Analyses governance structures for international finance, evaluates current regulatory reforms and proposes a new governance system for global financial markets.

A Brookings Institution Press and Visions of Governance for the 21st Century publication The latest in a series exploring twenty-first-century governance, this new volume examines the use of market means to pursue public goals. Market-based governance includes both the delegation of traditionally governmental functions to private players, and the importation into government of market-style management approaches and mechanisms of accountability. The contributors (all from Harvard University) assess market-based governance from four perspectives: The demand side deals with new, revised, or newly important forms of interaction between government and the market where the public sector is the customer. Chapters in this section include Steve Kelman on federal procurement reform, Karen Eggleston and Richard Zeckhauser on contracting for health care, and Peter Frumkin. The supply side section deals with unsettled questions about government's role as a provider (rather than a purchaser) within the market system. Contributors include Georges de Menil, Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise. A third section explores experiments with market-based arrangements for orchestrating accountability outside government by altering the incentives that operate inside market institutions. Chapters include Robert Stavins on market-based environmental policy, Archon Fung on social markets, and Cary Coglianese and David Lazer. The final section examines both the upside and the downside of the market-based approach to improving governance. Contributors include Elaine Kamarck, John D. Donahue, Mark Moore, and Robert Behn. An introduction by John D. Donahue frames market-based governance as an effort to engineer into public work some of the intensive accountability that characterizes markets without surrendering the extensive accountability of conventional government. A preface by Joseph S. Nye Jr. sets the book in the context of a larger inquiry into the future of governance.

After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs, and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences.

Paul De Grauwe examines why a healthy mix of market and state seems so difficult and analyses the internal and external limits of the market and the government, and the swing between these two points.

A Brookings Institution Press and Visions of Governance for the 21st Century publication Changing markets are challenging governance. The growing scale, reach, complexity, and popular legitimacy of market institutions and market players are re-opening old questions about the role of the public sector and redefining what it means to govern well. This volume—the latest publication from the Visions of Governance in the 21st Century program at the Kennedy School of Government—explores the way evolving markets alter the pursuit of cherished public goals. John D. Donahue and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. frame the inquiry with an essay on governing well in an age of ascendant markets. Other contributors (all from Harvard's Kennedy School unless otherwise indicated) address specific areas of market governance in individual chapters: Joseph P. Newhouse on the medical marketplace, Jose Gomez-Ibañez and John R. Meyer on transportation, William Hogan on electric power, Paul E. Peterson on K–12 education, L. Jean Camp on information networks, Akash Deep and Guido Schaefer (Vienna University of Economics & Business Administration) on federal deposit insurance, Frederick Schauer on "the marketplace of ideas," Anna Greenberg on the "marketization" of politics, David M. Hart on the politics of high-tech industry, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger on information law, John D. Donahue and Richard J. Zeckhauser on the challenges posed by fast-changing markets, and Mark Moore on the spread of market ideology.

This text studies transaction cost economics, influential in economic thought on how institutions work. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes it in organizational terms, as a governance structure.

Public managers can, to a certain extent, choose between various mana- ment paradigms which are provided by public and business administration scholars and by politicians as well. How do they find their way in this c- fusing supermarket of competing ideas? This book explores how public managers in Western bureaucracies deal with the mutually undermining ideas of hierarchical, network and market governance. Do they possess a specific logic of action, a rationale, when they combine and switch - tween these governance styles? This chapter sets the scene for the book as a whole and presents the - search topic and the research question. 1.1 Problem setting Since the Second World War, Western public administration systems have changed drastically. The hierarchical style of governing of the 1950s to the 1970s was partly replaced by market mechanisms, from the 1980s - wards. In the 1990s, a third style of governing, based on networks, further enriched the range of possible steering, coordination and organisation - terventions. In the new millennium, public sector organisations seem to apply complex and varying mixtures of all three styles of what we will - fine as governance in a broad sense. This development has brought about two problems.

This paper proposes an operational interpretation of the concept of economic governance. It argues that the capacity of governments to credibly ensure a secure economic environment provides an important benchmark against which governance can be evaluated. Such an environment—which is essential for sustained growth in a market economy—can be established through a rules–based system which ensures freedom of entry into the market, access to information, and sanctity of contracts. Since creating a secure economic environment involves profound, far–reaching social change, it has historically been a complex and lengthy process in most societies. However, basing policy prescriptions on this benchmark helps avoid possible conflicts between different social and moral values.