The global financial crisis has demonstrated weaknesses in resolution regimes for financial institutions around the globe, including in the European Union (EU). This paper considers the principles underlying resolution regimes for financial institutions, and draws out how a well-designed resolution regime can expand the toolset available for crisis management. Introducing, or in some cases expanding the scope, of these regimes is pressing to achieve more effective responses to ongoing financial sector weaknesses across the EU.

The SDN elaborates the case for, and the design of, a banking union for the euro area. It discusses the benefits and costs of a banking union, presents a steady state view of the banking union, elaborates difficult transition issues, and briefly discusses broader EU issues. As such, it assesses current plans and provides advice. It is accompanied by three background technical notes that analyze in depth the various elements of the banking union: a single supervisory framework; a single resolution and common safety net; and urgent issues related to repair of weak banks in Europe.

Developing an effective framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international regulatory reform. Large bank failures during the global financial crisis brought home the lack of adequate tools for resolving “too-big-to-fail” institutions. In cross-border cases, misaligned incentives and lack of robust mechanisms for resolution and cross-border cooperation left some country authorities with little choice but to take unilateral actions, which contributed to the high fiscal costs of the crisis and resulted in disorderly resolution in some cases

Responding to lessons learned during the global financial crisis, the EU Directive on the Recovery and Resolution of Banks and Securities Firms (the BRRD) has substantially changed the legal framework for insolvency management of financial services institutions across Europe. As the legislative process has been completed with the adoption of the BRRD, and of Regulation No 806/2014 establishing the Single Resolution Mechanism, this book offers a unique insight into the new European framework for the resolution of banks in distress. The chapters in this volume take stock of what has been achieved and present an insightful analysis of both the technical framework and its impact on banking institutions and their counterparties in representative forms of banking activities, including retail and wholesale depositors, counterparties to financial directives, and the providers of relevant parts of the market infrastructure. Special attention is given to the international coordination of resolution. The book's focus is on resolution and its impact on the relationships between banks, customers, other market participants and market infrastructure, including the preventative requirements on recovery and resolution planning under the BRRD. The chapters bring together a wide range of perspectives by scholars, practitioners from regulatory authorities and other parts of the financial safety net, as well as from private practice, from many jurisdictions, and both legal and economic backgrounds. Arranged broadly in line with the structure of the BRRD, the book is a highly useful reference for practitioners, policy-makers, and academics alike.

On June 28th 2012, the small island of Cyprus became the fifth government to request an economic bail-out from the Eurozone after losing access to international capital markets. Less than a year later, a €10 billion second rescue deal was agreed upon — an unprecedented agreement that bailed in creditors of Cyprus' two largest banks, and triggered an economic crisis that the nation still struggles to recover from today.This resourceful collection of essays provides a thorough and in depth analysis of how Cyprus reached the point of failure and what lessons this experience holds for future economic crises. The various perspectives collectively address unanswered questions, including whether the bail-in can be considered successful, why the recession was less severe than expected, and what conclusions can be drawn about stress-testing exercises across borders.Focusing on one of the (proportionately) largest crises in financial history, the case study will prove essential to policy-makers and politicians, especially in the euro area.

Europe’s banking system is weighed down by high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs), which are holding down credit growth and economic activity. This discussion note uses a new survey of European country authorities and banks to examine the structural obstacles that discourage banks from addressing their problem loans. A three pillared strategy is advocated to remedy the situation, comprising: (i) tightened supervisory policies, (ii) insolvency reforms, and (iii) the development of distressed debt markets.

The 4th Special Report in the Geneva Reports on the World Economy series reviews the current status of bail-ins and bank resolution in Europe. It first provides a critical comparison of the US and EU bank resolution rules, including the underlying similarities, differences and enhancement points of both frameworks. It then goes on to focus on European banking failures, providing estimates of taxpayer costs and considering the hypothetical application of stronger private sector bail-in consistent with the spirit of the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive. The report ends with a number of policy recommendations concerning governance, stress testing, cross-border issues and resolution of financial contracts.

This paper reviews empirical and theoretical work on the links between banks and their governments (the bank-sovereign nexus). How significant is this nexus? What do we know about it? To what extent is it a source of concern? What is the role of policy intervention? The paper concludes with a review of recent policy proposals.

This book takes stock after a year of application of the SRM and examines the situation from various perspectives: the perspective of the SRB, the NRA, the supervised bank and judicial protection. Special attention is given to the division of power between the RB and the NRA and the impact on the supervised bank, the relationship and links between the SRM and the SSM and the query whether the right balance between national and supranational powers has been struck, also in view of the principle of subsidiarity.

The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.