The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.

Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory presents a coherent overview of theoretical literature that studies the influence and formation of networks in social and economic situations in which the relations between participants who are not included in a particular participant's network are not of consequence to this participant. The material is organized in two parts. In Part I the authors concentrate on the question how network structures affect economic outcomes. Part II of the book presents the formation of networks by agents who engage in a network-formation process to be able to realize the possible gains from cooperation.

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many of these problems, players are organized according to either a hierarchical structure or a levels structure that restrict players' possibilities to cooperate. In this paper, we propose three new solutions for games with hierarchical structure and characterize them by properties that relate a player's payoff to the payoffs of other players located in specific positions in the structure relative to that player. To define each of these solutions, we consider a certain mapping that transforms any hierarchical structure into a levels structure, and then we apply the standard generalization of the Shapley Value to the class of games with levels structure. The transformations that map the set of hierarchical structures to the set of levels structures are also studied from an axiomatic viewpoint by means of properties that relate a player's position in both types of structure.

Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-)economics that studies the behavior of self-interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are possible. Our aim in this book is to present a survey of work on the computational aspects of cooperative game theory. We begin by formally defining transferable utility games in characteristic function form, and introducing key solution concepts such as the core and the Shapley value. We then discuss two major issues that arise when considering such games from a computational perspective: identifying compact representations for games, and the closely related problem of efficiently computing solution concepts for games. We survey several formalisms for cooperative games that have been proposed in the literature, including, for example, cooperative games defined on networks, as well as general compact representation schemes such as MC-nets and skill games. As a detailed case study, we consider weighted voting games: a widely-used and practically important class of cooperative games that inherently have a natural compact representation. We investigate the complexity of solution concepts for such games, and generalizations of them. We briefly discuss games with non-transferable utility and partition function games. We then overview algorithms for identifying welfare-maximizing coalition structures and methods used by rational agents to form coalitions (even under uncertainty), including bargaining algorithms. We conclude by considering some developing topics, applications, and future research directions.

This book analyzes coalitional control schemes by incorporating concepts of cooperative game theory into a distributed control framework. It considers a networked architecture where the nodes are the agents and the edges are their communication links and either the agents or the links are established as the players of cooperative games related to the cost function of the coalitional schemes. The book discusses various cooperative game theory tools that are used to measure/analyze the players’ features, impose constraints on them, provide alternative methods of game computation, detect critical players inside the control scheme, and perform system partitioning of large-scale systems, such as the Barcelona drinking water network, which is described in a case study.

A mathematical tool for scientists and researchers who work with computer and communication networks, Game Theory in Communication Networks: Cooperative Resolution of Interactive Networking Scenarios addresses the question of how to promote cooperative behavior in interactive situations between heterogeneous entities in communication networking scenarios. It explores network design and management from a theoretical perspective, using game theory and graph theory to analyze strategic situations and demonstrate profitable behaviors of the cooperative entities. The book promotes the use of Game Theory to address important resource management and security issues found in next generation communications networks, particularly heterogeneous networks, for cases where cooperative interactive networking scenarios can be formulated. It provides solutions for representative mechanisms that need improvement by presenting a theoretical step-by-step approach. The text begins with a presentation of theory that can be used to promote cooperation for the entities in a particular interactive situation. Next, it examines two-player interaction as well as interactions between multiple players. The final chapter presents and examines a performance evaluation framework based on MATLAB®. Each chapter begins by introducing basic theory for dealing with a particular interactive situation and illustrating how particular aspects of game theory can be used to formulate and solve interactive situations that appear in communication networks regularly. The second part of each chapter presents example scenarios that demonstrate the applicability and power of the theory—illustrating a number of cooperative interactions and discussing how they could be addressed within the theoretical framework presented in the first part of the chapter. The book also includes simulation code that can be downloaded so you can use some or all of the proposed models to improve your own network designs. Specific topics covered include network selection, user-network interaction, network synthesis, and context-aware security provisioning.

In this book applications of cooperative game theory that arise from combinatorial optimization problems are described. It is well known that the mathematical modeling of various real-world decision-making situations gives rise to combinatorial optimization problems. For situations where more than one decision-maker is involved classical combinatorial optimization theory does not suffice and it is here that cooperative game theory can make an important contribution. If a group of decision-makers decide to undertake a project together in order to increase the total revenue or decrease the total costs, they face two problems. The first one is how to execute the project in an optimal way so as to increase revenue. The second one is how to divide the revenue attained among the participants. It is with this second problem that cooperative game theory can help. The solution concepts from cooperative game theory can be applied to arrive at revenue allocation schemes. In this book the type of problems described above are examined. Although the choice of topics is application-driven, it also discusses theoretical questions that arise from the situations that are studied. For all the games described attention will be paid to the appropriateness of several game-theoretic solution concepts in the particular contexts that are considered. The computation complexity of the game-theoretic solution concepts in the situation at hand will also be considered.

PLAY. We all do it: wordplay, love play, role-play; we play cards, play sport, play the fool, and play around. And that’s just the grown-ups! It features in every aspect of our lives, whether we call it by that or another name. We all do it, but why do we do it? What does it mean to play and what, if any, difference does it make to our lives? Most crucially, and central to the theme of this book, is the question, ‘Does play have a positive impact on our health and wellbeing, and consequently a role in modern healthcare delivery?’ The contributors to this book provide a comprehensive overview of how play and play-based activities can be used throughout the adult lifespan to promote health and wellbeing within the context of healthcare service delivery for patients, their families and communities, and for the staff involved in their care. Responding to current global health concerns such as obesity, coronary heart disease, dementia and mental health, the book argues that play and playfulness offer a means of protection, promotion and recovery of positive health and wellbeing. The human tendency for play and playfulness as essential to personal growth and development lie at the heart of the discussion. This book will be of interest to all those working in health or social care settings, including nursing, social work and allied health students and professionals and those working within the therapeutic disciplines of art therapy, music therapy, and recreation alliances.

Over a period of several centuries, the academic study of risk has evolved as a distinct body of thought, which continues to influence conceptual developments in fields such as economics, management, politics and sociology. However, few scholarly works have given a chronological account of cultural and intellectual trends relating to the understanding and analysis of risks. Risk: A Study of its Origins, History and Politics aims to fill this gap by providing a detailed study of key turning points in the evolution of society's understanding of risk. Using a wide range of primary and secondary materials, Matthias Beck and Beth Kewell map the political origins and moral reach of some of the most influential ideas associated with risk and uncertainty at specific periods of time. The historical focus of the book makes it an excellent introduction for readers who wish to go beyond specific risk management techniques and their theoretical underpinnings, to gain an understanding of the history and politics of risk.