The reader may learn by participating in a wide variety of bargaining interactions, ranging from co-operative to competitive two-person bargaining to large group negotiations, and equal to unequal power positions.

This text bridges the gulf between theoretical economic principles of negotiation and auction theory and their multifaceted applications in actual practice. It is intended to be a supplement to the already existing literature, as a comprehensive collection of reports detailing experiences and results of very different negotiations and auctions.

"This volume brings together all of Ken Binmore's influential experimental papers on bargaining along with newly written commentary in which Binmore discusses the underlying game theory and addresses the criticism leveled at it by behavioral economists."--BOOK JACKET.

This book provides readers with a comprehensive survey of models of dynamic games in economics, including an extensive coverage of numerous fields of applications. It will also discuss and explain main concepts and techniques used in dynamic games, and inform readers of its major developments while equipping them with tools and ideas that will aid in the formulation of solutions for problems. A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics will interest those who wish to study more about the conceptions, approaches and models that are applied in the domain of dynamic games.

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.

Publisher Fact Sheet Looks at the entire negotiation process from the all-important, but often overlooked, initial planning stages, through opening negotiations, mid-game, end game, & follow up.

Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.

A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.

Steven J. Brams is one of the leading game theorists of his generation. This new edition includes brand new material on topics such as fallback bargaining and principles of rational negotiation.