Koopmans, who is both a peace negotiator and a scholar, discusses the practice, politics, and law of international mediation. With both depth and a light touch he explores successful as well as failed attempts to settle the wars of the world, building on decades of historical, political, and legal scholarship. Who can mediate between warring parties? How to build confidence between enemies? Who should take part in negotiations? How can a single diplomat manage the major powers? What issues to discuss first, what last? When to set a deadline? How to maintain confidentiality? How to draft an agreement, and what should be in it? How to ensure implementation? The book discusses the practical difficulties and dilemmas of negotiating agreements, as well as existing solutions and possible future approaches. It uses examples from around the world, with an emphasis on the conflicts of the last twenty-five years, but also of the previous two-and-a-half-thousand. Rather than looking only at either legal, political or organizational issues, Negotiating Peace discusses these interrelated dimensions in the way they are confronted in practice: as an integral whole. With one leading question: what can be done?

While we were still in Paris, I felt, and have felt increasingly ever since, that you accepted my guidance and direction on questions with regard to which I had to instruct you only with increasing reluctance.... "... I must say that it would relieve me of embarrassment, Mr. Secretary, the embarrassment of feeling your reluctance and divergence of judgment, if you would give your present office up and afford me an opportunity to select some one whose mind would more willingly go along with mine." These words are taken from the letter which President Wilson wrote to me on February 11, 1920. On the following day I tendered my resignation as Secretary of State by a letter, in which I said:

How do parties to peace negotiations actually build durable peace and what conundrums must they solve to achieve durable peace?

Written by Gilead Sher, Israeli Chief of Staff during the tumultuous 1999-2000 peace negotiations, this book provides a fast paced description and analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Presenting an overview of the core issues of contention, the various key ‘players’ and the possible solutions formulated during the peace process effort, the book sheds new light on the events of that period. An important contribution to the current literature, it provides a fresh understanding of the link between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the current global threats of Islamic fanaticism and international terrorism.

After a war breaks out, what factors influence the warring parties' decisions about whether to talk to their enemy, and when may their position on wartime diplomacy change? How do we get from only fighting to also talking? In The Costs of Conversation, Oriana Skylar Mastro argues that states are primarily concerned with the strategic costs of conversation, and these costs need to be low before combatants are willing to engage in direct talks with their enemy. Specifically, Mastro writes, leaders look to two factors when determining the probable strategic costs of demonstrating a willingness to talk: the likelihood the enemy will interpret openness to diplomacy as a sign of weakness, and how the enemy may change its strategy in response to such an interpretation. Only if a state thinks it has demonstrated adequate strength and resiliency to avoid the inference of weakness, and believes that its enemy has limited capacity to escalate or intensify the war, will it be open to talking with the enemy. Through four primary case studies—North Vietnamese diplomatic decisions during the Vietnam War, those of China in the Korean War and Sino-Indian War, and Indian diplomatic decision making in the latter conflict—The Costs of Conversation demonstrates that the costly conversations thesis best explains the timing and nature of countries' approach to wartime talks, and therefore when peace talks begin. As a result, Mastro's findings have significant theoretical and practical implications for war duration and termination, as well as for military strategy, diplomacy, and mediation.

This book discusses the role of time in peace negotiations and peace processes in the post-Cold War period, making reference to real-world negotiations and using comparative data. Deadlines are increasingly used by mediators to spur deadlocked negotiation processes, under the assumption that fixed time limits tend to favour pragmatism. Yet, little attention is typically paid to the durability of agreements concluded in these conditions, and research in experimental psychology suggests that time pressure can have a negative impact on individual and collective decision-making by reducing each side's ability to deal with complex issues, complex inter-group dynamics and inter-cultural relations. This volume explores this lacuna in current research through a comparative model that includes 68 episodes of negotiation and then, more in detail, in relation to four cases studies - the Bougainville and Casamance peace processes, and the Dayton and Camp David proximity talks. The case studies reveal that in certain conditions low time pressure can impact positively on the durability of agreements by making possible effective intra-rebel agreements before official negotiations, and that time pressure works in proximity talks only when applied to solving circumscribed deadlocks. This book will be of much interest to students of peace processes, conflict resolution, negotiation, diplomacy and international relations in general.

The “Joint Declaration of Twenty-two States,” signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 by the Chiefs of State or Government of all the countries which participated in World War Two in Europe, is the closest document we will ever have to a true “peace treaty” concluding World War II in Europe. In his new book, retired United States Ambassador John Maresca, who led the American participation in the negotiations, explains how this document was quietly negotiated following the reunification of Germany and in view of Soviet interest in normalizing their relations with Europe. With the reunification of Germany which had just taken place it was, for the first time since the end of the war, possible to have a formal agreement that the war was over, and the countries concerned were all gathering for a summit-level signing ceremony in Paris. With Gorbachev interested in more positive relations with Europe, and with the formal reunification of Germany, such an agreement was — for the first time — possible. All the leaders coming to the Paris summit had an interest in a formal conclusion to the War, and this gave impetus for the negotiators in Vienna to draft a document intended to normalize relations among them. The Joint Declaration was negotiated carefully, and privately, among the Ambassadors representing the countries which had participated, in one way or another, in World War Two in Europe, and the resulting document -- the “Joint Declaration” — was signed, at the summit level, at the Elysée Palace in Paris. But it was overshadowed at the time by the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe — signed at the same signature event — and has remained un-noticed since then. No one could possibly have foreseen that the USSR would be dissolved about one year later, making it impossible to negotiate a more formal treaty to close World War II in Europe. The “Joint Declaration” thus remains the closest document the world will ever see to a formal “Peace Treaty” concluding World War Two in Europe. It was signed by all the Chiefs of State or Government of all the countries which participated in World War II in Europe.

A critical study of incentives commonly used to induce non-state armed groups to engage in peace negotiations. Offers a closer analysis of these incentives, which offer such groups a place or a stake in governance, suggesting that not only are they frequently ineffective, but that they can have unintended and dangerous side effects.

""In an innovative study, two historians of the Arab-Israeli conflict reflect on what their craft can contribute to peacemaking."" -- Middle East Quarterly ""A fine overview of the troubled Arab-Israeli negotiations since Camp David, filled with sound analysis and a wealth of documentary material. Students and diplomats alike will benefit from this thoughtful study."" -- William B. Quandt, Byrd Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia ""This timely book... will be invaluable for students of Middle East international relations and for policy makers who seek a mutually acceptable resolution of this protracted conflict."" -- Michael Brecher, McGill University ""No matter where one stands on the issues, this valuable work commends itself to students, peace makers, and anyone concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict and its peaceful resolution."" -- Philip Mattar, Institute for Palestine Studies .."". Eisenberg and Caplan offer the reader lessons of the past and sound guidance for the present and the future.... a well-researched and well-written book."" -- Itamar Rabinovich, Tel-Aviv University What must change before the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved diplomatically? By illuminating recurring factors that seem to doom peacemaking, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace offers a fresh interpretation of how, when, and why the process does and does not work and points to diplomatic strategies that may produce an enduring peace.