This book provides unique perspectives on the state of the art in multispectral/hyperspectral techniques for early-warning monitoring against chemical, biological and radiological (CB&R) contamination of both surface (e.g. land) and air (e.g. atmospheric) environments through the presentation of a comprehensive survey of the novel spectroscopic methodologies and technologies that are emerging to address the CB&R defense and security challenges of the future. The technical content in this book lends itself to the non-traditional requirements for point and stand-off detection that have evolved out of the US joint services programs over many years. In particular, the scientific and technological work presented seeks to enable hyperspectral-based sensing and monitoring that is in real time and in-line; low in cost and labor requirements; and easy to support, maintain and use in military and security-relevant scenarios.

This book uses the 2001 anthrax attacks as its point of departure for an analysis of the past, present, and future of America's preparedness to deal with major challenges to public health, including bioterrorism and pandemic flu. The study identified the strength and weaknesses of the system while making recommendations for improvements. This allows the U.S. to be better prepared if faced with a larger or different biological threat. This book looks for linkages not only between bioterrorists and pandemic defenses, but also between public health security and the wider field of homeland security. Johnstone highlights some key foundation plans and strategies that are to serve as a basis for public health security. Failure to address these crucial issues not only creates unfounded mandates but also inhibits priority setting, leadership, and accountablity. Bioterror: Anthrax, Influenza, and the Future of Public Health Security utilizes a large number of sources from within both the public health and public policy communities to document how each sector responded to the anthrax attacks and re-emergent infectious diseases, and how those responses have evolved to the present day, As with other areas of homeland security, sustained progress in public health security is not likely until basic questions about funding priorities and leadership are successfully addressed. In the response to the only mass casualty event in the United States since 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and in various emergency simulation exercises such as TOPOFF series, major performance deficiencies have been observed. This book brings together a variety of sources, the best available evidence on the status of the public health security system at three distinct points: before 2001; during and immediately after the anthrax attacks; and in the period from 2004 to the present.

Introduction to Public Health, Fourth Edition offers a thorough, accessible overview of the expanding field of public health for students new to its concepts and actors. Written in engaging, nontechnical language, this best-selling text explains in clear terms the multi-disciplinary strategies and methods used for measuring, assessing, and promoting public health.Packed with illustrative real-world examples, this updated edition provides students with informative discussions of the current technical issues and practical obstacles facing public health practitioners and policymakers alike. Through coverage of new approaches to research and data collection, current best practices in the field, and the social and ethical challenges of devising public policy, Introduction to Public Health, Fourth Edition provides readers with a broad-reaching, practical framework for understanding the multifaceted forces and organizations of today's public health enterprise.

The anthrax attacks in fall 2001 spurred an extensive and costly decontamination effort where many decisions had to be made about which sites required cleanup, what method to use, how to determine the effectiveness of the cleanup, and how "clean" the building had to be for reoccupation. As part of a project funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and managed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the National Research Council was asked to consider the criteria that must be met for a cleanup to be declared successful, allowing the reoccupation of a facility. The report finds that efficiently sampling and characterizing a pathogen is critical for choosing the best remediation strategy. However, there should be no universal standard for deciding when a building is safe to re-enter because varying pathogen amounts and characteristics could require different strategies. The report offers a flowchart for decision-makers that includes questions about the characteristics of the pathogen; how far it has spread; whether it is transmissible between humans; and how long it will survive to pose a threat. The report also recommends that a risk-assessment approach be adopted as part of a strategy for achieving a "socially acceptable" standard for cleanup.