Talk about law often includes reference to ideals of justice, equality or freedom. But what do we refer to when we speak about ideals in the context of law? This book explores the concept of ideals by combining an investigation of different theories of ideals with a discussion of the role of ideals in law. A comparison of the theories of Gustav Radbruch and Philip Selznick leads up to a pragmatist theory of legal ideals, which provides an interesting new position in the debate about values in law between legal positivists and natural law thinkers. Attention for law's central ideals enables us to understand law's autonomous character, while at the same time tracing its connection to societal values. Essential reading for anyone interested in the role of values or ideals in law.

Philip Selznick's wide-ranging writings engaged with fundamental questions concerning society, politics, institutions, law, and morals. Never confined by a single discipline or approach, he proved himself a major figure across a range of fields including sociology, organizations and institutions, leadership, political science, sociology of law, political theory, and social philosophy. This volume, the first book-length treatment of Selznick's ideas, discusses Selznick's various intellectual contributions. Reading across Selznick's work, one appreciates the coherence of his fundamental preoccupations—with the social conditions for frustration and the vindication of values and ideas. Exploring Selznick's insights into the nature and quality of institutional, legal, and social life, the book also examines his particular ways of thinking, concerns, values, and sensibility. Martin Krygier brings to light the coherence of Selznick's fundamental preoccupations, allowing readers to fully engage with his unique insights and distinctive moral-intellectual sensibility.

This book argues that the institutions of law, and the structures of legal thought, are to be understood by reference to a moral ideal. The idea of law is an ideal of freedom, or independence from the power of others. The moral value and justificatory force of law are not contingent uponcircumstance, but intrinsic to its character as law. Doctrinal legal arguments are shaped by rival conceptions of the conditions for realisation of the idea of law.In making these claims, the author rejects the viewpoint of much contemporary legal theory, and seeks to move jurisprudence closer to an older tradition of philosophical reflection upon law, exemplified by Hobbes and Kant. Modern analytical jurisprudence has tended to view these older philosophiesas confused precisely in so far as they equate an understanding of law's nature with a revelation of its moral basis. According to most contemporary legal theorists, the understanding and analysis of existing institutions is quite distinct from any enterprise of moral reflection. But therelationship between ideals and practices is much more intimate than this approach would suggest. Some institutions can be properly understood only when they are viewed as imperfect attempts to realise moral or political ideals; and some ideals can be conceived only by reference to their expressionin institutions.

Over the past two decades Global Legal Pluralism has become one of the leading analytical frameworks for understanding and conceptualizing law in the 21st century. Wherever one looks, there is conflict among multiple legal regimes. Some of these regimes are state-based, some are built and maintained by non-state actors, some fall within the purview of local authorities and jurisdictional entities, and some involve international courts, tribunals, and arbitral bodies, and regulatory organizations. Global Legal Pluralism has provided, first and foremost, a set of useful analytical tools for describing this conflict among legal and quasi-legal systems. At the same time, some pluralists have also ventured in a more normative direction, suggesting that legal systems might sometimes purposely create legal procedures, institutions, and practices that encourage interaction among multiple communities. These scholars argue that pluralist approaches can help foster more shared participation in the practices of law, more dialogue across difference, and more respect for diversity without requiring assimilation and uniformity. Despite the veritable explosion of scholarly work on legal pluralism, conflicts of law, soft law, global constitutionalism, the relationships among relative authorities, transnational migration, and the fragmentation and reinforcement of territorial boundaries, no single work has sought to bring together these various scholarly strands, place them into dialogue with each other, or connect them with the foundational legal pluralism research produced by historians, anthropologists, and political theorists. Paul Schiff Berman, one of the world's leading theorists of Global Legal Pluralism, has gathered over 40 diverse authors from multiple countries and multiple scholarly disciplines to touch on nearly every area of legal pluralism research, offering defenses, critiques, and applications of legal pluralism to 21st-century legal analysis. Berman also provides introductions to every part of the book, helping to frame the various approaches and perspectives. The result is the first comprehensive review of Global Legal Pluralism scholarship ever produced. This book will be a must-have for scholars and students seeking to understand the insights of legal pluralism to contemporary debates about law. At the same time, this volume will help energize and engage the field of Global Legal Pluralism and push this scholarly trajectory forward into another two decades of innovation.

This book brings together twelve of the most important legal philosophers in the Anglo-American and Civil Law traditions. The book is a collection of the papers these philosophers presented at the Conference on Neutrality and Theory of Law, held at the University of Girona, in May 2010. The central question that the conference and this collection seek to answer is: Can a theory of law be neutral? The book covers most of the main jurisprudential debates. It presents an overall discussion of the connection between law and morals, and the possibility of determining the content of law without appealing to any normative argument. It examines the type of project currently being held by jurisprudential scholarship. It studies the different approaches to theorizing about the nature or concept of law, the role of conceptual analysis and the essential features of law. Moreover, it sheds some light on what can be learned from studying the non-essential features of law. Finally, it analyzes the nature of legal statements and their truth values. This book takes the reader a step further to understanding law.

Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and Perspectives enable readers to gain a holistic appreciation of the law by presenting a broad collection of ideas concerning the nature of law. The author draws from a number of social disciplines to provide a rounded sense of what law really is and how it should work in society. The text discusses a wide range of theories and theorists, and also traces the historical developments of Western legal thought from ancient times to the present day. With a focus on the historical and contemporary role of philosophy in the interpretation of law, Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and Perspectives provide a fascinating insight into the development of law and a comprehensive analysis of current legal thought. It is ideal for students of legal theory and jurisprudence, legal history, political philosophy, and legal practitioners and general readers interested in the theories underpinning our legal institutions and framework.

A standard legal resource since its first edition in 1978, this matchless book has proven itself the ideal overview of Dutch law for foreign lawyers. This Fifth Edition fully updates its systematic description of the legal sources, institutions, and concepts in all major fields of law. Recent developments covered include the progressive implementation of standards set by international conventions, the reorganization of the judiciary, the statute on environmental law, and the (re)codification of private international law. The continuing influence of European law is evident in many fields, perhaps most notably in family law. The various chapters are written by experts – scholars and lawyers – in particular fields, and provide an authoritative overview of each field. The historical sources of Dutch law are discussed, as well as Dutch legal culture, judicial organization, legal education, and the legal profession. These chapters are followed by introductions to essential issues of private and public law and labour law. The last chapter examines questions of legal philosophy. The only resource of its kind available, this book is unmatched as a thorough guide to further research. It offers practitioners, particularly foreign lawyers, a quick and reliable way into any area of Dutch law that they may be required to research. It will also be of great value to comparatists (especially those studying the influence of European law on national legal systems), scholars, and students. Like previous editions, the Fifth Edition has been prepared under the auspices of the Netherlands Comparative Law Association.

This book investigates the dynamic intertwinement of law and morality, with a focus on new and developing fields of law. Taking as its starting point the debates and mutual misunderstandings between proponents of different philosophical traditions, it argues that this theoretical pluralism is better explained once law is accepted as an essentially ambiguous concept. Continuing on, the book develops a robust theory of law that increases our grasp on global legal pluralism and the dynamics of law. This theory of legal interactionism, inspired by the work of Lon Fuller and Philip Selznick, also helps us to understand apparent anomalies of modern law, such as international law, the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and horizontal interactive legislation. In an ecumenical approach, legal interactionism does justice to the valuable core of truth in natural law and legal positivism. Shedding new light on familiar debates between authors such as Fuller, Hart and Dworkin, this book is of value to academics and students interested in legal theory, jurisprudence, legal sociology and moral philosophy.

Law can be seen to consist not only of rules and decisions, but also of a framework of institutions providing a structure that forms the conditions of its workable existence and acceptance. In this book Olsen and Toddington conduct a philosophical exploration and critique of these conditions: what they are and how they shape our understanding of what constitutes a legal system and the role of justice within it.