Brantly investigates how states decide to employ cyber in military and intelligence operations against other states and how rational those decisions are. He contextualizes broader cyber decision-making processes into a systematic expected utility-rational choice approach to provide a mathematical understanding of the use of cyber weapons.

This account of the Pearl Harbor attack denies that the lack of preparation resulted from military negligence or a political plot

How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.

Award-winning journalist Bob Woodward has spent over thirty years in Washington's corridors of power. In All the President's Men it was he, together with Carl Bernstein, who exposed the Watergate scandal and he has been giving us a privileged front-row seat to White-House intrigue and decision-making ever since. With PLAN OF ATTACK he brings his investigative skills to bear on the administration of George W. Bush, and the build-up to war in Iraq. What emerges is a fascinating and intimate portrait of the leading powers in Bush's war council and their allies overseas as they prepare their pre-emptive attack and change the course of history.

Discusses the Allied invasion of Normandy, with extensive details about the planning stage, called Operation Overlord, as well as the fighting on Utah and Omaha Beaches.

Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints. Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective offers implications based on the intelligence perspective, providing both historical background and scientific analysis that draws from the author's vast experience. The book is of utmost value to all those engaged in intelligence work, and to those whose operational or political responsibility brings them in touch with intelligence assessments and the need to authenticate and then adopt them or discount them. Similarly, the book will interest any reader intrigued by decision-making processes that influence individuals and nations at war, and sometimes even shape national destiny. --Ehud Barak, Former Prime Minister of Israel

Based on his first-hand experiences and observations of how the Department of Homeland Security is failing to make America safe, Ervin shows the real threats we face--from nuclear attack to homegrown terrorism. Pushed out by the White House for refusing to sugarcoat its failures, Ervin candidly discusses the circumstances of his departure. He takes the reader inside the decision-making councils of this newest department of the U.S. government, and shows how his team's prescriptions for urgent change were ignored--leaving the US vulnerable to another terrorist attack.

On August 7, 1998, terrorist bombs exploded outside of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing over 250 persons. Over the course of the next two weeks, decision making processes were placed into motion based upon the analysis of intelligence data. These processes culminated in President Clinton's decision to authorize U.S. military attacks against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan on August 21st.