This book assesses the legal and practical independence of the Palestinian Constitutional Court since the coup in July 2007 that brought the Fatah regime to power in the West Bank. It argues that the Court has failed to perform its fundamental function, namely upholding the Basic Law in the face of authoritarian actions by that regime, and that it is highly unlikely to resolve this problem while the state of emergency continues. This book offers a case study on how constitutional courts in authoritarian regimes fail to fulfil, and even obstruct, the promises of rights protections contained in constitutional texts. Moreover, it provides the first English-language study that covers the entire collection of judgments and interpretations issued by that Court until the first amendment of its law in October 2017, and thus can be considered one of the most authoritative studies on a court in an authoritarian Arab regime.

In this groundbreaking analysis of Supreme Court decision-making, Andrew Coan explains how judicial caseload shapes the course of American constitutional law and the role of the Court in American society. Compared with the vast machinery surrounding Congress and the president, the Supreme Court is a tiny institution that can resolve only a small fraction of the constitutional issues that arise in any given year. Rationing the Constitution shows that this simple yet frequently ignored fact is essential to understanding how the Supreme Court makes constitutional law. Due to the structural organization of the judiciary and certain widely shared professional norms, the capacity of the Supreme Court to review lower-court decisions is severely limited. From this fact, Andrew Coan develops a novel and arresting theory of Supreme Court decision-making. In deciding cases, the Court must not invite more litigation than it can handle. On many of the most important constitutional questions—touching on federalism, the separation of powers, and individual rights—this constraint creates a strong pressure to adopt hard-edged categorical rules, or defer to the political process, or both. The implications for U.S. constitutional law are profound. Lawyers, academics, and social activists pursuing social reform through the courts must consider whether their goals can be accomplished within the constraints of judicial capacity. Often the answer will be no. The limits of judicial capacity also substantially constrain the Court’s much touted—and frequently lamented—power to overrule democratic majorities. As Rationing the Constitution demonstrates, the Supreme Court is David, not Goliath.

A sitting justice reflects upon the authority of the Supreme CourtÑhow that authority was gained and how measures to restructure the Court could undermine both the Court and the constitutional system of checks and balances that depends on it. A growing chorus of officials and commentators argues that the Supreme Court has become too political. On this view the confirmation process is just an exercise in partisan agenda-setting, and the jurists are no more than Òpoliticians in robesÓÑtheir ostensibly neutral judicial philosophies mere camouflage for conservative or liberal convictions. Stephen Breyer, drawing upon his experience as a Supreme Court justice, sounds a cautionary note. Mindful of the CourtÕs history, he suggests that the judiciaryÕs hard-won authority could be marred by reforms premised on the assumption of ideological bias. Having, as Hamilton observed, Òno influence over either the sword or the purse,Ó the Court earned its authority by making decisions that have, over time, increased the publicÕs trust. If public trust is now in decline, one part of the solution is to promote better understandings of how the judiciary actually works: how judges adhere to their oaths and how they try to avoid considerations of politics and popularity. Breyer warns that political intervention could itself further erode public trust. Without the publicÕs trust, the Court would no longer be able to act as a check on the other branches of government or as a guarantor of the rule of law, risking serious harm to our constitutional system.

What does Israel's definition as a 'Jewish and democratic' state mean? How does it affect constitutional law? How does it play out in the daily life of the people living in Israel? This book provides a unique and detailed examination of the consequences of the 'Jewish and democratic' definition. It explores how the definition affects the internal ordering of the state, the operation of the law, and the ways it is used to justify, protect and regenerate certain features of Israeli constitutional law. It also considers the relationship between law and settler-colonialism, and how this relationship manifests itself in the constitutional order. The Dynamics of Exclusionary Constitutionalism offers a novel perspective on the Jewish and democratic definition rooted in constitutional theory and informed by a socio-legal approach. Relying on a wide range of court cases and statutes as well as secondary sources, the book shows how the definition is deeply embedded in the constitutional structure, and operates, as a matter of law, in a manner that concentrates political power in the hands of the Jewish citizens and excludes the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel from the political process. Mazen Masri's study is a timely intervention in an increasingly important question, and is essential reading for those who want to understand Israel's character, its relationship with the constitutional order, and its impact on society.

The 'Goldstone Report' of September 2009 started a critical debate at the international level. The Report raised serious allegations of grave violations of international law with regard to the Israeli attack on Gaza of 27 December 2008 - 18 January 2009, amounting to possible war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council, amidst high political pressure, endorsed the Report’s recommendations, calling for prompt and proper investigations to ensure accountability and justice for the victims. Given the lack of proper investigations at the national level, international justice mechanisms are now needed. Indeed, the ICC opened a preliminary examination of the situation but difficulties arose because of the uncertain status of the occupied Palestinian territory. The issue of the existence of a State of Palestine is extremely actual and still unsolved at the UN level. With a foreword by prof. William Schabas, the book collects contributions by renowned international law professors as Eric David, John Dugard, Richard Falk and many other distinguished scholars and lawyers, and brings together for the first time essential documentation on the 'Gaza conflict'. The underlying question, whether there is a court for Gaza, can be seen as a test case for international justice, and shed a light on the role of international institutions in the difficult combination of law and politics that connotes international justice. Useful for all those interested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as international and criminal law scholars, and human rights and humanitarian organizations.

Constitutional Idolatry and Democracy investigates the increasingly important subject of constitutional idolatry and its effects on democracy. Focussed around whether the UK should draft a single written constitution, it suggests that constitutions have been drastically and persistently over-sold throughout the years, and that their wider importance and effects are not nearly as significant as constitutional advocates maintain. Chapters analyse whether written constitutions can educate the citizenry, invigorate voter turnout, or deliver ‘We the People’ sovereignty.

Comparing constitutions allows us to consider the similarities and differences in forms of government as well as the normative philosophies behind constitutional choices. The objective behind this Companion is to present the reader with a succinct yet wide-ranging companion to a modern comparative constitutional law course.

A comparative and empirical analysis of proportionality in the case law of six constitutional and supreme courts.

"A farmer from a village in the occupied West Bank, cut off from his olive groves by the construction of Israel’s controversial separation wall, asked Israeli human rights lawyer Michael Sfard to petition the courts to allow a gate to be built in the wall. While the gate would provide immediate relief for the farmer, would it not also confer legitimacy on the wall and on the court that deems it legal? The defense of human rights is often marked by such ethical dilemmas, which are especially acute in Israel, where lawyers have for decades sought redress for the abuse of Palestinian rights in the country’s High Court―that is, in the court of the abuser. [This book] chronicles this struggle―a story that has never before been fully told― and in the process engages the core principles of human rights legal ethics. [The author] recounts the unfolding of key cases and issues, ranging from confiscation of land, deportations, the creation of settlements, punitive home demolitions, torture, and targeted killings―all actions considered violations of international law. In the process, he lays bare the reality of the occupation and the lives of the people who must contend with that reality. He also exposes the surreal legal structures that have been erected to put a stamp of lawfulness on an extensive program of dispossession. Finally, he weighs the success of the legal effort, reaching conclusions that are no less paradoxical than the fight itself."--

In a remarkably innovative reconstruction of constitutional history, Robert Burt traces the controversy over judicial supremacy back to the founding fathers. Also drawing extensively on Lincoln's conception of political equality, Burt argues convincingly that judicial supremacy and majority rule are both inconsistent with the egalitarian democratic ideal. The first fully articulated presentation of the Constitution as a communally interpreted document in which the Supreme Court plays an important but not predominant role, The Constitution in Conflict has dramatic implications for both the theory and the practice of constitutional law.