Fact finding in judicial proceedings is a dynamic process. This collection of papers considers whether computational methods or other formal logical methods developed in disciplines such as artificial intelligence, decision theory, and probability theory can facilitate the study and management of dynamic evidentiary and inferential processes in litigation. The papers gathered here have several epicenters, including (i) the dynamics of judicial proof, (ii) the relationship between artificial intelligence or formal analysis and "common sense," (iii) the logic of factual inference, including (a) the relationship between causality and inference and (b) the relationship between language and factual inference, (iv) the logic of discovery, including the role of abduction and serendipity in the process of investigation and proof of factual matters, and (v) the relationship between decision and inference.

As a result of recent scandals concerning evidence and proof in the administration of criminal justice - ranging from innocent people on death row in the United States to misuse of statistics leading to wrongful convictions in The Netherlands and elsewhere - inquiries into the logic of evidence and proof have taken on a new urgency both in an academic and practical sense. This study presents a broad perspective on logic by focusing on inference not just in isolation but as embedded in contexts of procedure and investigation. With special attention being paid to recent developments in Artificial Intelligence and the Law, specifically related to evidentiary reasoning, this book provides clarification of problems of logic and argumentation in relation to evidence and proof. As the vast majority of legal conflicts relate to contested facts, rather than contested law, this volume concerning facts as prime determinants of legal decisions presents an important contribution to the field for both scholars and practitioners.

This book provides an overview of computer techniques and tools — especially from artificial intelligence (AI) — for handling legal evidence, police intelligence, crime analysis or detection, and forensic testing, with a sustained discussion of methods for the modelling of reasoning and forming an opinion about the evidence, methods for the modelling of argumentation, and computational approaches to dealing with legal, or any, narratives. By the 2000s, the modelling of reasoning on legal evidence has emerged as a significant area within the well-established field of AI & Law. An overview such as this one has never been attempted before. It offers a panoramic view of topics, techniques and tools. It is more than a survey, as topic after topic, the reader can get a closer view of approaches and techniques. One aim is to introduce practitioners of AI to the modelling legal evidence. Another aim is to introduce legal professionals, as well as the more technically oriented among law enforcement professionals, or researchers in police science, to information technology resources from which their own respective field stands to benefit. Computer scientists must not blunder into design choices resulting in tools objectionable for legal professionals, so it is important to be aware of ongoing controversies. A survey is provided of argumentation tools or methods for reasoning about the evidence. Another class of tools considered here is intended to assist in organisational aspects of managing of the evidence. Moreover, tools appropriate for crime detection, intelligence, and investigation include tools based on link analysis and data mining. Concepts and techniques are introduced, along with case studies. So are areas in the forensic sciences. Special chapters are devoted to VIRTOPSY (a procedure for legal medicine) and FLINTS (a tool for the police). This is both an introductory book (possibly a textbook), and a reference for specialists from various quarters.

In this book a theory of reasoning with evidence in the context of criminal cases is developed. The main subject of this study is not the law of evidence but rather the rational process of proof, which involves constructing, testing and justifying scenarios about what happened using evidence and commonsense knowledge. A central theme in the book is the analysis of ones reasoning, so that complex patterns are made more explicit and clear. This analysis uses stories about what happened and arguments to anchor these stories in evidence. Thus the argumentative and the narrative approaches from the research in legal philosophy and legal psychology are combined. Because the book describes its subjects in both an informal and a formal style, it is relevant for scholars in legal philosophy, AI, logic and argumentation theory. The book can also appeal to practitioners in the investigative and legal professions, who are interested in the ways in which they can and should reason with evidence.

This book illustrates the program of Logical-Informational Dynamics. Rational agents exploit the information available in the world in delicate ways, adopt a wide range of epistemic attitudes, and in that process, constantly change the world itself. Logical-Informational Dynamics is about logical systems putting such activities at center stage, focusing on the events by which we acquire information and change attitudes. Its contributions show many current logics of information and change at work, often in multi-agent settings where social behavior is essential, and often stressing Johan van Benthem's pioneering work in establishing this program. However, this is not a Festschrift, but a rich tapestry for a field with a wealth of strands of its own. The reader will see the state of the art in such topics as information update, belief change, preference, learning over time, and strategic interaction in games. Moreover, no tight boundary has been enforced, and some chapters add more general mathematical or philosophical foundations or links to current trends in computer science. The theme of this book lies at the interface of many disciplines. Logic is the main methodology, but the various chapters cross easily between mathematics, computer science, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive and social sciences, while also ranging from pure theory to empirical work. Accordingly, the authors of this book represent a wide variety of original thinkers from different research communities. And their interconnected themes challenge at the same time how we think of logic, philosophy and computation. Thus, very much in line with van Benthem's work over many decades, the volume shows how all these disciplines form a natural unity in the perspective of dynamic logicians (broadly conceived) exploring their new themes today. And at the same time, in doing so, it offers a broader conception of logic with a certain grandeur, moving its horizons beyond the traditional study of consequence relations.

Recent work in artificial intelligence has increasingly turned to argumentation as a rich, interdisciplinary area of research that can provide new methods related to evidence and reasoning in the area of law. Douglas Walton provides an introduction to basic concepts, tools and methods in argumentation theory and artificial intelligence as applied to the analysis and evaluation of witness testimony. He shows how witness testimony is by its nature inherently fallible and sometimes subject to disastrous failures. At the same time such testimony can provide evidence that is not only necessary but inherently reasonable for logically guiding legal experts to accept or reject a claim. Walton shows how to overcome the traditional disdain for witness testimony as a type of evidence shown by logical positivists, and the views of trial sceptics who doubt that trial rules deal with witness testimony in a way that yields a rational decision-making process.

This Handbook draws together leading and emerging scholars to provide a comprehensive critical analysis of international refugee law. This book provides an account as well as a critique of the status quo, setting the agenda for future research in the field.

A global overview of evidentiary reasoning with contributions from leading authorities from different legal traditions and four continents.

This book intends to unite studies in different fields related to the development of the relations between logic, law and legal reasoning. Combining historical and philosophical studies on legal reasoning in Civil and Common Law, and on the often neglected Arabic and Talmudic traditions of jurisprudence, this project unites these areas with recent technical developments in computer science. This combination has resulted in renewed interest in deontic logic and logic of norms that stems from the interaction between artificial intelligence and law and their applications to these areas of logic. The book also aims to motivate and launch a more intense interaction between the historical and philosophical work of Arabic, Talmudic and European jurisprudence. The publication discusses new insights in the interaction between logic and law, and more precisely the study of different answers to the question: what role does logic play in legal reasoning? Varying perspectives include that of foundational studies (such as logical principles and frameworks) to applications, and historical perspectives.

In recent years coherence theories of law and adjudication have been extremely influential in legal scholarship. These theories significantly advance the case for coherentism in law. Nonetheless, there remain a number of problems in the coherence theory in law. This ambitious new work makes the first concerted attempt to develop a coherence-based theory of legal reasoning, and in so doing addresses, or at least mitigates these problems. The book is organized in three parts. The first part provides a critical analysis of the main coherentist approaches to both normative and factual reasoning in law. The second part investigates the coherence theory in a number of fields that are relevant to law: coherence theories of epistemic justification, coherentist approaches to belief revision and theory-choice in science, coherence theories of practical and moral reasoning and coherence-based approaches to discourse interpretation. Taking this interdisciplinary analysis as a starting point, the third part develops a coherence-based model of legal reasoning. While this model builds upon the standard theory of legal reasoning, it also leads to rethinking some of the basic assumptions that characterize this theory, and suggests some lines along which it may be further developed. Thus, ultimately, the book not only improves upon the current state of coherence theory in law, but also contributes to the larger debate about how to articulate a theory of legal reasoning that results in better decision-making.