A study of price and the organization of firms using game theory and neoclassical economics.

The Form of the Firm attempts to unveil the nature of the corporation as it exists in modern liberal societies. The author contends that economic theories understate the importance and danger of corporate power, and should be supplemented with a political analysis that foregrounds the sorts of political and moral values at stake in corporate activity.

This volume features a series of essays which arose from a conference on economics, addressing the question: what is the nature of the firm in economic analysis? This paperback edition includes the Nobel Lecture of R.N. Case.

This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.

This book brings together selections from the most influential writings on the internal economic organisation of business firms.

Handbook of Computational Economics: Heterogeneous Agent Modeling, Volume Four, focuses on heterogeneous agent models, emphasizing recent advances in macroeconomics (including DSGE), finance, empirical validation and experiments, networks and related applications. Capturing the advances made since the publication of Volume Two (Tesfatsion & Judd, 2006), it provides high-level literature with sections devoted to Macroeconomics, Finance, Empirical Validation and Experiments, Networks, and other applications, including Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations, Market Design and Electricity Markets, and a final section on Perspectives on Heterogeneity. - Helps readers fully understand the dynamic properties of realistically rendered economic systems - Emphasizes detailed specifications of structural conditions, institutional arrangements and behavioral dispositions - Provides broad assessments that can lead researchers to recognize new synergies and opportunities

Imperfections and Behavior in Economic Organizations analyzes the organization of economic decision making in a contemporary setting. The contributors focus on two important aspects of this analysis. First, they address the issue of imperfect or incomplete information and communication in economic organizations and consider imperfections arising from the interaction of the market organization with its environment. Second, the issue of cooperation in a competitive environment is thoroughly analyzed and alternative social trade organizations are designed to dissipate the allocation problems that arise in these situations.

This incisive Handbook provides a global update on the state of knowledge in cooperatives and mutuals, expertly describing future directions for research and education. Showcasing extensive discussions of cooperative theory, Matthew S. Elliott and Michael A. Boland, and the contributors, assess cooperatives' social, economic and environmental effects and analyse the impact of regional and cultural features that make cooperatives unique.

This innovative text grounds the economic analysis of labor markets and employment relationships in a unified theoretical treatment of labor exchange conditions. In addition to providing thorough coverage of standard topics including labor supply and demand, human capital theory, and compensating wage differentials, the text draws on game theory and the economics of information to study the implications of key departures from perfectly competitive labor market conditions. Analytical results are consistently applied to contemporary policy issues and empirical debates. Provides a coherent theoretical framework for the analysis of labor market phenomena Features graphical in-chapter analysis supplemented by technical material in appendices Incorporates numerous end-of-chapter questions that engage the analysis and anticipate subsequent results Includes innovative chapters on employee compensation methods, market segmentation, income inequality and labor market dynamics Balances theoretical, empirical and policy analysis