The Chinese Air Force (also known as the People's Liberation Army Air Force - PLAAF) is the third largest air force in the world, with an inventory of almost 2,200 combat aircraft. Against this, the Indian Air Force has a strength of about 860 combat aircraft. Does this make the PLAAF a giant in front of the IAF? The PLAAF may be having an advantage in terms of numbers but mere numbers do not tell the full story. The Chinese Air Force cannot deploy all these aircraft against India. In a meticulously researched analysis, the author argues that PLAAF will have serious limitations in achieving air superiority against the IAF. The limitations of airfield infrastructure and terrain in Tibet severely restrict PLAAF's capabilities to carry out a sustained air campaign against India. Since the 1990s, the Chinese Air Force has been modernising at a rapid pace. The large numbers of obsolete Soviet era fighter aircraft is being replaced by increasing numbers of fourth generation fighters of the SU-27/SU-30/J-10/J-11 class, but the IAF continues to maintain its technological lead, with the SU-30MKI of the IAF being more advanced than the SU-30MKK of PLAAF. India must continue to maintain its technological lead in the coming years. Another advantage the IAF has is in its superior training, but the Chinese are catching up in this field, with greater exposure to international exercises. The main advantage that the PLA has is in its second artillery's conventional capability. The author discusses the second artillery's capabilities and says that China's ballistic and cruise missiles will be a major threat to India, but they cannot incapacitate us. To counter the Chinese missile threat, India must develop similar capabilities with its Agni, Brahmos and Nirbhay missiles. The IAF needs to develop its capabilities in critical areas and exploit PLAAF's limitations, because unlike in 1962, this time, the contest is going to be in the air.

Presents revised and edited papers from a October 2010 conference held in Taipei on the Chinese Air Force. The conference was jointly organized by Taiwan?s Council for Advanced Policy Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the U.S. National Defense University, and the RAND Corporation. This books offers a complete picture of where the Chinese air force is today, where it has come from, and most importantly, where it is headed.

Exposing internal Chinese military documents and restricted-access studies, The Chinese Invasion Threat explores the secret world of war planning and strategy, espionage and national security. The untold story of the most dangerous flashpoint of our times.

Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.

Through extensive primary source analysis and independent analysis, this report seeks to answer a number of important questions regarding the state of China’s armed forces. The authors found that the PLA is keenly aware of its many weaknesses and is vigorously striving to correct them. Although it is only natural to focus on the PLA’s growing capabilities, understanding the PLA’s weaknesses—and its self-assessments—is no less important.

Less than a decade ago, China's air force was an antiquated service equipped almost exclusively with weapons based on 1950s-era Soviet designs and operated by personnel with questionable training according to outdated employment concepts. Today, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) appears to be on its way to becoming a modern, highly capable air force for the 21st century. This monograph analyzes publications of the Chinese military, previously published Western analyses of China's air force, and information available in published sources about current and future capabilities of the PLAAF. It describes the concepts for employing forces that the PLAAF is likely to implement in the future, analyzes how those concepts might be realized in a conflict over Taiwan, assesses the implications of China implementing these concepts, and provides recommendations about actions that should be taken in response.

China's recent reforms have led to unprecedented economic growth; if this continues, China will be able to turn its great potential power into actual power. The result could be, in the very long term, the rise of China as a rival to the United States as the world's predominant power; in the nearer term, China could become a significant rival in the East Asian region. In this context, the issue for U.S. policy is how to handle a rising power, a problem that predominant powers have faced many times throughout history. It is the contention of this report that the future Sino-U.S. context will illustrate many of the problems of deterrence theory that have been discussed in recent decades; deterrence theory will be, in general, more difficult to apply than it was in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War context. The key may be to seek nonmilitary means of deterrence, i.e., diplomatic ways to manipulate the tension to China's disadvantage.

In late 2015, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) initiated reforms that have brought dramatic changes to its structure, model of warfighting, and organizational culture, including the creation of a Strategic Support Force (SSF) that centralizes most PLA space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities. The reforms come at an inflection point as the PLA seeks to pivot from land-based territorial defense to extended power projection to protect Chinese interests in the "strategic frontiers" of space, cyberspace, and the far seas. Understanding the new strategic roles of the SSF is essential to understanding how the PLA plans to fight and win informationized wars and how it will conduct information operations.

A RAND study analyzed Chinese and U.S. military capabilities in two scenarios (Taiwan and the Spratly Islands) from 1996 to 2017, finding that trends in most, but not all, areas run strongly against the United States. While U.S. aggregate power remains greater than China’s, distance and geography affect outcomes. China is capable of challenging U.S. military dominance on its immediate periphery—and its reach is likely to grow in the years ahead.