This is a companion volume to the main report, Major Projects Report 2007 (HCP 98-I, ISBN 9780102951486) and a second volume (HCP 98-II, ISBN 9780102951493) containing the project summary sheets

This is a companion volume to the main report, Major Projects Report 2007 (HCP 98-I, ISBN 9780102951486) and a second volume (HCP 98-II, ISBN 9780102951493) containing the project summary sheets

The Major Projects Report 2007 covers cost, time and performance data for military equipment projects in the year ended 31 March 2007. 20 of the largest projects are examined where the main investment decision has been taken by the Ministry of Defence (the MoD), along with ten projects still in the Assessment Phase. Overall the MoD is in a similar position to 2006 for forecast cost and performance, but there continue to be time delays. The current total forecast cost for the 20 largest projects is £28 billion, which is £2.5 billion over the 'most likely' budget when the main investment decision was taken. The MoD expects ten projects to deliver within their most likely budgeted cost. Most of this cost growth occurred in earlier years but, on two projects, the Type 45 Destroyer (£354 million) and the Astute Class Submarine (£142 million), there has been significant cost growth in-year. The MoD has now agreed revised contracts on both of these projects to incentivise industry to reduce costs. The MoD was again pro-active in limiting potential in-year cost increases on individual projects through reassessing requirements, reducing quantities of equipments and re-allocating expenditure to other projects or budget lines. Five projects were delayed by a total of an extra 38 months this year. Of these, the most significant were the Type 45 Destroyer which has been delayed by a further 11 months and the Terrier and Next Generation Light Anti-Armour Weapon projects have each been delayed by a further 12 months. Detailed Summary Sheets for each of the 30 Projects are in Volume 2 (HCP 98-II, ISBN 9780102951493). There have been significant developments of interest on a project that appeared in the Major Projects Report until 2002-03, the Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) project, and detailed findings are given in Volume 3 (HCP 98-III, ISBN 9780102951509).

Your essential reference to the changing capabilities of modern navies and coast guards, their ships and maritime aircraft in service and under construction.

This is a companion volume to the main report (HCP 98-I, ISBN 9780102951486) and a third volume (HCP 98-III, ISBN 9780102951509) which examines the landing ship dock (auxiliary) project

This is the second volume in a series of chronological histories prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the ΙII Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964; The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.

The Defence Committee accepts that there are deep-rooted problems with the present acquisition system, and draws attention to the example of the decision in 2010 to change to the carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, a decision which later had to be reversed. The Committee agrees with the Government that the current arrangements for acquisition, constrained by public sector employment rules, are unsatisfactory. But the proposal to entrust acquisition to a Government owned, Contractor operated company is not universally accepted as the best way forward, and there are particular concerns about how the MoD's overall responsibility for acquisition could be maintained within a GoCo. The Committee considers that problems might arise if a non-UK company were given responsibility for UK defence acquisition. It further considers it vital that consultations are satisfactorily concluded with allies, to ensure that there is no adverse impact on co-operation, before any proposals are implemented.

The Major Projects Report 2007 covers cost, time and performance data for military equipment projects in the year ended 31 March 2008. 20 of the largest projects are examined where the main investment decision has been taken by the Ministry of Defence (the MoD) along with ten projects still in the Assessment Phase. Six projects are new to this report: future lynx; modernised target acquisition designation sight/pilots night vision sensor; naval extrememly high frequency/super high frequency satellite communication terminals; Typhoon future capability programme; advanced jet trainer project and project Eagle

The Major Projects Report 2003 provides information on progress made by the Ministry of Defence in procuring major defence equipment against cost, time and technical performance targets. It covers 30 projects split, according to Smart Acquisition principles, between the 20 largest projects on which the main investment decision has been taken, and the 10 largest projects yet to reach that point. For the 20 largest projects, costs are forecast to have increased by £3.1 billion in the last year, and are now 6.1 per cent over their approved costs. Difficulties on four older projects (which predate the introduction of Smart Acquisition) account for the majority of cost and time overruns. Following on from a NAO report on this topic (HCP 195, session 2003-04; ISBN 0102926581) published in January 2004, the Committee's report examines four main issues: the impact of the large cost overruns and delays; departmental risk management; ways of developing a more constructive relationship between the Department and industry; and lessons that need to be learned to avoid such poor procurement performance being repeated in future.