With China/US relations deteriorating the Taiwan Relations Act is the cornerstone of Asian policy and the intent of Congress in drafting the act more than 40 years ago TRA is significant if we are to meet the current crisis. The book which contains highly secret classifed memcoms and congressional debate which lends substance to the ambiguity that the crafters intended .

A close-up look at the struggle for democracy in Hong Kong. Hong Kong in the Shadow of China is a reflection on the recent political turmoil in Hong Kong during which the Chinese government insisted on gradual movement toward electoral democracy and hundreds of thousands of protesters occupied major thoroughfares to push for full democracy now. Fueling this struggle is deep public resentment over growing inequality and how the political system—established by China and dominated by the local business community—reinforces the divide been those who have profited immensely and those who struggle for basics such as housing. Richard Bush, director of the Brookings Institution’s Center on East Asia Policy Studies, takes us inside the demonstrations and the demands of the demonstrators and then pulls back to critically explore what Hong Kong and China must do to ensure both economic competitiveness and good governance and the implications of Hong Kong developments for United States policy.

Despite apparently consistent statements in 4 decades, the U.S. ¿one China¿ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ¿one China¿ policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. Contents of this report: (1) U.S. Policy on ¿One China¿: Has U.S. Policy Changed?; Overview of Policy Issues; (2) Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: Statements During the Admin. of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama. A print on demand report.

This volume describes the central issues animating the dynamic U.S.-Taiwan-China relationship and the salient international and domestic legal issues shaping U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific region. Lung-Chu Chen gives particular attention Taiwan's status under international law and the role of the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in the formulation and execution of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

As 1979 dawned, President Jimmy Carter extended diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. upending longstanding U.S. foreign policy in Asia. For thirty years after the triumph of Mao’s revolution, the United States continued to recognize the claim of the Republic of China, based on Taiwan, to govern the entire country. Intricate economic and cultural relations existed between Washington and Taipei, backed by a Mutual Defense Treaty. While Carter withdrew from the treaty, satisfying a core Chinese condition for diplomatic relations, he presented Congress with legislation to allow other ties with Taiwan to continue unofficially. Many in Congress took issue with the President. Generally supportive of his policy to normalize relations with China, they worried about Taiwan’s future. Believing Carter’s legislation was incomplete, especially regarding Taiwan’s security, they held extensive hearings and lengthy debates, substantially strengthening the bill. The President ensured the measure comported with the terms of normalization. He negotiated with Congress to produce legislation he could sign and Beijing could at least tolerate. Although the final product enjoyed broad consensus in Congress, fights over amendments were fierce, and not always to the President’s advantage. Passage of the Taiwan Relations Act stabilized America’s position in Asia and its situation with Taipei, while allowing the new China to be properly launched. Now in its fourth decade, the Act remains highly impactful on the leading bilateral relationship in the world.The United States Constitution makes Congress the President’s partner in shaping American foreign policy. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 vividly demonstrates how robust congressional engagement and inter-Branch cooperation leads to stronger and more durable policy outcomes, which enjoy a greater degree of public acceptance.

The Yearbook aims to promote research, studies and writings in the field of international law in Asia, as well as to provide an intellectual platform for the discussion and dissemination of Asian views and practices on contemporary international legal issues.

This study examines the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which defined U.S.-Taiwan relations after the United States' diplomatic recognition of China. It analyzes how President Carter's original legislation was shaped after extensive hearings, lengthy debates, and sharp disagreement in Congress and eventually achieved broad consensus.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

Today the most dangerous place on earth is arguably the Taiwan Strait, where a war between the United States and China could erupt out of miscalculation, misunderstanding, or accident. How and to what degree Taiwan pursues its own national identity will have profound ramifications in its relationship with China as well as in relations between China and the United States. Events late in 2004 demonstrated the volatility of the situation, as Taiwan's legislative elections unexpectedly preserved a slim majority for supporters of closer relations with China. Beijing, nevertheless, threatened to pass an anti-secession law, apt to revitalize pro-independence forces in Taiwan—and make war more likely. Taking change as a central theme, these essays by prominent scholars and practitioners in the arena of U.S.-Taiwan-Chinese relations combine historical context with timely analysis of an accelerating crisis. The book clarifies historical developments, examines myths about past and present policies, and assesses issues facing contemporary policymakers. Moving beyond simplistic explanations that dominate discussion about the U.S.-Taiwan-China relationship, Dangerous Strait challenges common wisdom and approaches the political, economic, and strategic aspects of the cross-Strait situation anew. The result is a collection that provides fresh and much-needed insights into a complex problem and examines the ways in which catastrophe can be avoided. The essays examine a variety of issues, including the movement for independence and its place in Taiwanese domestic politics; the underlying weaknesses of democracy in Taiwan; and the significance of China and Taiwan's economic interdependence. In the security arena, contributors provide incisive critiques of Taiwan's incomplete military modernization; strains in U.S.-Taiwan relations and their differing interpretations of China's intentions; and the misguided inclination among some U.S. policymakers to abandon Washington's traditional policy of strategic ambiguity.