The Moral Psychology of Anger is the first comprehensive study of the moral psychology of anger from a philosophical perspective. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in philosophy and the current social and political interest in anger, this collection provides an inclusive view of anger from a variety of philosophical perspectives. The authors explore the nature of anger, explain its resilience in our emotional lives and normative frameworks, and examine what inhibits and encourages thoughts, feelings, and expressions of anger. The volume also examines rage, anger’s cousin, and examines in what ways rage is a moral emotion, what black rage is and how it is policed in our society; how berserker rage is limited and problematic for the contemporary military; and how defenders of anger respond to classical and contemporary arguments that expressing anger is always destructive and immoral. This volume provides arguments for and against the value of anger in our ethical lives and in politics through a combination of empirical psychological and philosophical methods. This authors approach these questions and aims from a historical, phenomenological, empirical, feminist, political, and critical-theoretic perspective.

The Ethics of Anger provides the resources needed to understand the prevalence of anger in relation to ethics, religion, social and political behavior, and peace studies. Providing theoretical and practical arguments, both for and against the necessity of anger, The Ethics of Anger assembles a variety of diverse perspectives in order to increase knowledge and bolster further research. Part one examines topics such as the nature and ethics of vengeful anger and the psychology of anger. Part two includes chapters on the necessity of anger as central to our moral lives, an examination of Joseph Butler’s sermons on resentment, and three chapters that explore anger within Confucianism, Buddhism, and other Eastern religions. Part three examines the practical responses to anger, offering several intriguing chapters on topics such as mind viruses, social justice, the virtues of anger, feminism, punishment, and popular culture. This book, edited by Court D. Lewis and Gregory L. Bock, challenges and provides a framework for how moral persons approach, incorporate, and/or exclude anger in their lives.

This book offers both an introduction to the methods and language of moral psychology as a philosophical field, and to sadness as an emotion.

At a time when respect is widely touted as an attitude of central moral importance, contempt is often derided as a thoroughly nasty emotion inimical to the respect we owe all persons. But while contempt is regularly dismissed as completely disvaluable, ethicists have had very little to say about what contempt is or whether it deserves its ugly reputation. Macalester Bell argues that we must reconsider contempt's role in our moral lives. While contempt can be experienced in inapt and disvaluable ways, it may also be a perfectly appropriate response that provides the best way of answering a range of neglected faults. Using a wide variety of examples, Bell provides an account of the nature of contempt and its virtues and vices. While some insist that contempt is always unfitting because of its globalism, Bell argues that this objection mischaracterizes the person assessments at the heart of contempt. Contempt is, in some cases, the best way of responding to arrogance, hypocrisy, and other vices of superiority. Contempt does have a dark side, and inapt forms of contempt structure a host of social ills. Racism is best characterized as an especially pernicious form of inapt contempt, and Bell's account of contempt helps us better understand the moral badness of racism. It is argued that the best way of responding to race-based contempt is to mobilize a robust counter-contempt for racists. The book concludes with a discussion of overcoming contempt through forgiveness. This account of forgiveness sheds light upon the broader issue of social reconciliation and what role reparations and memorials may play in giving persons reasons to overcome their contempt for institutions.

The feeling that one can’t get over a moral wrong is challenging even in the best of circumstances. This volume considers challenges to forgiveness in the most difficult circumstances. It explores forgiveness in criminal justice contexts, under oppression, after genocide, when the victim is dead or when bystanders disagree, when many different negative reactions abound, and when anger and resentment seem preferable and important. The book gathers together a diverse assembly of authors with publication and expertise in forgiveness, while centering the work of new voices in the field and pursuing new lines of inquiry grounded in empirical literature. Some scholars consider how forgiveness influences and is influenced by our other mental states and emotions, while other authors explore the moral value of the emotions attendant upon forgiveness in particularly challenging contexts. Some authors critically assess and advance applications of the standard view of forgiveness predominant in Anglophone philosophy of forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment, while others offer rejections of basic aspects of the standard view, such as what sorts of feelings are compatible with forgiving. The book offers new directions for inquiry into forgiveness, and shows that the moral psychology of forgiveness continues to enjoy challenges to its theoretical structure and its practical possibilities.

"Anger has a bad reputation. Many people think that it is counterproductive, distracting, and destructive. It is a negative emotion, many believe, because it can lead so quickly to violence or an overwhelming fury. And coming from people of color, it takes on connotations that are even more sinister, stirring up stereotypes, making white people fear what an angry other might be capable of doing, when angry, and leading them to turn to hatred or violence in turn, to squelch an anger that might upset the racial status quo"--

This book provides an introduction to the major findings, challenges and debates regarding disgust as a moral emotion, and brings together scholarship from multiple disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, anthropology and law.

"The world today seems full of anger. In the West, particularly in the US and UK, this anger can oftentimes feel aimless, a possible product of social media. Still, anger is normally considered a useful motivational source for positive social change. Channeling that anger into movements for civil rights, alleviation of socio-economic inequality, and the end of endless wars, has long been understood as a valuable tactic. Moreover, anger is believed to be handy in everyday life in order to protect, and stick up for, oneself. On the flip side, the world today celebrates diminishing amounts of shame. Political leaders and pundits shamelessly abandon commitments to integrity, truth and decency, and in general, shame is considered to be a primitive, ugly emotion, which causes eating disorders, PTSD, teenage pregnancy, suicide, and other highly undesirable circumstances. Having shame is, thus, regularly understood as both psychologically bad and morally bad. In How to Do Things with Emotions, philosopher Owen Flanagan argues this thinking is backwards, and that we need to tune down anger and tune up shame. By examining cross-cultural resources, Flanagan demonstrates how certain kinds of anger are destructive, while a 'mature' sense of shame can be used -as it is in many cultures- as a socializing emotion, that does not need to be attached to the self, but can be called upon to protect good values (kindness, truth) rather than bad ones (racism, sexism). Drawing from Stoic, Buddhist, and other cultural traditions, Flanagan explains that payback anger (i.e., revenge) and pain-passing anger (i.e., passing hurt one is feeling to someone else) are incorrigible, and also, how the Western view of shame rooted in traditions of psychoanalysis is entirely unwarranted. Continuing his method of doing ethics by bringing in cross-cultural philosophy, research from psychology, and in this case widening that to include cultural psychology and anthropology, Flanagan shows exactly how our culture shapes our emotions-through norms and traditions-and how proper cultivation of our emotions can yield important progress in our morality"--

This comprehensive and cutting-edge volume maps out the terrain of moral psychology, a dynamic and evolving area of research. In 57 concise chapters, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars explore fundamental issues and current controversies. The volume systematically reviews the empirical evidence base and presents influential theories of moral judgment and behavior. It is organized around the key questions that must be addressed for a complete understanding of the moral mind.

Life, on a day to day basis, is a sequence of emotional states: hope, disappointment, irritation, anger, affection, envy, pride, embarrassment, joy, sadness and many more. We know intuitively that these states express deep things about our character and our view of the world. But what are emotions and why are they so important to us? In one of the most extensive investigations of the emotions ever published, Robert Roberts develops a novel conception of what emotions are and then applies it to a large range of types of emotion and related phenomena. In so doing he lays the foundations for a deeper understanding of our evaluative judgments, our actions, our personal relationships and our fundamental well-being. Aimed principally at philosophers and psychologists, this book will certainly be accessible to readers in other disciplines such as religion and anthropology.